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Abstract
The problem investigated in this thesis is the finance gap experienced by
,
small businesses in Egypt. Such a finance gap is represented in limited access to
institutional finance in general and medium-and long-term finance in particular.
The survey undertaken covered 81 small-scale manufacturing firms (SSMFs) in
the greater Cairo area. A questionnaire was used in order to ascertain the reasons
for the finance gap. The survey also included 9 case studies whose purpose was
to provide more detailed information on various questions regarding finance. In
addition to the survey-based work, this study includes a review of the financial
literature (3 chapters), an overview of the Egyptian economy and an assessment
of the financial resources of Egypt.
This thesis examines the following hypotheses:
(0 The banking service in Egypt is inadequate.
(ii) The owners/managers of small firms are reluctant to employ institutional
finance.
(iii) Institutional finance is more difficult to obtain than non-institutional finance.
(iv) The owners/managers of small firms are unaware of the relative advantages
of institutional finance as compared with some forms of non-institutional finance
(mainly equity capital and retained profits).
The research findings rejected the first hypothesis and proved the rest of the
hypotheses, which represent the reasons for the finance gap experienced by SSMFs
in Egypt. In order to assess their relevance, the research findings were compared
with the financial literature as well as the results of other studies. Finally, some
recommendations were suggested in order to overcome the problems of financing
small businesses in Egypt and give these businesses more access to institutional
finance.
To: Egypt
I love her
more than words can tell
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Abbreviations
CAPMS = Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics.
CBE	 = Central Bank of Egypt.
CD	 = Certificate of Deposit.
DIB	 = Development Industrial Bank.
EIDDC = Engineering and Indusrtrial Design Development Centre.
EPCSSI = Establishment for Productive Cooperation and Small-Scale Industries
GDP	 = Gross Domestic Product
GNP	 = Gross National Product.
IB banks = Investment-and-Business banks.
ISSI	 = Institute of Small-Scale Industries.
LE	 = Livre Egyptienne (Egyptian Pound). Exchange rate on the 3rd of
January, 1990: .C1 = LE 4.163, $1 = LE 2.563.
LSIF(s) = Large-Scale Industrial Firm(s).
LSMF(s) = Large-Scale Manufacturing Firm(s).
MTLT = Medium-Term and Long-Term.
ODEP = Open-Door Economic Policy.
PADH = Public Authority for Developing Handicraftsmen.
PAI	 = Public Authority for Industrialisation.
PAIFZ = Public Authority for Investment and Free Zones.
SIA	 = Social Insurance Agency.
SSIF(s) = Small-Scale Industrial Firm(s).
SSMF(s) = Small-Scale Manufacturing Firm(s).
TA	 = Tax Agency.
Definitions
Feddan = 1.038 acres = 4,200 square metres.
,
Hectare = 10,000 square metres.
Owner-manager(s) = Owner(s) and manager(s) at the same time.
Owner(s)/manager(s) = Owner(s) or manager(s).
Ton = 1,000 kilograms.
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Chapter One
Introduction
1.1. The Finance Gap
1.2. Statement of the Problem
1.2.1. Banque Misr
1.2.2. The Industrial Bank
1.2.3. Commercial Banks
1.2.4. The Development Industrial Bank
1.3. Research Hypotheses
1.4. Research Objectives
1.5. Research Methodology
1.6. Previous Studies
This chapter is, by definition, an introductory one which lays the basis for the
whole study; consequently it may be appropriate to take into consideration that:
(a) The definition of small businesses will not be discussed in this chapter as it will
be discussed later, in chapter seven, in the context of defining small businesses in
Egypt. The main reason is that this chapter, and the theoretical chapters, will
deal with the issue of small business finance in general terms, i.e. the context may
apply to small businesses in general regardless of the different definitions adopted
in different countries.
(b) Small firms engaged in the industrial activity are often referred to, in many
studies, as "small-scale industries", but this study will adopt the term "small-
scale industrial firms". The rationale for this choice is that the former term may
be understood to refer to the scale of the industry rather than the scale of the
firm itself; however, the term "small-scale industries" will be mentioned either as
part of a quotation or as a title of another study.
(c) The main concern of this .study, mainly the empirical study, is small-scale
manufacturing firms (SSMFs) rather than small-scale industrial firms (SSIFs);
this issue will be discussed in detail in chapter seven.
1.1. The Finance Gap:
The issue of the finance gap dates back to 1931, when the Macmillan
Committee (1) in the U.K. reported that small businesses experienced difficul-
ties in raising long-term finance in amounts that were not large enough for a
public issue. This finding has become known in the financial literature as the
Macmillan Gap. Forty years later, in 1971, the Bolton Committee reported that
there was no gap corresponding to the Macmillan Gap, but with the following
reservation:
(1) Report of the Committee on Finance and Industry, Cmnd. 3897, 1931, quoted in James
Bates. The Financing of Small Business. 2nd ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1971)
p. 15.
2
"This is not to say that existing institutional arrangements
are perfect, still less that every small business will be able
to find finance of the type it needs at the price it can afford
to pay', . (2)
On the other hand, Ray and Hutchinson (3)
 argue that a finance gap exists in
two ways: (a) if the marginal return on investments available to small businesses
exceeds their marginal cost of capital, but due to discontinuities in the provi-
sion of finance, funds were not available for otherwise profitable investments; or
(b) if the cost of money to small businesses, including a premium for risk and
loan administration, exceeds the cost of money to large businesses. Such exces-
sive cost, from the viewpoint of Ray and Hutchinson, will deter the investment
and growth of small businesses. It is also argued that a finance gap is mainly
due to the inadequacy of the capital base, on the grounds that small businesses
require equity rather than loan finance. (4)
On the whole, a finance gap may exist in either one or more of the following
forms:
(a) a shortage of long-term finance
(b) discontinuities in the provision of finance
(c) a relatively high cost of finance
(d) an inadequate capital base
However, it can be claimed that these forms neither represent all possible
forms of the finance gap, nor are they confined to a certain country or a group of
countries. In other words, a finance gap might exist in different forms in different
countries, or in different forms in the same country in different times, or it might
(2) Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Small Firms, Cmnd., 4811, London: HMSO, 1971,
p. 188.
(3) Graham H. Ray and Patrick J. Hutchinson, The Financing and Financial Control of Small
Enterprise Development (Aldershot: Gower Publishing Co. Ltd., 1983) P. 26.
(4) J.F. Collins. "Why Deregulating Banks Would Mean a Better Deal for Small Businesses",
Chartered Accountant of Australia, (52) no.9, 1982, pp. 25-8, cited in H.D. Griffiths. "A
Finance Gap for Small Business — is the Situation Improving?", Management Forum,
(12) no.l. March 1986. p. 28.
,
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not even exist at all. Hence, the existence, or magnitude, of a finance gap can be
said to be dependent on:
(a) the relative size of the firm
(b) the degree of sophistication or backwardness of the country's financial system,
which is a consequence of the status of the country's economy
(c) the attitudes of the monetary authorities and the tools they adopt to control
institutional finance
(d) the degree of competition, or monopoly, in the financial markets
(e) the awareness of small business managers of the existence and the relative
advantages of different credit facilities
(f) the governments' involvement in the financing of small businesses.
1.2. Statement of the Problem: 
The author's interest in small business finance in general, and small business
finance in Egypt in particular, was motivated by the following:
(a) the proliferating literature, during the 1980s, in the area of small business
finance
(b) the growing interest amongst international organisations, especially the World
Bank, in fostering small businesses, particularly in developing countries
(c) the growing importance of the role of the industrial sector in sustaining eco-
nomic development
(d) the lack of significant Government schemes to assist small businesses in Egypt,
especially in the area of finance
(e) the lack of significant studies of small businesses in Egypt.
As far as this study is concerned, the problem to be investigated will be
defined via demonstrating the difficulties that faced SSIFs, in obtaining institu-
tional finance, from the establishment of the first indigenous bank in Egypt until
the present time.
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1.2.1. Banque Misr: 
Banque Misr (Bank of Egypt) was found in 1920 as the first bank to be wholly
owned by Egyptians; the main concern of this bank was lo develop the Egyptian
economy in almost all areas. To do so, Banque Misr established, shared in and
lent to many businesses in the country, especially industrial firms. In 1922 both
the Government and Banque Misr directed their attention to SSIFs when the
Government deposited LE 100,000 in the Bank for allocation to the financing of
SSIFs; this amount was increased until it reached LE 300,000. (5) According to the
Bank's lending terms, the maximum loan maturity was five years and businessmen
were required to provide enough collateral, usually, through real-estate pledging.
Many businessmen did not have the required collateral, and Banque Misr did not
accept the pledging of machinery as collateral for loans; accordingly, this attempt
failed and almost all the lending of the Bank was directed towards large-scale
industrial firms (LSIFs) that had the required collateral. (6)
1.2.2. The Industrial Bank: 
This bank was licensed in 1947 and started to operate in 1949 with a paid-up
capital of LE 1.5 million of which the Government's share was 51 percent. (7)
The inauguration of the Industrial Bank was to fill a gap in financing industrial
firms, especially SSIFs after the unsuccessful experience of SSIFs with Banque
Misr during the 1920s and 1930s. The main purpose of the Industrial Bank was
to extend short-term as well as long-term loans to SSIFs, provided that they
had a sound financial position and enough collateral. The major part of the
Bank's lending was directed towards private-sector firms until 1964 when it started
concentrating on financing public-sector companies; however, private-sector firms
(5) Mohammed H. Al-Zahar, "The Role of Small-Scale Industries in the Egyptian Economy:
with Special Reference to their Financing Problem", Egyptian Review for Commercial
Studies, (El-Mansourah University), (6) no.2, 1982 (in Arabic) p. 37.
(6) Ibid.. p. 38.
(7) "The Development Industrial Bank (DIB) in Ten Years", a report published on the lath
anniversary of the DIB, Cairo: DIB, 1986 (in Arabic) p. 12.
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regained their position as the Bank's major borrowers during the years 1969 and
1970. (8) The loans to SSIFs represented a small fraction of the Bank's total loans
as shown in the following table:
Table 1.1. The Industrial Bank's loans to SSIFs as compared to other borrowers,
1964/65 — 1969/70.
1964/65 1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70
Borowers LE % LE % LE % LE % LE % LE %
000 000 000 000 000 000
r-
SSIFs 19 1.6 228 9.0 246 5.1 547 13.8 638 10.8 1,001 12.2
Other
borrowers* 1,150 98.4 2,296 91.0 4,535 94.9 3,426 86.2 5,296 89.2 7,222 87.8
Total 1,169 100 2,524 100 4,781 100 3,973 100 5,934 100 8,223 100
* Embraces: public-sector companies, private-sector LSIFs and the cooperative sector.
Source: Compiled from Mamdouh F. Al-Sharqawy, "Means and Methods of Developing
Small-Scale Industries in Egypt", Cairo: Development Industrial Bank (DIB),1981, (in
Arabic) pp. 83-4.
As shown in the table, the Industrial Bank's loans to SSIFs had been in-
creasing in both amount and relative importance through the stated period. This
was due to the percentage increase in loans to these firms being in excess of the
percentage increase in loans to other borrowers and/or the Bank's total loans.
In the financial year 1967/68 loans to SSIFs reached their peak, accounting for
13.8 percent of the Bank's total loans, as a result of an increase in loan amounts
to these firms while both loans to other borrowers and the Bank's total loans
decreased simultaneously. Nevertheless, whether considered in absolute amounts
or in percentages, loans to SSIFs did not represent a significant proportion of the
Industrial Banks's loan portfolio. However, in 1971 SSIFs became worse off when
the Industrial Bank was amalgamated with the Bank of Alexandria, and these
(8) Mainclouh F. Al-Sharqawy, "Means and Methods of Developing Small-Scale Industries in
Egypt", Cairo: DID. 1981 (in Arabic) p. 83.
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firms were left without a specialised bank.
1.2.3. Commercial Banks: 
,
Also in 1971 the functional specialisation, among commercial banks, was
implemented. (9) According to this system each bank was assigned the financing
of a specific economic activity; such specialisation was applied to the banks' deal-
ings with public-sector companies and the private sector was left free to deal with
all banks. In this regard it is worth mentioning that the banking sector in Egypt,
during the period 1961-1973, consisted of only public-sector banks. As far as the
industrial sector was concerned, public-sector companies had to deal only with
the Bank of Alexandria while private-sector firms had the choice of dealing with
any bank. Hence, commercial banks gave priority to public-sector companies in
their lending practices; being state-owned, these companies were not denied any
credit although they owed the banks substantial amounts of money in arrears. (10)
However, the National Bank of Egypt was regarded as the most willing com-
mercial bank to lend to SSIFs in the 1970s. Nevertheless, its loans to SSIFs in
1975 amounted to only LE 0.5 million, mainly short-term loans, while its loan
portfolio amounted to LE 1,400 million. (II) These loans to SSIFs accounted for
only 0.04 percent of the Bank's loan portfolio, and this is an indication of the
insignificant amount of finance provided to these firms. In a study of SSIFs en-
gaged in the textile industry the Institute of National P1anning (12) showed that
medium-and long-term loans provided to all SSIFs by commercial banks were
(9) Republican decree no. 2422 of 1971.
(10) Mahrous A. Hasan, "An Appraisal of Lending Policies in the Egyptian Commercial Banks",
(Cairo: Ain Shams University, M.B.A. thesis, 1980) (in Arabic) p. 153.
(11) Khalid Ikram (Coordinating Author), Egypt: Economic Management in a Period of
Transition (Published for the World Bank, Baltimor: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1980) p. 250.
(12) The Institute of National Planning. "Small-Scale Industries and Industrial Development:
a Case Study of the Textile Industry in Egypt". Cairo: the Institute of National Planning.
1981 (in Arabic) p. 149.
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insignificant, as indicated by the following figures:
(a) loans from the National Bank of Egypt to SSIFs for the financing of machinery
accounted for 13.6 percent of the Bank's loans to these firms;
,
(b) loans from Banque du Caire (Cairo Bank) to SSIFs for the financing of ma-
chinery accounted for only 3.6 percent of the Bank's loans to these firms; and
(c) loans from both Banque Misr and the Bank of Alexandria were confined to
short-term loans for the financing of raw materials.
1.2.4. The Development Industrial Bank: 
Five years after the amalgamation of the Industrial Bank with the Bank of
Alexandria in 1971, the Development Industrial Bank (DIB) was inaugurated
in August 1976. According to its statute, the main purpose of the DIB is the
promotion of Egyptian industry especially SSIFs, cooperatives and handicraft es-
tablishments, via the following measures: (13)
(a) carrying out feasibility studies for new projects that apply for finance from
the Bank
(b) advancing secured as well as unsecured loans as follows:
— short-term loans for no more than 12 months to finance short-teim
operations
— medium-term loans for no more than 5 years to finance raw-material needs
and other production operations
— long-term loans for no more than 25 years to finance the expansion of
projects and replacement operations
(c) participating in industrial projectc
(d) helping graduates of technical schools and patentees to launch industrial
projects
(e) investing excess funds in shares and bonds.
(13) The DIB in Ten Years, op. cit.. p. 16.
8
The DIB is a state-owned bank whose capital is wholly owned by the Central
Bank of Egypt (CBE), and its balance sheet is shown in the following table:
Table 1.2. The DIB's balance sheet on June 30, 1986
Assets / Liabilities LE 000 %
Assets:
Cash in hand and with banks 19,296 3.00
Loans, investments and participations 555,637 94.00
Fixed assets and other debit balances 17,929 3.00
Total assets 592,862 100
Liabilities:
Deposits and current accounts 41,557 7.00
Banks' dues 175,182 29.55
Creditors 57,615 9.72
Provisions 67,602 11.40
Loans from international organizations 212,792 35.90
Net worth 38,114 6.43
Total liabilities 592,862 100
Source: DID. "Annual Report: 1985/86", Cairo: DIB, 1987, p. 17.
The DIB's balance sheet shows that the main source of funds for the Bank is
loans from international organisations accounting for 35.9 percent of total liabili-
ties. These organisations are, mainly, the European Community, the World Bank,
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and many oth-
ers. Loans from such organisations are advanced to the DIB on favourable terms in
order to enable it to sustain industrial enterprises in Egypt in general, and SSIFs
in particular. The second major component of the DiB's liabilities is banks' dues
(29.55 percent of total liabilities), as the Bank obtains loans (mainly long-term)
from the CBE, as well as other banks, in order to finance its long-term opera-
tions. Unlike commercial banks, the DIB (as a specialised bank) does not accept
9
demand deposits as one of its main activities; (14) and this conforms to the nature
of its operations that have mainly long-term maturities. As for the Bank's assets,
they are shown in the balance sheet in aggregate figures which makes it difficult to
assess the magnitude of each component of the most important assets, i.e. loans,
investments and participations. However, some details about the Bank's loans
are available, and this helps in investigating these loans as shown in the following
table:
. (14) Article 43 of law no. 163 of 1957 and article 16 of law no. 120 of 1975.
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Table 1.3 shows that the DIB finances not only SSIFs, but also handicraft
activities (very small industrial firms) or what the Bank calls "very small indus-
tries". In this regard, it is apparent from the table that total loans to very small
,
industrial firms (VSIFs) account for 15.2 percent of the Bank's total loans, total
loans to SSIFs account for 12.9 percent and total loans to other sectors account
for 71.9 percent. If both VSIFs and SSIFs are considered as one group, they will
account for only 28.1 percent of the Bank's total loans vis-a-vis 71.9 percent for
other sectors. In this respect, it can be claimed that those other sectors are mainly
large-scale industrial firms (LSIFs) on the grounds that they obtained 170 loans
amounting to LE 150,404 thousand, and this results in an average loan amount
of LE 885 thousand (150,404/170). On the other hand, the average loan amount
for VSIFs is LE 48.6 thousand, and the average loan amount for SSIFs is LE 105
thousand. This means that each single loan to a firm from the other sectors is
equivalent to 18 loans to VSIFs and 8 loans to SSIFs; and this may emphasise
that those other sectors are mainly LSIFs.
Nevertheless, it may be argued that the DIB finances more small than large
firms, on the grounds that it advanced 655 loans to VSIFs and 258 loans to SSIFs,
compared with only 170 loans to other sectors. Such an argument is refutable
because:
(a) the number of loans does not correspond to the number of firms that deal with
the Bank, simply because each firm can obtain as many as three loans according
to the categories shown in table 1.3; and
(b) even if the number of loans is assumed to correspond to the number of firms,
which is not realistic, this number represents only a tiny fraction of small firms
in Egypt (in 1986 there were at least 3,000 SSIFs in Egypt; the number of VSIFs
is not known but it should be much more than the number of SSIFs).
Concerning the shares of different sectors in loans according to maturity,
both VSIFs and SSIFs account together for 48.9 percent of short-term loans,
12
compared with 51.1 percent for other sectors. As regards medium-and long-term
loans (MTLT loans), other sectors dominate these loans in both local currency
(72.2 percent) and foreign currencies (78.8 percent). If all MTLT loans in all
-
currencies are considered, other sectors will account for 76.1 percent of these
loans compared with 23.9 percent for both VSIFs and SSIFs together. On the
other hand, the average size of an MTLT loan to other sectors (in all currencies)
is LE 981 thousand, vis-a-vis LE 47.7 thousand for VSIFs and LE 105.9 thousand
for SSIFs. These figures indicate that (a) the dominance of other sectors is more
evident in MTLT loans than it is in short-term loans; and (b) these other sectors,
once again, are mainly LSIFs. In this regard, the relatively small share of SSIFs
in the DIB's loans in general and in MTLT loans in particular implies that:
(a) the DIB is reluctant to lend to SSIFs; or
(b) the Bank imposes difficult lending terms on th.ese firms; or
(c) many SSIFs have alternative sources of finance, particularly MTLT finance;
Or
(d) the owners/managers of SSIFs are reluctant to borrow from the DIB for some
unknown reasons.
On the whole, the pros of the DIB are:
(a) It is more keen on providing MTLT loans, especially to SSIFs, than commer-
cial banks.
(b) It allocates a reasonable proportion of its loans for the financing of new busi-
nesses; at the end of June 1986 loans to new businesses accounted for 46.6 of the
Bank's total loans. (15)
(C) It represents a good source of foreign-currency finance which SSIFs need for
the importation of raw materials and/or machinery.
On the other hand, the cons of the DIB are:
(a) It has only three branches, one in Cairo, one in Alexandria and one in Tanta,
(15) DIR. "Annual Report: 1985/86", Cairo: DI13. 1987, p. 22.
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all located in northern Egypt; even the other three branches under construction
are located in northern Egypt (the 10th of Ramadan city, the 6th of October city,
and Port Saeid city).
-
(b) As a consequence of branch location, the Bank's lending is concentrated in
the north of the country; the total loans which the DIB advanced between 1976
and 1986 are distributed as 73.4 percent in northern Egypt, 12.8 percent in new
cities (which are mainly in northern Egypt), 10.4 percent in southern Egypt and
3.4 percent in the Suez Canal zone. (16)
(c) As discussed above, the major proportion of the Bank's loans are directed
towards LSIFs rather than SSIFs.
(d) From tables 1.2 and 1.3 above the DIB's total loans (LE 209,247 thousand)
account for only 37.7 percent of the Bank's loans, investments and participations
(LE 555,637 thousand), and these investments and participations are not known,
i.e. whether they are in SSIFs or LSIFs, in new businesses or in existing businesses,
... etc.
From the preceding context, it can be noticed that SSIFs face the following
difficulties:
(a) Banks usually require collaterals for loans to small firms, and some of these
firms cannot provide such collaterals.
(b) Small firms face tough competition from large firms when seeking to obtain
institutional finance.
(c) Commercial-bank credit provided to small firms, mainly MTLT loans, may be
regarded as insignificant.
(d) Some small firms have no access to the DIB because of the concenttation of
the Bank's activity in a particular part of the country.
(e) The major part of the DIB's loans, especially MTLT loans, is directed to large
firms rather than small firms.
(16) Ibid.. p. 19.
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Accordingly, the problem which faces small firms in Egypt can be diagnosed
as a finance gap represented in limited access to institutional finance in general,
and MTLT finance in particular.
1.3. Research Hypotheses: 
Given the diagnosis of the problem as limited access to institutional finance,
this study is based on the following hypotheses:
(i) The banking service in Egypt is inadequate.
(ii) The owners/managers of small firms are reluctant to employ institutional
finance.
(iii) Institutional finance is more difficult to obtain than non-institutional finance.
(iv) The owners/managers of small firms are unaware of the relative advantages
of institutional finance as compared with some forms of non-institutional finance
(mainly equity capital and retained profits).
1.4. Research Objectives: 
This study has two objectives:
(i) Testing the validity of the above-mentioned hypotheses.
(ii) Suggesting some practical solutions to the problems that small firms encounter
in obtaining the necessary finance, mainly institutional finance.
1.5. Research Methodology:
In order to achieve its objectives, this study adopts both theoretical and em-
pirical approaches as follows:
(a) The theoretical approach depends on providing a background on finance in
general, and small business finance in particular. This will be achieved by re-
viewing the theory of finance and its relevance to small businesses; in this regard,
references will be made to the experience of some developed countries, especially
the U.K.
15
(b) In order to provide a background on the environment in which small firms
exist, the study contains an overview of the Egyptian economy and its position
at the present time.
,
(c) Also, the finance resources of Egypt, mainly institutional finance resources,
will be investigated in order to assess their magnitude and the way they are
directed.
(d) As for the empirical study, details of the survey's methodology are provided
in chapter seven.
(e) Finally, the study concludes by a summary of the results and the findings
that can be deduced from these results. On the basis of the survey findings, the
conclusion includes some suggestions for solving the problems of financing small
businesses in Egypt; these suggestions will take into account the limitations and
considerations that could be found in a country like Egypt.
1.6. Previous Studies: 
To the author's knowledge this is the first survey-based study of small business
finance in Egypt. Most of the studies of small businesses are mainly papers that
deal with general aspects of small businesses, and the main source of information
for such papers is the published data. However, there are only two studies of
small businesses in Egypt that might be regarded as significant compared with
the others; even though, these studies deal with many aspects of SSIFs where the
issue of finance has little attention. An outline of these two studies is provided
below.
The first study is entitled: "Small-Scale Industries and Industrial Develop-
ment: a Case Study of the Textile Industry in Egypt". This study was prepared
by a team of four scholars and a team of assistants at the Institute of National
Planning in 1981. The objective of this study was to demonstrate the role of
SSIFs in industrial development in general and their role in industrial develop-
16
ment in Egypt in particular; it consists of eight chapters as follows:
Chapter one: The Objective and Methodology of the Study.
Chapter two: The Concept of Small-Scale Industries.
..
Chapter three: The Participation of Small-Scale Industries in the Industrial
Development in Egypt and Japan.
Chapter four: The Expected Role of Small-Scale Industries in the Industrial
Development in Egypt.
Chapter five: Financial Analysis of Small-Scale Industries: the Case of the
Textile Industry.
Chapter six: Internal Problems that Small-Scale Industries Encounter.
Chapter seven: External Problems that Small-Scale Industries Encounter.
Chapter eight: Recommendations for Sustaining Small-Scale Industries.
As far as finance is concerned, it is dealt with in two sections, among eight
sections, of chapter six. This did not give scope for a detailed investigation of the
problem of finance and its implications.
The second study is entitled: "Small-Scale Industries in the Egyptian Econ-
omy: an Analytical Study". This study is a master's thesis in economics at Cairo
University, prepared by Ola A.H. El-Sheikh in 1985; it consists of three chapters
as follows:
Chapter one: The Concept of Small-Scale Industries and their Expected Role in
Economic Development.
Chapter two: An Analytical Study of the Status of Small-Scale Industries in the
Egyptian Industrial Structure.
Chapter three: Strategy and Programmes for Reviving Small-Scale Industries in
Egypt.
It is worth mentioning that the latter study, as well as the former one, incor-
porates handicraft activities as well as SSIFs, although they are quite different as
17
will be discussed later. Concerning the issue of finance, it was dealt with briefly
in the last chapter, i.e. a brief description of finance facilities available to SSIFs
in Egypt.
..
The scope of the above-mentioned studies suggests that there is a lack of
work in the area of small business finance in Egypt; such a lack of work gives a
reasonable justification for this study and highlights its importance. Also, this
study comes at a time when the Egyptian Government is giving an increasing
attention to SSIFs as a useful vehicle for economic development in general and
industrial development in particular.
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Chapter Two
Short-Term Finance
2.1. The Matching of Maturities
2.2. The Main Sources of Short-Term Finance
2.2.1. Trade Credit
2.2.2. Bank Short-Term Credit
2.2.2.1. Secured Short-Term Credit
2.2.2.2. Unsecured Short-Term Credit
2.3. Short-Term Finance and Small Businesses
2.3.1. The Cost of Short-Term Finance
2.3.2. The Relationship with Creditors
2.3.3. The Features of Small Business Finance
2.1. The Matching of Maturities: 
It is commonly known, in the financial literature, that the financing of any
business enterprise should be based on matching the maturities of both assets and
sources of finance. In other words, short-term current assets should be financed
by short-term sources, and both fixed assets and the permanent part of current
assets should be financed by long-term sources. This matching of maturities is
not an easy task, especially for newly-established firms that have to predict their
financing needs which depend on their investment plans (both short-term and
long-term). These plans, in turn, depend on the firm's expected market share
and the availability, and cost, of each financing source. For well-established firms,
the matching of the maturities of both assets and financing sources depends, to
a large extent, on their experience in the realms of business; even though, such
a matching might involve significant difficulties in times of bad sales or tight
financial markets. However, bad sales and tight financial markets are deemed to
be the exception rather than the common practice.
In this respect, some scholars regard the firm's financing needs on an aggregate
basis, in the sense that they define the total cost of both current assets and fixed
assets as the firm's "cumulative capital requirement". This cumulative capital
requirement should be financed, mainly, by long-term sources; accordingly, from
their point of view, the raised long-term finance will determine whether the firm
is a short-term borrower or lender. (1) The implications of this viewpoint are:
(a) if the raised long-term finance exactly meets the firm's cumulative capital
requirement, this firm will face no problem; (b) if the raised long-term finance is
less than the firm's cumulative capital requirement, it has to borrow on a short-
term basis to bridge the gap; and (c) if the raised long-term finance exceeds the
firm's cumulative capital requirement, this firm has the opportunity to invest the
(1) Richard Brea1cy and Stewart Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance (New York: McGraw.
Hill Book Co.. 1984) pp. 617-18.
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excess raised funds on a short-term basis. On the whole, this viewpoint suggests
that long-term finance is the determinant of short-term finance; but this seems
questionable because:
-
(a) Concerning the assumption of long-term finance being in excess of the firm's
cumulative capital requirement, first of all, why should the firm raise funds in
excess of its needs? And if this happens, it means that the firm has to look
for other uses for the excess funds either by lending them, if applicable, or by
investing them in marketable securities. This approach has two implications:
first, the return on the investment of the excess funds must be greater than or,
at least, equal to the cost of long-term finance; second, this raises the issue of
evaluating different investment opportunities and the time elapsed therein.
(b) Even if the raised long-term finance exactly meets the firm's cumulative capital
requirement, this means that some short-term assets are financed by long-term
sources which results in the payment of interest on unused funds, although this
may happen only in certain times during the year.
(c) When the raised long-term finance lags behind the firm's cumulative capital
requirement and the difference is covered by short-term finance, this raises the
issue of the suitability of the raised short-term finance for the firm's financing
needs (as this approach may result in financing long-term assets by short-term
sources that will be due well before the maturity of such assets).
As far as debt maturity is concerned, some scholars argue that there are
strong similarities between a lengthy financing relationship involving a sequence
of short-term loans and loans with a long formal maturity. (2) This argument is
based on the notion that a long-standing lender-borrower relationship will allow
the formal short maturity of loans to be informally extended in a bad year which
makes the "effective" maturity of such loans indefinitely long. In other words,
(2) Stephen H. Archer, G. Marc Choates and George Racette, Financial Management. 2nd
ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1983) pp. 684-5.
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according to this viewpoint, short-term loans are often granted with the mutual
expectation between the firm and the bank that the loan will be renewed. Such
a viewpoint, also, seems debatable because:
(a) According to this viewpoint, the "strong" similarities between a sequence
of short-term loans and loans with long formal maturities are attributed to the
renewal of short-term loans in a bad year. As mentioned earlier, bad years are
deemed to be the exception rather than the common practice.
(b) Neither the borrower nor the lender should "often" make a short-term loan
with the expectation of its renewal. This is because the borrower's application
for a short-term loan should be based on his exact financing needs as predicted
or planned, and the lender should advance the loan after assessing the borrower's
financing needs and their justifications.
(c) If the borrower is not sure of the length of his financing needs he can arrange
a flexible form of short-term finance such as an overdraft or a line of credit.
(d) The frequent renewal of short-term loans, on the part of the borrower, might
jeopardize his relationship with the lender as the latter plans the uses of his funds
according to the maturities of these funds, and such a renewal may deter his plans.
(e) When all these factors are taken into consideration and some unpredicatabie
hazards occur, the lender is not expected to reject the circumstantial renewal of
a short-term loan.
Hence, it can be said that the matching of maturities should be considered
as the basis of determining the firm's financing needs in order to avoid the con-
sequences of the unmatched maturities. Also, the financial manager should base
his financing decisions on facts or, to say the least, on sound planning rather than
on a "comfortable" financing policy.
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2.2. The Main Sources of Short-Term Finance: 
A review of the financial literature may reveal that there are many sources
of short-term finance; however, this chapter is concerned with the most common
sources of short-term finance for business enterprises in general and for small
businesses in particular, namely trade credit and bank short-term credit.
2.2.1. Trade Credit: 
Trade credit can be considered as one of the most traditional sources of finance
for all business enterprises both large and small. This kind of credit arises when
the manufacturer, or wholesaler, of raw materials, or resale goods, provides the
buyer with such commodities without requiring immediate payment. The seller
of goods, however, may ask the buyer to sign a promissory note as a guarantee
for the debt. In any case, trade credit is provided against a satisfactory track
record, for old customers, or after assessing the creditworthiness of the buyer, for
new customers, as conceived by the seller. The maturity of trade credit is the
grace period granted to the buyer to pay for the purchased goods. This grace
period, which is known as the terms of credit, differs from one seller to another
and may differ from one buyer to another (although dealing with the same seller),
depending on the nature of their activities and their creditworthiness. Also, these
terms of credit may include a cash discount if the buyer repays within a certain
period of time. For example, if the terms of credit are 3 percent/10, net 40 days,
this means that the buyer will be granted a 3 percent cash discount if he repays
within 10 days or, if otherwise, he must repay the full amount of debt within not
more than 40 days.
Although trade credit might involve formal terms of credit and an assessment
of the buyer's creditworthiness, it can be said to represent an informal or a non-
institutional source of finance as it is based, in many cases, on the personal contact
between the buyer and the seller, especially if both of them are small businesses.
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Other advantages of trade credit are: (3)
(a) It represents a continuous form of credit because there is no need for formal
arrangement of financing.
(b) If there are some restrictions in trade credit, they are less than those imposed
by money lenders.
(c) It is a flexible financing method because the firm does not have to pledge any
collateral or adhere to a strict payments schedule.
Also, some firms may stretch the payments of trade credit beyond the agreed-
upon period in order to make the maximum possible use of this facility; but such
a practice might mar the relationship between the firm and its suppliers which
may downgrade the firm's creditworthiness. Even if the firm does not stretch the
repayment beyond the net period, as set-up by the commodity supplier, trade
credit may become noticeably expensive. For example, if the terms of credit are 2
percent/15, net 45 days, the value of the ordered goods is .C10,000, and the firm
decides to repay on the 45th day, this firm will lose 2 percent discount, or .C200,
in order to make use of the amount to be paid, or .C9,800, for extra 30 days. In
this case the annual cost of trade credit is:
200	 365X --= 0.248 or 24.8 percent per annum
9, 800	 30
or, equivalently, it can be calculated as follows:
0.02	 365X	 = 0.248 or 24.8 percent per annum1 — 0.02	 30
These calculations show the significant increase in the cost of trade credit if
the firm chooses not to benefit from the offered discount; of course the cost of
trade credit will increase if the offered discount increases and/or the net period
(3) James C. Van Horne. Financial Management and Policy, 6th ed. (New Jersey: Printice-
Hall. Inc.. 1983) pp. 439-40.
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decreases and vice versa. The main implications of this situation are:
(a) The existence of an early-repayment discount may force the firm to repay in
the early period stated in the terms of credit in order to avoid the relatively high
,
cost of the lost discount.
(b) It may be useful for the purchasing firm to obtain a bank loan, with a maturity
corresponding to the discount period, in order to pay for the purchased goods and
benefit from the discount, as the interest on bank loans is expected to be less than
the cost of the lost discount.
(c) Small businesses are expected to incur a relatively high cost of trade credit if
they cannot afford early repayment depending on their own funds or if they do
not qualify for a bank loan.
(d) It seems that the real benefits of trade credit materialize when the terms of
credit do not include an early-/payment discount.
2.2.2. Bank Short-Term Credit: 
The term bank credit, rather than bank loans, is used in this context as it
incorporates all bank transactions, including loans, which result in providing a
customer with money to be repaid at some date in the future. On the other hand,
the term bank loans is often referred to as a lump sum of money provided to a
customer to be repaid at some date in the future; all forms of bank credit, however,
can be repaid, together with the interest, either as a lump sum or on an instalment
basis. Also, bank credit will be regarded, in this context, to come from commercial
banks rather than any other financial institutions on the grounds that these banks
are the main suppliers of short-term finance for different business enterprises.
Hence, the word bank or banks will be used as a synonym for commercial bank or
commercial banks respectively.
Commercial-bank credit, in general, has a fairly short-term maturity, as a
major part of the sources of funds for these banks is represented in current
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accounts and deposits that are subject to withdrawal without notice such as
savings accounts. Consequently, commercial banks have to maintain a minimum
level of liquidity in their assets in order to cater for customers' withdrawals from
these accounts whenever requested. Also, some banks are conservative in their
lending policies to the extent that their provision of funds, to business enterprises,
is almost confined to short-term and medium-term credit. On the whole, the
maturity of bank short-term credit is often one year or less as it is deemed to
finance short-term or current assets and temporary activities. In this regard,
short-term loans are said to be self-liquidating in the sense that such loans are
provided to finance seasonal or cyclic business peaks which will generate cash
to pay off the loan. (4) In general, short-term credit can be either secured or
unsecured, as discussed below.
2.2.2.1. Secured Short-Term Credit
If a bank credit is secured, this means that the firm pledges part of its assets
as collateral for the provided funds in order to eliminate or reduce loss should
the borrowing firm default; this happens when the firm's ability to repay a loan,
as perceived by the bank, is questionable. The firm's ability to repay the loan
becomes questionable if the bank assesses its creditworthiness as unsatisfactory
or if it is a newly established firm which, by definition, does not have a track
record or financial statements to show to the bank. Some banks, however, ask for
collateral as an extra precaution even if the firm's creditworthiness is assessed to
be satisfactory. In any case they consider the matching between the loan maturity
and the collateral's maturity, i.e. they accept only current assets as collateral for
short-term loans. Also, banks prefer that the value of the collateral exceeds the
loan amount because (a) the loan will be due together with the interest charged;
and (b) to make sure that they will get back the amount due should the collateral's
(4) John J. Hampton, Financial Decision Making: Concepts, Problems and Cases, 3rd ed.
(Virginia: Reston Publishing Co., Inc., 1983) p. 507.
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market value deteriorate in case of liquidation. As for interest rates on secured
loans, they are expected to be higher than the bank's prime rate (5) because:
(a) secured loans are deemed to be advanced to less creditworthy customers; and
(b) there is the transaction cost incurred in assessing and monitoring the collat-
eral.
Secured short-term credit, in general, falls in two main categories: receivables,
or accounts receivable, loans and inventory loans. (6)
Receivables Loans: If a firm makes a significant proportion of its sales on
credit against promissory notes signed by the buyers, it may use these notes as
collateral for a short-term loan should the lender's terms require such collateral.
In this case, the bank will assess both the general quality and the average size
of these accounts receivable in order to determine the maximum amount to be
advanced against them. Usually, the loan represents a certain precentage of the
total value of the accounts receivable, and the remaining percentage is retained
as a safety margin for the bank because of the above-mentioned reasons. This
safety margin, however, depends on the quality of the accounts receivable as well
as the access given to the bank to monitor these accounts.
As an alternative to obtaining a receivable-secured loan, a firm may factor its
accounts receivable by selling them to a factor for a discount from their face value.
In this case the firm does not receive any payments before its accounts receivable
are due. Also, the factoring arrangement may be with or without recourse. A
factoring arrangement with recourse means that the firm bears the risk of its
customers' default while a factoring arrangement without recourse means that
the factor bears the risk of the firm's customers' default. If the firm requires early
payment it may obtain a loan, from the factor, secured by its accounts receivable.
In this case, the factor charges the firm an interest rate, on such a loan, as well as
(5) A bank's prime rate is the interest charged to its best customers
(6) Stephen H. Archer et al.. op. cit.. pp. 704-8; James C. Van Horne, op. cit.. pp. 454-62.
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the factoring fee which ranges between one percent and two percent of the face
value of the accounts receivable. Another phase of factoring is that which arises
when the manufacturer sells his goods to a factor for a discount and this factor
-
will be responsible for collecting the debts; in this case the factor may either pay
immediately or on the maturity date of the debts. (7) A factoring arrangement
seems to be a suitable means of finance for small businesses, especially if it is
without recourse, as it relieves them of following up their accounts receivable and
the cost incurred therein. Also, a factoring arrangement may be more useful for
small businesses if it results in immediate payment by the factor provided that
the total cost of factoring does not exceed the cost of a loan secured by accounts
receivable.	 a
Inventory Loans: These loans are, more or less, similar to receivables loans
in the sense that they are advanced against the pledge of current assets, in this
case the firm's inventory. As is the case in receivables loans, the loan represents
a certain percentage of the pledged goods and this percentage varies according
to the marketability of these goods and their resistance to deterioration. Also,
interest rates on such loans are expected to be higher than the bank's prime rate
and the forementioned reasons hold.
As far as small businesses are concerned, the majority of short-term loans
are expected to be secured either by accounts receivable or by inventory for two
reasons: (a) if the firm is newly established, it will have no track record to help
in assessing its creditworthiness; and (b) if the firm has been in the realms of
business for a farily long period of time, its creditworthiness can be held less sat-
isfactory as compared with any other larger firm; in other words, its smallness of
size will imply that it is more vulnerable to market fluctuations as compared with
any other larger firm.
(7) James Bates, The Financing of Small Business, 2nd ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell,
1971) P. 128.
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Documentary Credits: A documentary credit is an agreement between a bank
and its customer according to which terms the former pays an agreed-upon
amount of money, on behalf of the customer, to a third party. This credit is
said to be documentary as it entitles the bank to possess certain documents as
collateral for the advanced credit. Such documents include the bill of lading,
the insurance certificate and any other documents to accompany a cargo of mer-
chandise shipped to the customer by the forementioned third party (the seller).
According to this definition, documentary credits are deemed to be advanced,
mainly, for the financing of imported raw materials or resale goods. Besides these
documents, however, banks usually require their customers to deposit a certain
percentage of the agreed-upon amount of credit as a further guarantee. This
percentage, as well as the interest charged, may vary according to the bank's
assessment of the customer's creditworthiness and his past record if any.
Documentary credits seem to be good facilities for different business enter-
prises whose activities depend, partly or completely, on imported goods because:
(a) when the exporter of goods is paid via bank arrangement, this makes him
more confident in dealing with the importer; (b) it saves the time consumed in
making payments abroad especially if it requires certain procedures; and (c) as
the buyer will pay the bank only a percentage of the price of the imported goods,
documentary credits make such goods available to the buyer without having to
pay their price in full. Compared with large businesses, small businesses may be
in an unfavourable situation as regards their accessibility to documentary credits
because: (a) some cmall businesses may not qualify as documentary-credit cus-
tomers and, consequently, they have to arrange the payments directly with the
exporter who may require cash payments; (b) even if they qualify as documentary-
credit customers, small businesses may be charged a higher interest rate; and (c)
small businesses may be required to deposit a higher percentage of the credit
amount as they may be regarded as less creditworthy,i.e. a small business should
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be in a fairly liquid position in order to have access to documentary credits.
2.2.2.2. Unsecured Short-Term Credit: 
.,
If a bank provides credit to a business enterprise without pledging some of
its assets, this means that the bank depends, in making such a decision, on the
borrower's creditworthiness. In order to assess the borrower's creditworthiness
banks, usually, investigate the following aspects:
(a) The manager's charisma amongst the business's executives and employees.
(b) The manager's personal reputation among those who deal with him, especially
credit supliers.
(c) The business's past record with other credit suppliers, if any, as well as with
the bank itself.
(d) The business's capital gearing, i.e. the relationship between its equity capital
and debts. (8)
(e) The business's financial performance, as deduced from the analysis of its fi-
nancial statements, especially in the areas of profitability and turnover.
Having assessed the borrower's creditworthiness as satisfactory, the bank can
provide such a borrower with an unsecured short-term credit; the main types of
such credit are: unsecured short-term loans, overdrafts, lines of credit, revolving
credits and transaction loans. (9)
Unsecured Short-Term Loans: These loans represent a traditional form of
short-term financing. A short-term loan is usually obtained in a lump sum and
repaid either on the maturity date, together with the interest due, as lump sum
or on an instalment basis. Short-term loans, in this sense, are assumed to finance
(8) This issue will be discussed, in detail, in chapter four.
(9) Adapted from: Edward W. Davis and John Pointon, Finance and the Finn (London:
Oxford University Press, 1984) pp. 196-7; Hal B. Pickle and Royce L. Abrahamson. Small
Business Management, 4th ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1986) pp. 134-6; Robert
R. Owen. Daniel It. Garner and Dennis S. Builder, Arthur Young Guide to Financing for
growth (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1986) pp. 96-7; James C. Van Horne, cm.. cit.,
pp. 444-6.
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operations with definite maturity otherwirse they will become expensive. In other
words, if the borrower estimates his financing need to last for one year but used
the borrowed money for less than this period, the loan will become relatively ex-
pensive as the interest is due on the whole amount of the loan no matter whether
it has been fully or partly used. For small businesses the cost of obtaining a
short-term loan gains more significance, as any increase in the cost of borrowing
can be easily reflected in a decrease in their profits; hence, it is preferable for
small businesses to seek more flexible forms of short-term credit.
Overdrafts: An overdraft is an informal agreement between a bank and its cus-
tomer to allow the latter to draw on his current account up to a certain debit
amount, which represents the maximum limit of the agreed-upon overdraft. The
main advantage of overdrafts is their flexibility, as the borrower does not have to
withdraw all the agreed-upon amount of money, and this makes them relatively
cheap as the interest is charged only on the withrawn amount; another advantage
is that there is no penalty on the unwithdrawn amount. On the other hand, the
main disadvantages of overdrafts are that they are technically repayable on de-
mand; also, it is difficult for the borrower to calculate their cost exactly as the
interest rate on overdrafts is variable according to market conditions.
Lines of Credit: A line of credit is the American counterpart for an overdraft
in the U.K. with a slight difference which is that a line of credit is established,
usually, for one year while an overdraft is repayable on demand, but both of them
can be renewed. For small businesses, both overdrafts and lines of credit represent
flexible forms of short-term credit which relieve them of being bound to a fixed
amount of money for a fixed maturity as is the case with traditional short-term
loans. Also, they gain a special importance for firms that cannot estimate the
exact amount and the exact duration of their short-term financing needs. On the
other hand, a small business may face a significant problem if the bank refuses to
renew an overdraft or a line of credit.
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the nominal interest rate
Revolving Credits: A revolving credit is a formal agreement between a bank
and its customer which entitles the latter to borrow up to a certain maximum
amount of funds. The formal characteristic of the revolving credit subjects the
,
borrower to paying a commitment fee on the unborrowed amount should his bor-
rowing be less than the agreed-upon maximum amount. According to this defini-
tion, a revolving credit can be disadvantageous, if compared with both overdrafts
and lines of credit, because of the commitment fee which the borrower has to pay.
However, a revolving credit may be for a longer maturity than both overdrafts
and lines of credit.
Transaction Loans: These loans are advanced to finance a single activity, e.g.
a contract to provide certain goods or services. In this case, the contractor is
expected to repay the loan, together with the interest due, after he receives pay-
ments for the goods or services provided. This type of credit is limited to those
businesses that work on a remittent basis according to their customers' orders.
Although the above-mentioned forms of bank credit are not secured by certain
assets, some banks may require a compensating balance to be deposited with the
bank, at the time of making the loan, which makes the "real" cost of the loan
higher than the nominal interest rate. For example, a borrower may apply for
a one-year loan of .C10,000 at a 15 percent interest rate but the bank requires a
compensating balance of 20 percent of the loan amount. In this case, the following
formula is suggested to calculate the real interest rate on such a loan:
the real interest rate = 1 — the percentage of the compensating balance
0.15
	
 — 0.1875 or 18.75 percent= 1 — 0.20
This rise in the interest rate is due to the payment of 15 percent interest on
.C10,000 while using only £8,000, i.e. the "net" loan amount is £8,000.
Equivalently, if the net loan amount of £8,000 is insufficient for the borrower's
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the needed amount
needs, he has to borrow more than .C10,000 in order to meet the compensating-
balance requirement and, simultaneously, keep the loan amount to be .C10,000.
The amount to be borrowed can be calculated using the following, suggested,
formula:
the amount to be borrowed 
= 1 — the percentage of the compensating balance
10 000 
£12,500
This means that the borrower will pay 15 percent interest on .C12,500 while
using only .C10,000, and the real interest rate will be 18.75 percent as well.
Likewise, if the bank deducts the interest in advance from the loan amount,
the real interest rate will be higher than the nominal interest rate. For example,
if the interest of 15 percent is to be deducted in advance, the following formula
is suggested to calculate the real interest rate:
the nominal interest rate 
the real interest rate — 1 — the nominal interest rate
0.15
	  = 0.176 or 17.6 percent.1 — 0.15
Having estimated his short-term financing needs, and having obtained the
necessary information about the available forms of short-term credit, does the
borrower have a free choice among these forms? He does not because all borrow-
ers are expected to apply for unsecured credit, while banks seek to secure their
money often by requiring a collateral especially for credit provided to less cred-
itworthy borrowers. Also, it is argued that the crucial consideration is the bank
manager's attitude as he is in the position of being able to dictate the terms and
the businessman should accept this and fit in (sic) with the wishes of the bank
manager. (10)
(10) Jim Dewlmrst and Paul Burns. Small Business: Finance and Control (London: Macmillan
Press Ltd.. 1983) p. 82.
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2.3. Short-Term Finance and Small Businesses: 
As far as small businesses are concerned, short-term finance may have some
special implications as regards: (a) its cost; (b) the relationship between small
businesses and their suppliers of short-term finance, especially banks; and (c) the
main features that characterise short-term finance for small businesses.
2.3.1. The Cost of Short-Term Finance
In general, it can be said that the main determinant of the cost of finance to
all business enterprises is the cost of these funds to credit suppliers. In addition to
the cost of funds, there are some other factors to be taken into consideration such
as: (a) the existing prime rate; (b) the creditworthiness of the borrower; and (c)
the present and prospective relationship between the borrower and the lender. (11)
Also, there are other aspects which may be accounted for, in determining the cost
of credit, such as the supply of and demand for finance as well as the transaction
costs incurred by the creditor. Some lenders, however, may charge exaggerated
interest rates to their borrowers, especially small businesses, in order to offset the
relatively high costs associated with small business loans. A study conducted in
Mexico on small-scale manufacturing firms revealed that interest rates charged on
such businesses, by some moneylenders, are between 2 and 8 times those charged
by official banks and lending institutions.(12)
Given the fact that the interest rate on bank credit, or the price of goods
provided by trade creditors, should be higher than, or at least equal to, the cost
incurred by those credit suppliers, and given that small businesses do not enjoy a
strong negotiating position as do large businesses, it can be argued that the cost
of short-term finance to small businesses is relatively high as compared with large
businesses because:
(11) James C. Van Horne, op. cit.. p. 448.
(12) Hubert Schmitz. "Growth Consraints on Small-Scale Manufacturing in Developing Coun-
tries: A Critical Review", World Development. (10) no.6, 1982, pp. 440-41.
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(a) Interest rates on bank short-term credit are usually tied to the bank's prime
rate, and small businesses are often regarded as less creditworthy, than large busi-
nesses. Accordingly, the interest rates on bank credit provided to small businesses
are expected to be equal to the prime rate plus a risk premium, which usually
ranges between 2 percent and 4 percent.
(b) Transaction costs, which banks incur in processing loans and collaterals, are
deemed to be fixed costs that do not vary propotionately with the loan size.
Hence, the cost of small loans, to small businesses, is expected to be higher than
the cost of large loans to large businesses.
(c) Some banks require compensating balances to be deposited against some loans,
and this makes the real cost of such loans noticeably higher than the nominal in-
terest rate, as the real amount acquired by the borrower is less than the nominal
size of the loan.
(d) When trade creditors offer cash discount for early repayment, some small
businesses cannot repay during the discount period either because of the lack of
liquidity or because they wish to direct the funds to other uses. This makes the
cost of trade credit significantly high as discussed earlier.
2.3.2. The Relationship with Creditors: 
The relationship between business enterprises and their creditors builds up
through time and cannot be determined by a single transaction. Also, such a
relationship will be strengthened when the debtor carries out his obligations sin-
cerely and the creditor adopts objective and flexible criteria of evaluating credit
applications. However, there are some practices that may hinder such a rela-
tionship; some of these practices can be attributed to the debtor, others can be
attributed to the creditor as follows:
(a) Some businesses stretch their trade-credit payments beyond the credit period
in order to make the maximum use of funds; but such a practice involves dangers
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because suppliers may refuse any credit or they may quote higher prices. (13)
(b) Even if the supplier of trade credit will not react in such a way, slow payment
only shifts the financial burden to the seller, and if the seller is also a small busi-
ness there is only a shifting of the problem to another business unit or sector. (14)
(c) Some banks strictly apply some rules of thumb on a univariate basis. For ex-
ample, if the accounts of a small business show high profit and low liquidity, it
is difficult for such banks to make a trade off when they insist that the current
ratio should be 2:1. (15)
(d) Some lenders may regard their customers on a short-term rather than a long-
term basis, in the sense that they evaluate credit applications on a transaction
basis as if the customer were a casual one. Such a practice can be against the
lender's interest because a small borrower, and consequently a less profitable one
today, may become a large borrower, and consequently a more profitable one, in
the future.
2.3.3. The Features of Small Business Finance: 
Small business finance in general and short-term finance in particular has the
following features: (16)
(a) Small business loans tend to be of a shorter term.
(b) Some small firms depend more heavily on banks for external finance than do
most large firms.
( /3) J. Fred Weston and Eugene F. Brigham, Managerial Finance, 5th ed. (London: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1975) p. 836.
(14) Roland I. Robinson, "The Financing of Small Business in the United States", in Stuart W.
Bruchey (ed.) Small Business in American Life (New York: Columbia University Press,
1980) P. 292.
(15) Graham H. Ray and Patrick J. Hutchinson.  The Financing and Financial Control of Small
Enterprise Development (Aldershot: Gower Publishing Co. Ltd., 1983) p. 69.
(16) Adapted from: Committee of Inquiry on Small Firms (Bolton Committee), "Financial
Facilities for Small Firms", Research Report no.4. London: HMSO, 1971, p. 19; Gra-
ham H. Ray and Patrick J. Hutchinson, op. cit., pp. 45-6; J.S. Boswell, "Small Finn
Survey", London: Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation Ltd., 1967, p. 5;
R. Richardson Pettit and Ronald F. Singer, "Small Business Finance: A Research Agenda",
Financial Management Review. Autumn, 1985, p.56; James Bates, op. cit.. p. 15.
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V(c) The general standard of creditworthiness imposed by the banks on small busi-
nesses rises, in times of credit squeeze, affecting these businesses with differential
severity.
(d) A more important role of trade credit.
(e) The trade-credit position of small firms worsens as large firms demand prompt
payment for supplies while delaying their own payments of bills.
(f) Loans from directors are common in small firms.
(g) Small business loans tend to have more detailed and stringent indenture agree-
ments or covenants.
(h) Small business loans tend to be secured by particular assets, perhaps by assets
that are not part of the firm, i.e. assets of the individual personal guarantees or
assets of other firms owned by the same individuals.
(i) The small business may not be able to demonstrate its chan.ces of success in
order to persuade potential lenders.
(j) Lending institutions may not cater for the special problems involved in small
business finance.
(k) The businessman may not know how or where to obtain finance.
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3.1. Start-up Capital: 
Broadly defined, start-up capital or initial capital can be regarded as the
funds needed to start a new business. In this respect, it may be appropriate to
distinguish between the term start-up capital and the term seed capital; Patrick
Liles defines seed capital as follows:
"Seed capital might typically be used to make a feasibility
study, develop a new product or idfa into the prototype
stage, or to start a new company". ( )
This definition implies that seed capital and start-up capital are the same, but
it can be argued that they are different. On the one hand, seed capital represents
the funds needed to finance the pre-start-up stage of the business, mainly the
feasibility study which tests the launchibility of the entrepreneur's idea. On the
other hand, start-up capital, or initial capital, represents the funds required for
the real start of the business. In other words, it represents the cost of acquiring the
assets such as premises, machinery, raw materials ... etc., necessary to start the
business. The main reasons for distinguishing between the two types of finance
are: (a) providing seed capital for a certain project does not necessarily mean
that this project will start its activity, simply because the feasibility study might
prove that such a project is unfeasible; and (b) not all financial backers, who
might be interested in providing finance for the start-up stage, are expected to
provide seed capital, as there will be almost no tangible assets to take possession of
should the project prove to be unfeasible. Accordingly, seed capital is expected to
be provided, mainly, by the owner(s) of the new business, while start-up capital
can be provided by both the owner(s) and other sources of finance. William
Chandler (2) estimates that at least 95 percent of the successful seed financing,
in the United States, must still come from traditional sources such as family
(1) Patrick R. Liles, New Business Ventures and the Entrepreneur (Illinois: Richard D. Irwin.
Inc., 1974) p. 465.
(2) William R. Chandler, "Pre-start up capital", in Stanley E. Pratt (ed.). Guide to Venture
Capital Sources. 7th ed. (Massachusetts: Capital Publishing Corporation. 1983) p. 29.
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members, friends, or groups of private investors; he also states that 90 percent of
the active professional venture-capital groups seldom make seed-stage investment.
3.1.1. Sources of Start-up Capital: 	 ,
Start-up capital cannot be expected to be provided entirely by external sources
of finance, as the owner(s) should contribute a reasonable portion of such capital;
this portion represents the base component which stimulates other sources to take
part in the start-up financing. In general, start-up finance may be for a long term
to finance fixed assets and the permanent part of current assets. Also, it may be
for a short term to finance the rest of current assets, especially accounts receiv-
able, as the new business is expected to provide trade credit to its customers and,
at the same time, pays in cash to its suppliers. Besides the owner(s)' funds, the
other main sources of start-up capital are: (3)
(a) Family members, friends and acquaintances.
(b) Banks.
(c) Finance companies.
(d) Wealthy individuals.
(e) Venture-capital companies such as the Industrial and Commercial Finance
Corporation (ICFC) in the U.K. and Small Business Investment Companies
(SBICs) and Minority Enterprise Small Business Investment Companies
(MESBICs) in the United States.
(f) Trade-credit suppliers.
(g) Leasing companies.
(h) Past employees who have confidence in the entrepreneur and his project.
(i) Industrial companies that are interested in the development or purchase of
new products or ideas.
(3) Adapted fronv Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions (Wil-
son Committee), "The Financing of Small Firms", Cmnd. 7503, London: HMSO, 1979,
pp. 4-5; Irving Burstiner, The Small Business Handbook (New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Inc..
1979) pp. 76-8; Patrick R. Liles, op. cit.. p. 466
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(j) Brokers and firms established to provide initial capital.
3.1.2. The Problems of Raising Start-up Capital: 
The above-mentioned sources of start-up capital can be classified in two main
categories: (a) institutional sources represented in banks, finance companies,
venture-capital companies, leasing companies, industrial companies and firms
established to provide start-up capital; and (b) non-institutional sources rep-
resented in family members, friends, acquaintances, wealthy individuals, trade-
credit suppliers, past employees and brokers. By and large, it can be said that
non-institutional sources are easier to approach than institutional sources, but
each of them has its own characteristics and problems. For example, individuals
might ask for an equity stake in the business, in return for providing a portion
of the start-up capital, which may not appeal to the owner who prefers to retain
full control of the business. As for institutional sources of start-up capital, the
problems associated with their provision of funds vary according to the nature of
each institution, or group of institutions, as follows:
(a) Banks, especially commercial banks, usually prefer to lend on a short-term,
rather than on a long-term, basis which makes bank finance seldom suitable for
start-up purposes; even though, they often ask for collateral for their loans.
(b) Finance companies usually charge higher interest rates on the finance facilities
they provide, as compared with banks.
(c) ICFC, in the U.K. , provides finance for few launches, and it is more likely to
support proprietors with good track records. (4)
(d) SBICs, in the United States, are less willing to finance start-ups as they invest
only about 25 percent of their funds in new companies. (5)
These difficulties may make start-up financing the most crucial stage in the
(4) Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions, op. cit., p. 9.
(5) David. J. Gladstone, "SBA Programs for Financing a Small Business", in Stanley E. Pratt
(ed.). op. cit., p. 33.
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financing of the business, upon its success depends the success of the subsequent
stages of financing the business. If the business to be started is small, the situation
is even worse as the suppliers of start-up capital will regard such a business as
more risky; consequently, they will either reject its request for finance or impose
difficult terms on it.
3.2. Equity Capital: 
Equity capital represents the owner(s)' funds invested in the business; these
funds consist of the owner(s)' initial capital plus retained profits if any. If the
business is a sole proprietorship and the owner wants to raise additional equity
capital, he will need another partner, or other partners, as supplier(s) of such
capital. The original owner will have the advantage of the new partner(s) sharing
with him the unlimited responsibility for the firm's debts. On the other hank
there are some disadvantages such as: (6)
(a) The original founder of the business must share profits with the new partner(s).
(b) The founder loses full control of the management of his business._:
(C) The founder will be subject to the risk that his partner may rashly involve the
firm in further liabilities.
(d) In the event of the firm's liabilities exceeding its assets on dissolution and his
partner becoming bankrupt, the founder partner will be held responsible for all
the firm's debts even if this means realising his private assets to meet them.
The first two of these disadvantages seem to be inevitable consequences of
raising equity capital in such a way; the other two can be significantly reduced
by choosing the right partner as these latter disadvantages seem to be dependent
on his personality. However, many proprietors tend to choose their new partners
from family members or friends in whom they have confidence based on a fairly
long relationship.
(6) Kenneth Midgley and Ronald G. Burns, Business Finance and the Capital Market. 2nd ed.
(London • Macmillan Press Ltd.. 1972) P. 27.
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If the business's capital is divided into shares, equity capital will consist of
ordinary shares plus retained profits plus preference shares; loans from sharehold-
ers are sometimes considered as part of equity capital. However, these loans will
,
be excluded from equity capital, in this context, as they do not qualify as either
shares or retained profits but they are, by definition, loans.
3.2.1. Ordinary Shares (Common Stock): 
Ordinary shares represent part of the owners' interest in a business as the
other part is represented in preference shares which will be discussed below. If
a company wants to raise additional equity capital, it may do so via issuing
new ordinary shares and selling them to the prospective investors. To float an
ordinary-share issue the company incurs the costs associated with the floatation
such as brokers' commission, legal charges, advertising .... etc. Some of these
costs vary with the size of the issue, others do not, i.e. they are the same for any
size of issue such as advertising. If these fixed costs are calculated as a percentage
of the issue size, they will vary adversely with this size; in other words, they
will represent a higher percentage of small issues and vice versa, as shown in the
following table:
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Table 3.1. Estimated costs of two different share issues
Elements of Cost
Amount
.C250,000
of issue
:C1,000,000
.0 % .0 %
Advertising 5,000 2.0 5,000 0.5
Accounting fees 2,000 0.8 3,000 0.3
Legal charges 1,000 0.4 2,000 0.2
Commission 7,500 3.0 20,000 2.0
Quotation fee 210 0.084 525 0.053
Miscellaneous 1,000 0.4 1,000 0.1
Tot al 16,710 6.7 31,525 3.2
Source: Calculated from: Committee of Inquiry on Small Firms (Bolton Commitee).
"Financial Facilities for Small Firms", Research Report no.4, London: HMSO, 1971,
p. 38.
The previous table shows that although advertising and miscellaneous costs
are the same for both issues, they represent higher percentages of the smaller
issue than of the larger one. All other costs vary consecutively, in amount, with
the issue size but they vary adversely as percentages; the same applies to total
costs as shown in the table. As small businesses are expected to issue a relatively
small amount of common stock, the cost of raising equity capital in such a way
will be noticeably high and may be prohibitive. Thus, small businesses may face
a real difficulty in raising external equity capital.
3.2.2. Retained Profits: 
Retained profits represent that portion of the achieved profits kept in the
company to be reinvested; hence, retained profits represent an internal source of
finance in general and of equity finance in particular. The amount of retained
profits, however, depends on: (a) the amount of profits achieved at the end of
each financial year, as this amount fluctuates from one year to another, and the
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balance of retained profits may become negative should the company incur loss;
(b) the tax situation of the partners, as highly taxed partners usually prefer the
profits to be retained while low-taxed partners prefer the, profits to be distributed
to them, depending on their propensity to consume; (c) the expected rate of return
on alternative investment opportunities, as the partners may prefer to withdraw
their profits from the company and invest them elsewhere if the expected rate of
return in the company is lower, and vice versa; and (d) the dividend policy of the
company, as this policy differs from one company to another and from one country
to another. For example, U.K. companies usually pay an interim dividend and
a final dividend each year, while most American companies pay equal quarterly
dividends. (7)
As far as small businesses are concerned, retained profits are expected to
represent an important source of equity finance due to the difficulties which these
businesses encounter in raising external equity finance as discussed above. On the
other hand, the dependence of small businesses on retained profits, as a source
of finance, may be hindered if the partners depend completely on their shares in
profits as sources of income.
3.2.3. Preference Shares (Preferred Stock): 
Preference shares have some of the characteristics of both ordinary shares
and loans. They resemble ordinary shares in the sense that they do not have
a maturity date, and they resemble loans in the sense that they involve a fixed
obligation on the company in the form of the fixed dividend percentage to be paid
to the holders of preference shares. On the other hand, preference shares differ
from ordinary shares in the sense that preference shareholders do not have the
voting right, and they differ from loans in the sense that the holder of a preference
share cannot force the company to pay him the annual dividend if the profits are
(7) D.R. Myddleton, Financial Decisions, 2nd ed. (Essex: Longman Group Ltd.. 1983)
p. 154.
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not sufficient or if the company decides not to make any dividends. Nevertheless,
preference shares may be cumulative in the sense that preference shareholders
may have the right to be paid their dividends in arrears before the company
can distribute any profits to its ordinary shareholders. There are, however, two
different views of preference shares as a source of finance; they may be regarded
either as an alternative to ordinary shares or as an alternative to debt finance, as
shown in the following figure:	
__
Figure 3.1. Alternative views of preference capital
Source: D.R. Myddleton, Financial Decisions. 2nd ed. (Essex: Longman Group Ltd., 1983)
p. 100.
Column A shows that a preference-share issue can be used as an alternative
to debt finance; but this is not attractive because preference shares are more
expensive than loans as will be discussed in the next chapter. Column B shows
that a preference-share issue can be used as an alternative to an ordinary-share
issue if the company reaches, or is near to, its debt limit.
In assessing public equity markets in the United States, William Wetzel
(8) William E. Wetzel, Jr., "Informal Invest= — when and where to look" in Stanley E. Pratt
(Ed.), az cit.. p. 25.
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argues that these markets are not a source of capital for most corporations, and
retained profits are the only source of equity capital for privately-held corpora-
tions. The grounds for this argument is that, in the United States, there are over
two million incorporated businesses but only about 12,000 enjoy sufficiently wide
ownership to be considered publicly owned, and the shares of about 4,000 firms
are traded on an organised stock exchange. Given the forementioned difficulties
of raising equity capital, the difficulties that small businesses might encounter are
obvious.
3.3. Medium-and Long-Term Loans: 
The border line between medium-term and long-term loans is not very clear
in the financial literature; i.e. the maturities of both types of loans are mixed.
In other words, the maturity of medium-term loans ranges between 3-10 years,
while the maturity of long-term loans ranges between 5-10 years or even more. In
this context, the term medium-and long-term (MTLT) will be used to incorporate
all loans with maturities in excess of one year unless otherwise denoted.
Medium-and long-term loans (MTLT loans) can be obtained either by floating
a bond issue in the capital market or by applying for such loans to banks or other
financial institutions. If a company wants to obtain a long-term loan via the
floatation of a bond issue, it will incur all costs associated with such a floating.
These costs include printing costs, legal fees and underwriting expenses including
the underwriter's spread; thus, the larger the issue the smaller the costs as a
percentage of the floating proceeds. (9) When a company applies to a bank, or
another financial institution, for a medium-term or a long-term loan, this company
has to comply with the lender's terms; these terms may include the minimum
and/or the maximum loan amount, the interest rate on the loan and the required
(9) James C. Van Horne. Financial Management and Policy, 6th ed. (New Jersey: Prentice-
Hail. Inc., 1983) p. 526.
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collateral if any. Also, the company's loan application must qualify as a sound
loan according to the lender's criteria discussed in the last chapter.
Small businesses are expected to face some difficulties in obtaining MTLT
loans, such as:
(a) It may be difficult for a small business to obtain a long-term loan via the
floatation of a bond issue, as the needed amount of funds may not meet the
minimum limit set by the underwriter. Even if the underwriter does not set a
minimum size for the bond issue, the floatation costs for a relatively small issue
will be noticeably high and may be prohibitive.
(b) Some small businesses may not be able to meet the lenders' requirements
concerning interest rates or collaterals.
The Bolton Committee (10) pointed out some difficulties encountered by U.K.
small businesses, in obtaining MTLT loans, such as:
(a) The proportion of funds of some insurance companies going to small firms
varied from nil to under one percent.
(b) Only a minority of pension funds engage in financing small firms.
(c) The high-lower limits put by financial institutions concerning term-loan
schemes.
(d) The high fees charged to small business loans such as legal, accounting and
surveying charges, and these do not vary proportionately with the loan size.
(e) Many of the institutions supplying term loans have been subject to "ceilings",
and such restrictions may encourage them to concentrate on large transactions.
(f) Although the number of applications for term loans is much lower than that
for short-term loans, a high proportion is refused.
Given these difficulties in obtaining MTLT loans, some small businesses may
approach non-institutional sources for such loans, especially loans from directors
(10) Adapted from: Committee of Inquiry on Small Firms (Bolton Committee) "Financial
Facilitiem for Small Firms", Research Report no.4, London: HMSO. 1971. pp. 31-5.
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or even from partners. Such loans have the advantage of avoiding the formalities
associated with institutional loans as well as better terms because those directors
or partners are expected to be keen not to let the businessface financial difficulties.
The following table shows the loans from directors as a percentage of long-term
loans in both small and large businesses in the U.K.
Table 3.2. Percentage distribution of long-term loans in both small
and large businesses in the U.K., 1975
Types of
loans
Manufacturing Non-
manufacturing
All small
companies
Large
companies
Loans from directors 37.0 57.6 51.5 0.0
Other long-term loans 63.0 42.4 48.5 100
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Adapted from: Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions
(Wilson Committee), "The Financing of Small Firms", Cmnd. 7503, London: HMSO,
1979. p. 57.
This table shows that loans from directors represent a major component of
small business long-term loans, as they account for more than half the total long-
term loans in small companies vis-a-vis nil in large companies. This phenomenon
reflects the difficulties that face small businesses in obIt ning long-term loans from
financial institutions while large businesses seem not to face any difficulties in this
respect. However, major clearing banks started to provide long-term loan schemes
of up to 20 years duration, and they no longer concentrate on the provision of
short-term loans. (11)
3.4. Lease Finance: 
Leasing a particular asset means having the right to use that asset without
having a title to it. In other words, the owner of an asset (the lessor) allows
(11) Jim Dewhurst and Paul Burns. Small Business: Finance and Control (London: Macmillan
Press Ltd., 1983) pp. 84-6.
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another party (the lessee) to make a full use of this asset for a certain period
of time in return for regular payments, over that period, including the charged
interest rate. In the U.K., for instance, this rate lies, in the range of 2 to 5
percentage points above the Bank of England Minimum Lending Rate or to be
negotiated at some margin above the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR)
or the Finance House Base Rate. (12) The lease agreement is put in a formal
contract which contains stipulations as regards lease period, lease payments, the
lessor's right to repossess the asset should the lessee default ... etc. Lease contracts
can apply to almost all fixed assets that can be used by individuals or business
enterprises such as buildings, machinery, computers, ships, aircraft, vehicles ...
etc. The main suppliers of lease finance are banks, bank subsidiaries, finance
companies and insurance companies. Sole proprietorships can be said to be less
qualified to provide lease finance due to their lack of the necessary funds and
expertise that are available to large institutions.
3.4.1. The Main Types of Leases:
Lease contracts lie in two main types: operating lease and financial lease.
Under an operating-lease agreement the lessee has the right to use the asset for
a relatively short period of time which is less than the economic life of the leased
asset. There is no consensus, however, on the length of the operating-lease period;
but it is estimated to range from six months to three years. (13) On the whole,
the main characteristics of an operating lease are:
(a) It is for a fairly short period of time.
(b) It is subject to cancellation either by the lessor or by the lessee after giving a
stipulated notice. (14)
(12) Edward W. Davis and John Pointon, Finance and the Firm (London: Oxford University
Press. 1984) p. 213.
(13) Ibid., p. 211.
(14) John J. Hampton, Financial Decision Making: Concepts. Problems and Cases, 3rd ed.
(Virginia: Reston Publishing Co., Inc., 1983) p. 565.
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(c) it is, usually, a full-service lease according to which terms the lessor provides
maintenance, pays for the insurance and pays any property tax due on the leased
asset.	 ,
The other type is a financial lease which is also called capital lease or full-
payment lease. A financial lease can be defined as an agreement according to
which terms the lessee is allowed to use an asset for a period corresponding to the
asset's economic life in return for regular payments over the stipulated period.
The main characteristics of a financial lease are:
(a) It is a long-term financing method as it extends to almost all the asset's
estimated economic life.
(b) It is a non-cancellable contract either by the lessor or by the lessee.
(c) Lease payments usually correspond to the cost of the leased asset plus a profit
to the lessor.
(d) According to a financial-lease contract the lessee agrees to maintain the asset,
insures it and pays any property tax due on that asset.
(e) Some lease contracts give the lessee the option to buy the leased asset, at
the end of the lease period, for a bargain price or an agreed-upon price or at the
market value of the asset at the end of the lease period.
(f) Some lease contracts entitle the lessee to a proportion of the proceeds of
the sale of the leased asset at the end of the lease period. For example, most
U.K. financial lease contracts entitle the lessee to 90 to 99 percent of the sale
proceeds. (15)
There are, however, other types of lease agreements such as hire-purchase
and sale-and lease-back agreements. Under a hire-purchase agreement the lessee
is given the option to purchase the leased asset before the expiry of the leasing
period. In this case the lessee's decision to exercise the option will depend on the
(15) Colin M. Young, "Leasing", in Jack Broyles, Ian Cooper and Simon Archer (eds),
Financial Management Handbook, 2nd ed. (Aldershot: Gower Publishing Co. Ltd., 1983)
p. 287.
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availability of funds and his evaluation of the purchase against the continuation
of the lease agreement. Sale-and lease-back agreements arise when a firm sells an
asset to another party and leases it back from that party; .under such an agreement
the firm loses its title to the asset and acquires the use of that asset for the lease
period. Firms that sell and lease back their assets do so when they are in need of
funds to finance urgent requirements, in which case the firm finds it difficult to
obtain finance from other sources.
3.4.2. Assessing Lease Finance:
It is worth mentioning that the assessment of lease finance will focus only on
financial lease, which represents the most suitable substitute for MTLT loans as
well as being the most commonly used form of leasing. Accordingly, the terms
leasing or lease finance will be used as synonyms for financial lease unless other-
wise denoted. Assessing lease finance, in this context, means the examination of
its merits assuming that the other alternative is to buy the particular asset and
finance this purchase with a long-term loan. In order to decide whether to buy
the asset or lease it, the decision maker calculates the net present value of both
costs and gains realised under each alternative, in order to choose the alternative
which achieves the largest positive net present value.
One of the main advantages attributed to lease finance is that it is an off-
balance sheet finance, in the sense that the lessee does not have to show the
leased assets and lease obligtations on his balance sheet; instead, he only adds a
brief footnote to his accounts describing the lease obligations. This off-balance
sheet finance is deemed to maintain the firm's borrowing capacity and its credit
rating. Financial institutions, however, have become aware of such a loophole in
accounting practices and sought a way out. At the beginning of 1977, United
States firms were required to capitalise their financial leases. 	 fi-
(16) Richard Brealey and Stewart Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1984) p. 545.
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nancial leases means calculating the present value of lease payments and showing
this amount on both sides of the balance sheet. The leased asset and its corre-
sponding liability will be amortized by deducting lease payments from both sides
of the firm's balance sheet.
Another advantage associated with lease finance is that all lease payments
are tax-deductible expenses while only the interest on borrowed money is a tax-
deductible expense. This advantage seems to be plausible as it results in the
actual lease payments being less than those registered in the firm's books. For
example, if the firm's annual lease payments are .C50,000 and the corporate tax
rate is 40 percent, then the firm achieves a tax saving of .C20,000 (50,000 x 0.40)
which makes the "real" lease payments .C30,000 (50,000 x (1 — 0.40)). Sometimes
the firm incurs loss or its profits do not reach the threshold of corporate tax;
in this case the tax-saving advantage loses its credibility as there will be no tax
charges.
When the lessor realises any investment tax benefits he can pass them to
the lessee in the form of reduced lease payments. In the U.K., for instance,
there is an investment incentive represented in allowing the owner of an asset
to offset its cost against his taxable profits for the year in which the asset is
purchased. (17) Also, in the United States the owner of an asset is entitled to an
investment incentive known as the Investment Tax Credit (ITC). According to
this incentive the owner of an asset reduces his taxes by the ITC without affecting
the depreciation schedule of the asset; under the 1981 law the ITC is 6 percent
for qualified assets depreciated over 3 years and 10 percent for all other qualified
assets. (18) These incentives will result in reducing the cost of acquiring the asset
to the owner, and it is assumed that such reduction, or part of it, will be passed
to the lessee who incurs less payments than otherwise would be the case. This
(17) Colin M. Young. op. cit.. p. 274.
(18) John J. Hampton, op. cit.. pp. 582-3.
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assumption has two implications, first: it implies that the owner of the-asset is
a tax payer; but if he incurs losses or if his profits do not reach the threshold of
corporate tax, he will not benefit from such incentives and, consequently, will not
pass any reductions to the lessee. Second: it implies that the lessor is willing to
pass the investment benefits to the lessee; but if the lessor is in a monopolistic
position, he will dictate his terms on the lessee including lease payments which
might be fairly large.
It is also worth noticing that leasing may not represent a hundred percent
finance if lease payments are payable in advance. (19) The rationale for this
viewpoint can be easily inferred, that is paying rentals in advance makes the real
cost of leasing higher than otherwise would be the case. For example, if the cost
of the leased equipment is £100,000 and the annual lease payment is £20,000
payable in advance, this means that the instant financing realised by the lessee is
only .C80,000 (100, 000 — 20, 000).
As far as small businesses are concerned, lease finance seems to be appealing
because: (a) it relieves them of paying a lump sum of money to buy the particular
asset, and this money can be invested elsewhere in the firm; (b) it is useful for
those businesses which do not have profits to be retained to finance the purchase
of fixed assets; and (c) it is useful for those businesses which have no access to
bank credit or face difficulties in dealing with banks.
3.5. Venture Capital: 
The term venture capital or risk capital refers to financing situations where
both risk and profitability are noticeably high. Definitions given to venture capital
regard it as representing the provision of funds for the financing of: (20)
(19) R,. Fawthrop, "Equipment Leasing", in Michael Firth and Simon Keane (Eds.) Issues in
Finance (Oxford: Philip Allan Publishers, Ltd., 1986) p. 106.
(20) Adapted from: Patrick R.. Liles. op. cit.. p. 461; James C. Van Home, op. cit., p. 533;
Jim Dewhurst and Paul Burns. op. cit., p. 107: Stanley E. Pratt (ed.). op. cit.. p. 7.
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(a) New, high-risk, high-profit-oriented enterprises.
(b) Large interests in publicly traded companies where uncertainty is significant.
(c) Seed-capital requirements. 	 ,
(d) Start-up capital requirements.
(e) Early-stage development.
(f) Expanding the business's activity.
(g) Going concerns that are unable to raise funds from conventional public or
commercial sources.
(h) Relatively small, rapidly growing concerns.
These areas of financing seem to be compatible with the term venture capital
except for the last three areas because: (a) for a business to expand its activity,
this implies that the business is successful and profitable, also this implies that
the business is fairly well established which reduces the risk associated with its
activity; (b) going concerns, that are unable to raise funds from conventional
sources, are expected to be small and such an inability does not necessarily mean
that they are risky but it may, rather, mean that such sources are not interested
in financing small businesses; and (c) small, rapidly growing companies may rep-
resent the favourite arena for venture-capital financing due to their good profit
potential; the Apple Computer Corporation is a good example of such businesses.
Yet, the financial literature often relates venture-capital financing to small
business financing, which seems to involve a fallacy represented in the confusion
between "small businesses" and "young businesses". While the term small refers
to the firm's size in terms of the number of workers or the volume of sales, or
whatever criterion is adopted, the term young refers to the firm's age in terms
of maturity and stability. Accordingly, venture-capital finance should be related
to young businesses rather than small businesses because if a certain business is
small, this does not necessarily mean that it is young; and if a certain business
is large, this does not necessarily mean that it is old enough or well-established.
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In other words, financial backers may come across a small business which is well-
established but the nature of its activity keeps it small; also, financial backers
may come across a large business which is still premature but it started large.
The main consequence of such a notion is that providing finance for large-young
companies may be riskier than providing finance for small-old firms, as the amount
of funds and the magnitude of risk in the former case are greater than those in the
latter. However, the question which arises is how old is a young business? The
answer depends on the business's type of activity and the time it takes to reach
the maturity stage; light industries, for instance, are expected to take a shorter
time to reach the maturity stage than do heavy industries.
3.5.1. Sources of Venture-Capital Finance
Like most types of finance, venture-capital funds can be obtained from insti-
tutional as well as non-instutional sources; these sources are: (21)
(a) Wealthy individuals.
(b) Pension funds.
(c) Life insurance companies.
(d) Bank holding companies.
(e) The Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation (ICFC), in the U.K., and
its subsidiaries; this corporation is owned by the clearing banks and the Bank of
England.
(f) The British Technology Group (BTG) which was formed in 1981 by the merger
of the National Research and Development Corporation and the National Enter-
prise Board.
(g) Investment development companies such as the American Research and De
(21) Adapted from: Patrick R. Liles, op. cit., p. 462; James C. Van Home, op. cit.. p. 534;
Jim Dewhurst and Paul Burns, op. cit.. pp. 107-8; Robert R. Owen, Daniel R. Garner
and Dennis S. Bunder, Arther Young Guide to Financing for Growth (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1986) pp. 74-6; Addison W. Parris. The Small Business Administration
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968) p. 150; J. Fred Weston and Eugene F. Brigham.
Managerial Finance, 5th ed. (London: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1975) p. 842.
56
velopment Corporation.
(h) The Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs) and Minority Enter-
prise Small Business Investment Companies (MESBICs); all those companies are
licensed and regulated by the Small Business Administration (SBA) in the United
States.
(i) Corporation venture capital activities set up in some large industrial compa-
nies to make investments in related but non-competing fields.
(j) Investment banking firm's venture capital funds.
(k) Private venture capital partnerships established by experienced individuals in
order to provide venture capital, as well as providing skills and experience.
These suppliers of venture capital usually consider the trade off between risk
and profitability in order to minimise the risk and/or maximise the profitability
of their invested funds. In this respect, venture-capital suppliers evaluate both
the entrepreneur and the business itself as follows: (22)
(a) Concerning the entrepreneur, they consider his integrity and reliability, abili-
ties and competence, attitudes and ambitions, innovation and enthusiasm and his
willingness to take risks
(b) Concerning the business, they examine its suitability as a venture-capital
investment, potential economic gains, the probability of success and the docu-
mentation to be attached to the application for finance such as a full business
plan including projected profit-and-loss accounts, balance sheets and cash-flow
statements.
3.5.2. Assessing Venture-Capital Finance
The assessment of venture-capital finance will be held in terms of the mag-
nitude of such finance and its share in risky situations, mainly start-ups. Also,
the assessment will be confined to the U.K. and the United States as they are the
(22) Adapted from: Patrick R.. Liles. op. cit., pp. 473-9; Jim Dewhurst and Paul Burns, op.
cit.. pp. 110-12.
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leading countries in this area and the most important sources of literature. In
this regard, it is noticed that:
(a) For venture-capital suppliers to minimise their risk and maximise their profits,
they concentrate on industries with which they are familiar; moreover, they seek
to have a voice in the management of the firms they finance. (23)
(b) For a firm to attract the interest of institutional venture investors, it must
have a growth rate in excess of 40 percent per year. (24) This implies that a growth
rate of up to 40 percent will be financed by internal sources; and this means that
the firm with this growth rate must achieve a 40 percent rate of return on equity
capital and retains all the profits for growth financing.
(c) In 1985 only about 30 percent of the number of financings made by U.K.
venture-capital organisations were for start-ups and early-stage companies. (25)
(d) Also in the U.K., ICFC tends to support the proprietors who have good track
records or those who prove to be winners or near-winners of competitions. (26)
(e) In the United States, less than half of the annual new investments by venture-
capital industry goes to start-up situations; also, less than a quarter of the new
ventures launched annually are backed by professional venture investors, and the
rest are backed by individuals or groups of individuals. (27)
(f) Also in the United States, SBICs provide small businesses with loans rather
than equity capital because they borrow most of their funds from the SBA. (28)
The preceding context suggests that institutional venture-capital suppliers
seem to adopt conservative financing policies, either because of the nature of
their sources of funds or because of their attitudes towards risk-bearing finance.
Consequently, institutional sources of venture-capital finance are expected to be
(23) Robert R.. Owen et al., op. cit.. p. 73.
(24) William E. Wetzel, Jr., op. cit., p. 25.
(25) Richard Hargreaves. Starting a Business. 2nd ed. (Loudon: Heinman Ltd., 1987) p. 76.
(26) Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions (Wilson Committee)
op. cit.. p. 9.
(27) William E. Wetzel. Jr.. op. cit.. p. 24.
(28) David J. Gladstone. op. cit.. p. 32.
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of less importance to small businesses as compared with individuals who seem to
be more risk takers.
,
3.6. Financing Expansion: 
Expanding a firm's activity means increasing its market share, provided that
the market can absorb more quantities of the particular product(s). The main
consequence of expanding the firm's activity is the growing need for additional
funds, especially in the form of long-term finance in order to cope with the growth
requirements. The growth of any business usually occurs gradually; in other
words, most business enterprises do not move suddenly from inception to maturity
but, rather, they pass through some stages known as the life cycle of the firm.
3.6.1. The Firm's Life Cycle: 
The life cycle concept adopted in this context depends on that developed by
Eugene Brigham (29) who divides the firm's life cycle into four stages as follows:
Stage one: Experimentation: both sales and profits grow slowly.
Stage two: Exploitation: rapid growth of sales and profitability due to the
acceleration of market acceptance of its product.
Stage three: Maturity: the growth rate of sales slows down as growth, in large
part, is dependent on replacement demand.
Stage four: Decline: this decline is due to: (a) new competitive products;
(b) technological and managerial obsolescence; and (c) saturation of
demand for its product.
The financing patterns corresponding to these stages are shown in the follow-
ing table:
(29) Eugene F. Brigham, Financial Management: Theory and Practice. 3rd ed. (New York:
The Dryden Press. 1982) p. 821.
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Table 3.3. Financing patterns at four stages of a firm's development
Stage Financing pattern
1. Formation
2. Rapid growth
3. Growth to maturity
4. Maturity and industry
decline
Personal savings, trade credit, government agencies.
Internal financing, trade credit, bank credit,
venture capital.
Going public, money and capital markets.
Internal financing, share repurchases,
diversifications, mergers.
Source: Eugene F. Brigham, Financial Management: Theory and Practice, 3rd ed. (New
York: The Dryden Press, 1982) p. 832.
This view of the firm's financing patterns was modified later by Hutchinson
and Ray as shown in the following table:
Table 3.4. The traditional view of the financial life-cycle of the firm
Stage Source of finance Potential stress factors
Inception
Growth I
Growth II
Growth III
Maturity
Decline
Owners' resources.
As above plus: retained profits,
trade credit, bank loans and
overdrafts, hire purchase, leasing.
As above plus: longer-term
finance from financial institutions.
As above plus: new issue market.
All sources available.
Withdrawal of finance, firm
taken over, share repurchase,
liquidation.
Under capitalization
"Overtrading"
Liquidity crises
Finance gap
Loss of control
Maintaining the return on
investment
Falling return on
investment
Source: Patrick Hutchinson and Graham Ray. "Surviving the Financial Stress of Small
Enterprise Growth", in James Curran, John Stanworth and David Watkins (Eds.). The
Survival of the Small Firm: Volume one: the Economics of Survival and Entrepreneurship
(Aldershot: Gower Publishing Co. Ltd., 1986) p. 55.
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Both table 3.3 and table 3.4 present almost the same financing patterns,
during the firm's life cycle, especially for the growth stages. Concerning the stage
of decline, it can be argued that this stage is not inevitable for all firms. In
other words, many firms can maintain the maturity stage and survive the decline
stage via research and development programmes, market research programmes
and management training programmes. Nevertheless, the relevant stage, in this
context, is the growth stage which is expressed as rapid growth in table 3.3 and
growth I through growth III in table 3.4. Table 3.4 shows the problems that face
a growing firm, the most important of which are overtrading and the finance gap;
these problems seem to embody the difficulties associated with the financing of
expansion.
3.6.2. The Problems of Financing Expansion: 
The difficulties which face small businesses, in obtaining the necessary finance
for their expansion, are usually associated with rapid growth. In other words, if
a certain business is expanding slowly, this expansion will be almost unnoticeable
and can be fairly easily financed, whereas a rapidly-growing business will need
sizeable amounts of funds most of which will be on a long-term basis. Unfortu-
nately, some businesses have no choice but to expand rapidly simply to withstand
the rapidly-growing market and/or the rapidly growing competition. In this re-
gard, it is argued that financing rapid growth is more difficult than financing the
investment in a new plant or some other aspect of steady growth, because rapid
growth involves greater risk although the potential rewards may be high. (30) It
is also argued that the existence of the small, rapidly growing firm is precarious
because: (a) it faces difficulties in obtaining equity capital because it is not large
enough to go public and little is known about it; and (b) its own demonstrated
success may stimulate an influx of new firms, with the consequent likelihood of a
(30) A. C. Hazel and A.S. Reid. Rapid Company Growth: How to Plan and Manage Small
Company Expansion (London: Business Books Ltd., 1979) p. 75.
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declining market share and increased competitive pressure. (31)
Empirical studies seem to support these viewpoints as they stress the problem
'
of financing as an impediment to expansion. A study of 860 small businesses in
West Scotland, in 1982, by A. Leyshon (32) showed that growth inhibition due to
the availability/cost of finance is more explicit among manufacturing firms than
other types of businesses as follows:
(a) Growth inhibition due to the availability of finance was reported by 31.0
percent of manufacturing firms, 26.5 percent of retailing firms and 22.0 percent
of services firms.
(b) Growth inhibition due to the cost of finance was reported by 54.9 percent of
manufacturing firms, 45.2 percent of retailing firms and 29.3 percent of services
firms.
In the United States, William Wetzel, Jr. and Ian Wilson (33) carried out a
study of 110 New Hampshire-based firms with at least 50 employees and growing
at rates of 15 percent or more; some of the research findings are:
(a) 44 percent of the firms growing at rates between 30 percent and 40 percent
experienced curtailed growth because of the lack of access to the necessary capital.
(b) 67 percent of companies expanding at rates of 50 percent or more reported
growth problems as a result of inadequate expansion capital.
(c) As company size increases, the problems of access to capital tend to decrease.
(d) Forced reliance on short-term debt is primarily a problem of the smaller, more
rapidly-growing firms.
(e) 51 percent of the sample firms reported that there was a shortage of equity and
(31) Eugene F. Brigham, op. cit., p. 826.
(32) A. Leyshon, "The U.K. Government Small Business Model — A Review", European Small
Business Journal, (1) no.1, 1982, pp. 58-66, quoted in Martin Walbank, "Equity Shar-
ing Policies in New Venture Funding", European Small Business Journal, (1) no.3, 1983,
p. 12.
(33) William E. Wetxel, Jr. and Ian G. Wilson, "Seed Capital Gaps: Evidence from High-
Growth Ventures", Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research. 1985, pp. 222-230.
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long-term debt capital, and this was common among the smaller, more rapidly
growing firms.
(f) Companies growing by 40 percent or more are twice as likely to pursue external
equity financing as companies growing at less than 20 percent annually.
The previous context suggests that small businesses face real problems in
the financing of expansion; this issue stimulates the question of whether small
businesses have to expand. Jim Dewhurst and Paul Burns (34) point out that
when economies of scale are important the small business must grow simply to
survive, and when economies of scale are not important the optimal firm size is
relatively small. Yet, growth inhibition is not necessarily due to the lack of access
to external finance but it could be due to the business itself as well. In other words,
some sole proprietorships may experience growth inhibition because the owner-
managers are unwilling to give up part of their control over their businesses in
return for additional external equity capital; and this may result in the business's
expansion being dependent on the sufficiency of retained profits.
(34) Jim Dewhurst and Paul Bunk cet cit., P. 50.
63
Chapter Four
Capital Structure
and the Cost of Capital
4.1. Capital Structure
4.1.1. Business Risk
4.1.2. Financial Risk
4.1.3. The Effect of Capital Structure on Shareholders' Income
4.1.4. Small-Business Capital Structure
4.2. Cost of Capital
4.2.1. The Weighted Average Cost of Capital
4.2.2. Optimal Capital Structure
4.2.3. Agency Costs
e
4.2.4. Small-Business Cost of Capital
total debt
4.1. Capital Structure: 
The term capital structure refers to the way of financing the firm's assets; in
other words, it represents the variety of sources used in financing the firm's assets
and the relative importance of each source. As is well known, the main sources of
finance are ordinary shares, preference shares and debt (both short-term and long-
term debts). Hence, the term capital structure refers to the distribution of these
financing sources or, broadly defined, the extent to which a firm depends on debt
financing as parallel to equity financing. The degree of the firm's dependence
on debt financing is known as financial gearing or financial leverage which is
measured as follows:
total debt 
Financial gearing (financial leverage) — 	 x 100total assets
or, equivalently, it can be measured as follows:
Financial gearing (financial leverage) —
equity capital
Accordingly, if a certain firm has total assets of .C10 million and these assets
are financed with .C4 million worth of equity capital and .C6 million worth of debt,
16 million this firm's financial gearing is 60 percent ( xi-
u million X 100 or 1.5 (164	
On the other hand, if the firm depends only on equity capital to finance its assets,
it is said to be ungeared or unlevered. A question may arise concerning the
significance of studying the capital structure or measuring the financial gearing
or financial leverage. The reason is that different financing sources have different
attributes from the standpoint of investors on the one hand and the standpoint
of the firm on the other, especially the risk associated with each source. These
different views are shown in the following figure:
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Ordinary shares
Preference shares
Debt
	n
Figure 4.1. Risk classification of different sources of finance
,
Investors' standpoint	 The firm's standpoint
From the investors' standpoint, the safest investment in a certain firm is to
buy bonds issued by it, as these bonds represent funds lent to the firm. Bond
holders are virtually sure that they will get their periodic interest payments no
matter how low are the firm's profits; the same can hold for banks as suppliers of
loans. Moreover, if the firm fails to pay the debtors their periodic interest and/or
loan instalments, they can force it into liquidation and have prior cliam on its
assets. On the extreme end, in figure 4.1, are ordinary shares that neither have
any pre-determined return nor have they any pre-determined claim on the firm's
assets. In other words, ordinary shareholders will get all the remaining profits
after paying all other claims; in case of liquidation, ordinary shareholders have
a residual claim on the firm's assets after satisfying all other claims. In case of
ordinary partnerships or sole proprietorships, the owners' responsibility for the
firm's debts can be extended to their personal properties should the firm's assets
be insufficient to meet debtors' claims in case of liquidation. As for preference
shares, they have some of the attributes of both ordinary shares and debt. They
resemble ordinary shares in the sense that they have no maturity date, and they
resemble debt in the sense that they have a fixed annual dividend. The main
difference between preference shares and both other sources is that the annual
dividend on these shares is not a legal obligation on the firm. In other words,
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if the firm's profits, after paying all debt obligations, are insufficient or if the
board of directors decides not to pay any dividends, then preference shareholders
cannot force the firm to make such dividends albeit they may be paid in arrears.
Assessing these sources from the firm's standpoint, they will be ranked the other
way round, i.e. ordinary shares are the least risky, debt is the most risky source,
and preference shares lie in between, and the same reasons hold.
Given the main characteristics of different sources of finance and given that
debt finance is the riskiest of these sources from the firm's standpoint, the question
which arises is: What are the main determinants of the firm's capital structure?
The answer is that these determinants are business risk and financial risk.
4.1.1. Business Risk: 
. The term business risk refers to the probable fluctuations in the firm's op-
erating profits (before interest and tax) due to the fluctuations in sales revenue
and/or in total costs. The extent to which the firm's profits may fluctuate de-
pends on the sensitivity of such profits to any changes in the firm's sales and/or
costs. Business risk can be regarded as part of the unsystematic risk, which is
peculiar to a certain firm or industry, representing the effect of competition or
technological change in the particular industry. On the other hand, systematic
risk represents the changes in the economy as a whole or in political relations
among countries, thus affecting all activities in a particular country or a group of
countries; but this latter issue is irrelevant in this context.
To assess the sensitivity of the firm's profits to any variations in sales revenue
or total costs, break-even analysis is employed. This analysis stems from the fact
that variable costs vary with the volume of units produced and sold but they are
fixed for each single unit; and fixed costs do not vary with the volume of units
produced and sold but they are variable for each single unit. Hence, it is the
fixed costs that matter as the firm incurs these costs at all levels of production
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and sales, at least in the short run. The incurring of fixed costs, regardless of the
volume of production and sales, is known as the "operating leverage". (1) The
effect of the operating leverage can be shown in the break,even chart as follows:
units produced and sold
Figure 4.2. Break-even chart
This chart shows the main elements that affect the firm's profits, namely sales
revenue and total costs. The latter consist of variable costs, which vary directly
with the volume of units produced and sold, such as raw materials, direct labour
costs, direct sales costs and the like. The other component is fixed costs, which
do not vary with the volume of units produced and sold, such as depreciation,
rents, administrative costs and the like. The most important element is fixed
costs that must be met regardless of the volume of the production and sales.
Figure 4.2. shows that at a certain level of fixed costs, and consequently of total
costs, the firm must produce and sell the volume OY (with sales revenue of OX)
(1) James C. Van Home. Financial Management and Policy. 6th ed. (New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall. Inc.. 1983) p. 144.
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merely to meet its total costs. Accordingly, the break-even point is represented
by the intercept between the sales-revenue line and the total-cost line. If the firm
produces and sells a volume greater than OY , it will achieve profits; if the firm
produces and sells a volume less than OY , it will incur loss. The break-even point
can be expressed mathematically as follows:
F
P — V
where:
Y = the break-even volume (units to be produced and sold)
F = fixed costs
P = price per unit
V = variable cost per unit
For example, if the firm's fixed costs are £10,000, the price per unit is .0 30
and the variable cost per unit is £20, then the break-even volume is:
10 000 
Y —	 '30 — 20 — 1,000 units
This means that for the firm to meet its fixed costs it has be produce and
sell 1,000 units; any volume of production and sales in excess of 1,000 units will
result in profits, and any volume of production and sales less than 1,000 units will
result in loss. The effect of the operating leverage will be magnified if any of the
following occurs: (a) fixed costs increase; (b) the variable cost per unit increases;
or (c) the price per unit decreases. In all these cases, the firm has to produce and
sell more units merely to break even.
4.1.2. Financial Risk: 
Financial risk can be regarded as a consequence of the excessive use of fi-
nancial leverage; i.e. the excessive dependence on debt financing which results
Y—
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in fixed obligations represented in loan instalments and/or interest payments.
These fixed obligations will increase the firm's fixed costs and, consequently, raise
its break-even point. The risk factor involved in the use of debt financing is that
debt payments have claims on the firm's earnings prior to those of shareholders
regardless of the volume of these earnings. Moreover, if the firm's earnings are
insufficient to meet debt obligations, lenders and bondholders can force it into
liquidation. Thus, the presence of debt financing is deemed to raise the firm's
break-even point as shown in the following chart:
units produced and sold
Figure 4.3. Break-even chart with borrowing
Source: Adapted from J.R. Franks and J.E. Broyles. Modern Managerial Finance
(Chichester: John Wiley and Sons. 1979) p.211.
This figure depicts the combined effect of both operating leverage and financial
leverage. In other words, the presence of financial leverage pushes up both fixed
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costs and total costs, thus shifting the break-even point upwards. In this case,
the firm has to produce and sell the volume 0? (with sales revenue ak) in order
to meet the costs incurred under the new situation and avoid the financial risk
associated with debt financing.
4.1.3. The Effect of Capital Structure on Shareholders' Income: 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the shareholders of any firm have a
residual claim on the firm's profits after fully meeting interest payments on the
firm's debt. Consequently, those shareholders will incur all losses resulting from
debt financing should the firm's profits lag behind debt commitments. By the
same token, shareholders will be entitled to all accrued profits should these profits
be in excess of debt commitments. Hence, it can be said that the employment
of financial gearing, or financial leverage, affects the income of shareholders. To
illustrate this notion, it is assumed that there are three firms, A,B and C, identical
in all aspects but their capital structure as follows:
Capital structure Firm
A
Firm
B
Firm
C
Equity capital 100,000 50,000 30,000
Borrowing (at a 12 percent interest rate) — 50,000 70,000
Total capital and liabilities 100,000 100,000 100,000
Assuming a corporate income tax rate of 40 percent for all firms, if the net
operating income (before interest and tax) is .0 20,000 for all firms in year one,
and this income is halved in year two to become .C10,000, then the results will be
as shown in the following table:
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Table 4.1. The effect of financial gearing on shareholders' income
Items Year one Year two
Firm A: (Financial gearing = zero)
Net operating income before interest and tax
.
,
20,000 10,000
— Interest payments — —
Net profits before tax 20,000 10,000
— Corporate tax (40%) 8,000 4,000
Net profits after tax 12,000 6,000
Return on equity = netepgurotfiytscaapftietraitax ino — 12% 160 .010 _ 6%
Firm B: (Financial gearing = 50%)
Net operating income before interest and tax 20,000 10,000
— Interest payments = 50,000 x 0.12 6,000 6,000
Net profits before tax 14,000 4,000
— Corporate tax (40%) 5,600 1,600
Net profits after tax
net profits after taxReturn
. ,
8,400
8 .400
	 i a 0 of
.
2,400
2.400
4.8%on equity = equity capital 51000 — Ithon 50.000 —
Firm C: (Financial gearing = 70%)
Net operating income before interest and tax 20,000 10,000
— Interest payments = 70,000 x 0.12 8,400 8,400
Net profits before tax 11,600
_	 ..
1,600
— Corporate tax (40%) 4,640 640
—
Net profits after tax 6,960 960
Return	 = net	 afteron equity 3'2%1906000 — 23.2% 30.Tio —
72
The preceding example shows that the employment of debt financing acceler-
ates the return on equity capital in year one. This is proven as firm A, with no
debt, achieves a 12 percent return on equity capital, firm B, with 50 percent debt,
achieves 16.8 percent and firm C, with 70 percent debt, achieves 23.2 percent. On
the other hand, when net operating income drops, the return on equity capital
is noticeably reduced by the employment of debt financing. This is proven as
firm A, with no debt, achieves a 6 percent return on equity capital, firm B, with
50 percent debt, achieves 4.8 percent and firm C, with 70 percent debt, achieves
3.2 percent. Hence, it can be said that financial gearing magnifies the effect of
changes in operating income upon shareholders' income; consequently, the em-
ployment of debt financing should be handled with caution. In other words, firms
with significant business risk should reduce their dependence on debt financing
in order to avoid the combined-negative effects of both operating leverage and
financial leverage. For those firms with good profit potential, it is not unwise
to increase their dependence on debt financing; but to what extent can a firm
employ debt financing? This issue will be dealt with later in this chapter.
4.1.4. Small-Business Capital Structure: 
Small-business capital structure is not expected to be similar to that of large
businesses, in the sense that small businesses are expected to be less geared than
large businesses due to their relatively low dependence on debt financing. This
phenomenon may be due to one or more of the following reasons:
(a) Some small businesses may not have access to institutional finance either be-
casue they do not qualify as borrowers or because of the unavailability of such
finance.
(b) Banks often set a maximum gearing ratio at which they decline loan ap-
plications, and this restricts the businesses' ability to borrow, even if they are
successful enough to pay back these loans.
(c) High interest rates required by some institutional lenders tend to make debt
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financing noticeably expensive.
(d) Many small businesses cannot afford the floatation costs of a bond issue, if
any, which may be prohibitive.
In the U.K., in the 1970s, banks were criticized by the Wilson Committee (2)
for requiring a low level of capital gearing (3)
 in order to lend to small businesses.
The level of gearing required by U.K. banks, according to the Wilson Committee,
was 1:1 compared with 2:1 or 3:1 in other European countries. In 1981, the
U.K. Government introduced a loan guarantee scheme called Small Business Loan
Guarantee Scheme, known as LGS or the Scheme. According to the LGS, the
Department of Industry guarantees the repayment of 80 percent of medium-term
loans over two to seven years (not overdrafts) made by the participating financial
institutions to eligible businesses. (4) After two years from the introduction of
the LGS, small-business capital gearing was as shown in the following table:
(2) Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions (Wilson Committee), "The
Financing of Small Firms", Cmud. 7503, London: HMSO, 1979, p. 23.
total borrowing(3) Calculated as equity capital •
(4) Robson Rhodes, "A Study of Businesses Financed under the Small Business Loan Guar-
antee Scheme", London: Department of Trade and Industry, 1984, p. 7.
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Table 4.2. Small-business capital gearing in the U.K., 1983.
Capital Gearing* New % Existing %
Less than 1 : 1 8	 ' 8
1 : 1 to 2 : 1 4 29
2 : 1 to 3 : 1 8 17
3 : 1 to 4 : 1 6 6
4 : 1 to 5 : 1 8 3
5: 1 to 10 : 1 14 3
10 : 1 to 20 : 1 2 —
Over 20 : 1 4 —
Infinite (negative shareholders' funds) 46 34
Tot al 100 100
total borrowing
* Calculated a, —.---
equity capital
Source: Robson Rhodes, "A Study of Businesses Financed under the Small Business
Loan Guarantee Scheme", London: Department of Trade and Industry, 1984, P. 104.
This table shows that: (a) new businesses tend to be highly geared as com-
pared with existing businesses; (b) gearing ratios, in general, significantly exceed
the limits required by the U.K. banks in the 1970s (1:1); and (c) a considerable
percentage of small businesses, especially new ones, employed excessive borrow-
ing, so much so that they became insolvent (negative shareholders' funds). These
phenomena imply either that financial institutions have violated sound lending
practices, depending on the Government's guarantee of the repayment of 80 per-
cent of loans, or that small businesses have abused the Scheme, depending also on
the Government's guarantee. Even so, these businesses cannot be considered to
represent all U.K. small businesses; the reason is that, at the time of the above-
mentioned study, small businesses in the U.K. were estimated to amount to one
and a quarter million of which only one percent have received a scheme loan. (5)
(5) Ibid., p. 3.
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An interesting study of small business finance was conducted recently in twelve
countries, some of which were developed and others developing countries. Some
of the findings of this study are: (6)	 ,
(a) Capital structure of growing firms varies directly with age and size of the firm
and with the level of economic development of the country.
(b) In the early stages of growth, the firms are less dependent on bank borrowing
and more dependent on relatives/friends and personal equity capital; this phe-
nomenon is more noticeable in developing countries.
(c) As the small firm grows, in size or age, more financing options become available
to it.
Small-business dealing with banks, according to the above-mentioned study,
is shown in the following table:
(6) Rein Peterson and Joel Shulman, "Capital Structure of Growing Small Firms: A 12-
Country Study on Becoming Bankable TM , International Small Business Journal, (5) no.4.
1987, p. 11.
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Table 4.3. Percentage distribution of firms which depend on bank credit
Host country Number
5-20
of employees
More than 50
West Germany 88 90
Canada 67 74
U. K. 72 100
U. S. A. 62 77
Spain 50 57
Netherlands 61 71
Japan 67 85
Cameron 54 75
Colombia 55 87
Brazil 35 63
Indonesia 33 59
Kenya 32 65
All countries 57 75
Developed countries 70 83
Developing countries 43 67
Source: Rein Peterson and Joel Shulman, "Capital Structure of Growing Small Firms:
A 12-Country Study on Becoming Bankable", International Small Business Journal. (5)
no.4, 1987, p. 13.
This table shows that firms with 5-20 employees are, generally, less depen-
dent on bank credit than those with more than 50 employees. In the developed
countries, the majority of both size groups depends on bank credit, 70 percent
of the former group and 83 percent of the latter (only in the U.K. do all firms
with more than 50 employees deal with banks). For developing countries, less
than half of the firms with 5-20 employees and two thirds of the other group
depend on bank credit. Hence, small-business capital structure is expected to be
dominated by equity capital and non-institutional credit; the expected reasons
are mentioned at the beginning of this section. If less dependence on bank credit
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makes these businesses less vulnerable to financial risk, it may deter their growth
because: (a) non-institutional credit may be less sufficient than bank credit; and
(b) loan financing is the cheapest source of finance as will be discussed below,
4.2. Cost of Capital: 
The common objective of any business enterprise is to maximise its value to its
shareholders,i.e. to maximise its share price in the capital market. To achieve this
objective, the firm has to choose investment projects whose cash inflows exceed
the cash outlay required for these investments. As cash inflows will be realised
in the future, they must be discounted to the present in order to compare their
present value with the cash outlay. The discount rate used in this process is the
cost of capital to the firm; and this discount rate is a weighted average of the
individual costs of the different sources used in financing the investment.
4.2.1. The Weighted Average Cost of Capital: 
As mentioned earlier, the main sources of finance are ordinary shares, prefer-
ence shares and debt. If a certain firm or investment project is financed with only
one of these sources, then the cost of capital to this firm or project is the cost of
the particular source used in its financing. On the other hand, if a certain firm
or investment project is financed with more than one of these sources, then the
cost of capital to this firm or project is the average cost of the particular sources,
weighted according to their relative percentages in the firm's capital structure.
Hence, to arrive at the weighted average cost of capital, the cost of each individual
source must be calculated first.
Cost of ordinary shares: As ordinary shareholders are entitled to all the re-
maining profits after satisfying all other claims, then the cost of these shares to
the firm can be simply regarded as the distributable profits related to the value
of ordinary shares. In other words, what represents a cost to the firm represents,
at the same time, a return to the investors. However, firms do not often dis-
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tribute all the achieved profits but, rather, they retain part of these profits to
be reinvested in the firm. The retention of profits means that the firm deprives
the investors from reinvesting their profits either in the firm's shares or elsewhere
with the same risk. Accordingly, the investors expect the firm to reinvest the
retained profits in such a way as to yield at least the same rate of return on their
investment in ordinary shares, in order to offset the lost opportunity of investing
the profits elsewhere.
Nevertheless, the cost of ordinary shares if often regarded, in the financial
literature, as the cost of equity capital. This is implied by the incorporation
of the cost of ordinary shares and the cost of retained profits. In this context,
however, the cost of ordinary shares will not be referred to as the cost of equity
capital because preference shares are regarded as part of equity capital, and the
cost of the these shares is calculated in a different way as will be discussed below.
The cost of ordinary shares is calculated as follows:
C 0 = —D + G
P
where:
Co = cost of ordinary shares
D = the expected dividend per share
P = the market price per share
G = the expected rate of growth in dividends
For example, if the market price per share is £100, the expected dividend per
share is £12 and the expected rate of growth in dividends is 5 percent, then the
cost of ordinary shares is:
12Co =	 + 0.05 = 0.17 or 17 percent100
Using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the cost of ordinary shares
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can be calculated as follows:
Co = RF + 13(RM — RF) ,
where:
C. = cost of ordinary shares
RF = risk-free rate of return
# = a coefficient calculated to reflect the risk associated with investing in the
firm's shares
RM = the market return on a portfolio of securities
(RM — RF) = the risk premium required by investors in the market
For example, if the return on treasury bills is 10 percent (risk-free rate of
return), the market return is 16 percent and fl for the particular firm is 1.2, then
the cost of ordinary shares is:
C. = 0.10 + 1.2(0.16 — 0.10) = 0.172 or 17.2 percent
Cost of Preference Shares: The cost of preference shares is, simply, the annual
fixed dividend on each share. This dividend can be designated either as a fixed
amount of annual dividend or as a percentage of the share's par value. If the
par value of a preference share is £20 and the annual dividend percentage is
15 percent, then the annual dividend per share is 20 x 0.15 = .C3 and the cost
of preference shares to the firm is 15 percent. Equivalently, if the par value of
a preference share is £20 and the annual dividend per share is .C3, the cost of
preference shares to the firm is:
Cr
	
3
Li =-	 -7 - -2T) — 0.15 or 15 percent
where:
C,. = cost of preference shares
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C,. = 20 — 2 = 0.167 or 16.7 percent
3
D = the annual dividend per share
P = the par value per share
However, this equation is not always true because the firm usually incurs the
costs of floating a preference-share issue. These floatation costs make the net
proceeds from a preference-share issue less than the par value of the shares, thus
raising the cost of these shares to the firm (the same applies to ordinary share-
issues). In this case, the net proceeds from the sale of a share must be employed
in calculating the cost of preference shares as follows:
C, =
P — F
where:
= cost of preference shares
D = the annual dividend per share
P = the par value per share
F = the floatation cost per share
For example, if the par value of a preferene share is £20, the annual dividend
is .C3 and floatation cost per share is .C2, the cost of preference shares is:
Cost of Borrowing: The cost of borrowing, in general, is the interest charged
on loans; nevertheless, this cost is not as simple as it seems to be. For example,
if a certain firm wants to obtain a loan via the floatation of a bond issue, this
firm will incur the floatation costs which make the net proceeds from the issue
less than the par value of the issued bonds. In this case the cost of borrowing is
calculated as follows:
81
where:
Cb = cost of borrowing
R the interest due on each bond
P the par value per bond
F the floatation cost per bond
For example, if the par value per bond is £50, the interest rate is 10 percent
and the floatation cost per bond is £3, then the interest due on each bond is
50 x 0.10 = £5, and the cost of borrowing is:
Cb =	 = 0.1064 or 10.64 percent
From the standpoint of business enterprises, the above-mentioned cost of bor-
rowed funds does not represent the "real" cost of these funds because interest
payments are deductible expenses for tax purposes. In other words, when a firm
deducts interest payments in the profit-and-loss account, it reduces the taxable
profits and, hence, pays less taxes than otherwise would be the case. This deduc-
tion makes the real interest less than the nominal interest on the borrowed funds,
and this real cost of borrowing is calculated as follows:
Cb = R(1 — T)
where:
Cb cost of borrowing
R = the interest rate on borrowed funds
T = the corporate tax rate
For example, if the interest rate on borrowed funds is 13 percent and the
corporate tax rate is 40 percent, then the real cost of borrowing is:
Cb = 0.13 (1 — 0.40) = 0.078 or 7.8 percent
5
In this case, the firm achieves a tax saving of the corporate tax rate times the
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interest on borrowing or 0.13 x 0.40 = 0.052 or 5.2 percent. Equivalently, if the
borrowed amount is .C10,000 and the interest rate is 13 percent, then:
The interest due = 10,000 x 0.13 = £1,300
	 ,
The tax saving = 1,300 x 0.40 = £520
Then, the real interest payment = 1,300 — 520 = £780
In this regard, it is worth mentioning that not all firms benefit from the tax
saving resulting from borrowing. The reason is that the firm might incur loss or
its profits might not reach the threshold of corporate tax; therefore this firm will
not pay taxes and there will be no tax saving.
After calculating the cost of each individual source, the average cost of capital
to the firm can be calculated by multiplying the cost of each source by its relative
weight in the firm's capital structure. This will be done by assuming that XYZ
firm has the following capital structure:
XYZ capital structure £000
Ordinary shares 50
Preference shares 10
Borrowing (at a 13 percent interest rate) 40
Total capital and liabilities 100
The total book value of this firm is £100 thousand (total assets or total capital
and liabilities), and this value will be used in calculating the weight of each source
of finance which produces the following average cost of capital:
o	 r	 b
K = C ' . (--) + C r (.17) + C b (17)V
where:
K = the weighted average cost of capital
V = the total value of the firm
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Co = cost of ordinary shares
o = the value of ordinary shares
C,. = cost of preference shares 	 ,
r = the value of preference shares
Cb = cost of borrowing
b = the value of borrowed funds
If the cost of ordinary shares is 17 percent, the cost of preference shares is
16 percent and the cost of borrowing is 8 percent, the weighted average cost of
capital, K, is calculated as follows:
50	 10	 ( 40	)K =0.17 (—)	 (+ 0.16 —) + 0.08 —
100	 100	 100
= 0.17 x 0.50 + 0.16 x 0.10 -I- 0.08 x 0.40 = 0.133 or 13.3 percent
From the previous equation, the cost of capital to XYZ firm is 13.3 percent;
and this means that this firm should use a discount rate of 13.3 percent in calcu-
lating the present value of cash inflows generated from its investments. In other
words, 13.3 percent is the minimum rate of return which XYZ should earn on its
investments in order to maintain its value in the capital market.
4.2.2. Optimal Capital Structure:
It is worth mentioning that the weighted average cost of capital, as discussed
above, can be considered a "historical" cost which may not represent the true
cost of capital because:
(a) The weighted average cost of capital represents the cost of financing sources
already used, and this makes it valid for the appraisal of existing investments
while the cost of financing new investments may be more or less different.
(b) Book values, of the different financing sources, were used in calculating the
weighted average cost of capital, and these values may differ from the "current"
market values at which any new financing will be made.
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Ordinary shares
Preference shares
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(c) The weights used in calculating the average cost of capital imply that the
existing capital structure is optimal, and any future financing will be Made in the
same proportions. 	 ,.
Consequently, new investments will be financed with new capital whose cost
may be different from the existing cost of capital; and this necessitates the use
of the marginal cost of the incremental financing. For the weighted average cost
of new financing to be marginal, the weights employed must be marginal in the
...
sense that they must correspond to the proportions of financing sources the firm
intends to employ. (7) In this respect, the firm is expected to intend to employ
an optimal capital structure. But what is the optimal capital structure? The
answer to this question will be cited after depicting the cost/return classification
of different financing sources as follows:
Investors' standpoint 	 The firm's standpoint
Figure 4.4. Cost/return classification of different sources of finance
From the firm's standpoint, the cheapest source is debt financing as its real
cost is noticeably less than the nominal interest rate because of the tax saving
discussed earlier. Preference shares are more expensive than loans, though they
bear a fixed annual dividend, because the dividend on preference shares is an
appropriation of profit rather than a deductible expense. As for ordinary shares,
(7) James C. Van Home, 22 cit.. p. 222.
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they are the most expensive source of finance because ordinary shareholders are
entitled to all the remaining profits after satisfying both debtors and preference
shareholders. From the investors' standpoint, bond issues have the least return,
ordinary shares have the highest return and preference shares lie in between; the
reason is the inverse relation between return and safety discussed earlier in this
chapter.
For a firm which wants to minimise its cost of capital, the optimal capital
structure might be regarded as an all-debt structure,i.e. the firm is entirely fi-
nanced by borrowing. But this is not realistic, because both institutional and
non-institutional lenders will not lend to the firm in the absence of a reason-
able equity base. If the optimal capital structure is regarded as the structure
with the possible maximum debt/equity ratio, this may have an adverse effect on
both the cost of capital and the value of the firm in the capital market because:
(a) increasing debt involves a higher financial risk, which gives shareholders cause
to require higher rates of return on their shares; and (b) increasing debt adversely
affects the firm's credit rating and, consequently, the lenders might charge the firm
higher interest rates and/or impose some restrictive covenants on it.
If the optimal capital structure is regarded to minimise the cost of capital
and maximise the value of the firm, each of these two requirements is a direct
consequence of the other; this can be proved as follows: (8)
the value of the firm V = D -I- E
where:
D = the market value of the firm's debt
E = the market value of firm's equity
the weighted average cost of capital P = K i (f) + K e (f)
where:
(8) J. Board. -.Corporate Borrowing Policy", in Michael Firth and Simon M. Keane (cds),
Issurs in Finance (Oxford: Philip Allan Publishers Ltd., 1986) P. GO.
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p . the average return or capitalisation rate which represents the average returns
on debt and equity
Ki = return on debt	 ,
Ke = return on equity
According to these equations, there is an inverse relation between the average
cost of capital, P, and the total value of the firm V; accordingly, any capital
structure which maximises V will also minimise P. In this regard, it can be
argued that the value of the firm is affected by the firm's overall risk; i.e. business
risk and financial risk. Hence, given a certain level of business risk, the optimal
capital structure must achieve the following objectives simultaneously: (a) the
maximisation of the firm's value; (b) the minimisation of the cost of capital; and
(c) the minimisation of the firm's overall risk. When a firm decides what would be
its optimal capital structure, it may face some discrepancies between the existing
and the target capital structure; in this case there are two financing strategies: (9)
(a) If the firm is substantially below its target debt/equity ratio, the management
might recapitalise by issuing new debt and purchasing its own ordinary shares with
sale proceeds in order to achieve the target mix of equity and debt; or
(b) The management might finance new investments, with debt, in a gradual
approach until it reaches the target capital structure; with either strategy, the
target weights must be used to compute the marginal cost of capital.
One of the most important views, concerning the issue of optimal capital
structure, is that of Modigliani and Miller (1°) which is based on the following
assumptions:
(a) Perfect capital markets under conditions of atomistic competition.
(b) The expected values of probability distribution of the returns on shares are
(9) Stephen H. Archer. G. Marc Choate and George Racctte, Financial Management, 2nd ed.
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1983) pp. 439-40.
(10) Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller, "The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and
the Theory of Investment". American Economic Review, (XLVIH) no.3, June, 1958,
PP . 267-72.
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the same for all investors.
(c) Firms are divided into equivalent-return classes, and all shares of firms within
a certain class are perfect substitutes for each other.
	
,
(d) No corporate income taxes; this assumption was relaxed later in the analysis.
Given these assumptions, and apart from the mathematical proofs, the view
of Modigliani and Miller can be summarised as follows:
Proposition I: The market value of any firm is independent of its capital struc-
ture and is obtained by capitalising its expected return at a rate appropriate to
its class. Equivalently, the average cost of capital to any firm is completely inde-
pendent of its capital structure and is equal to the capitalisation rate of a pure
equity stream of its class. The rationale of this proposition is what they call "the
arbitrage process" in which an investor can sell the overpriced shares and buy the
underpriced ones. As investors exploit these arbitrage opportunities, the value of
the overpriced shares will fall and that of the underpriced shares will rise, thereby
eliminating the discrepancy between the market values of the firms.
Proposition II: This proposition takes into consideration both the interest rate
on debt and the financial risk. Accordingly, the expected yield of a share of stock
is equal to the appropriate capitalisation rate for a pure equity stream in the class
plus a premium, related to financial risk, equal to the debt-to-equity ratio times
the spread between the capitalisation rate and the interest rate.
Depending on these propositions, Modigliani and Miller conclude that an
optimal capital structure does not exist, as all structures are equivalent from the
point of view of the cost of capital. Yet, they later recognised the tax saving
which results from debt financing and admitted that the existence of debt in the
firm's capital structure will cause the value of the firm to rise.(11)
(11) Franco Mocligliani and Merton Miller, "Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A Correction",
American Economic Review. (53) June, 1963, pp. 433-43, cited in James C. Van Home,
op. cit.. p. 255.
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Nonetheless, the issue of optimal capital structure is still controversial and
a comprehensive theory of the firm's capital structure seems to be unachievable
in the near future because:
(a) All the attempts made so far to lay a basis for a theory of capital structure are
based on theoretical assumptions which can hardly exist in the real world. The
most important of these assumptions is the existence of perfect capital markets;
but market imperfections do exist, such as transaction costs, bankruptcy costs,
the unavailability of information to some investors and the existence of irrational
investors.
(b) Theorists often assume that investors will act according to abstract formulae,
but those investors may have subjective incentives to invest in certain securities;
moreover, some investors might sell out certain securities merely because of ru-
mours.
(c) Theorists assume that all types of finance are available to all firms at all times;
but some firms, especially small firms, have limited access, or probably no access
at all, to certain types of finance.
4.2.3. Agency Costs: 
The agency theory regards the manager (or management) of a firm as an
agent to the owners, in case of the separation of management from ownership,
or an agent to outside owners in case of the firm being partially owned by the
manager(s). The non-manager owners expect the manager to act in their interest,
i.e. to take the decisions that maximise their wealth. Agency problems arise when
the manager seeks his own interest by consuming part of the firm's resources
in the form of non-pecuniary perquisites such as prestigious expenditure. In
this case, the outside owners seek the necessary means which guarantee that
the manager will act in their interest. Also, debtholders may become aware of
the risky investments that the manager might undertake in anticipation of high
profits. Such awareness, on the part of debtholders, stems from the fact that if the
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firm goes bankrupt and the value of its assets substantially deteriorates, they may
not realise the value of their debt. Consequently, debtholders seek the necessary
means which restrict the manager's decisions in such a way as to minimise the
probability of bankruptcy. The actions of both equity holders and debtholders
involve different types of expenses called agency costs.
In their introduction to a theory of corporate ownership structure, Michael
Jensen and William Meckling (12) regard agency costs as being the sum of the
following costs:
(a) the monitoring expenditure incurred by the principal (the owner(s)) in order
to limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for
the agent and by observing, measuring and controlling his behaviour;
(b) the bonding expenditure incurred by the agent (the manager(s)) in order to
guarantee that he will not take actions which would harm the principal, or ensure
that the principal will be compensated if he takes such actions; and
(c) the residual loss which is represented in the reduction of the welfare experi-
enced by the principal (expressed in pecuniary terms) as a result of the divergence
between the agent's decisions and those decisions which would maximise the wel-
fare of the principal.
Yet, there is another source of agency costs represented in informational asym-
metry which means that the management possesses some information which is
valuable but unavailable to the market; without such informatiron the market
cannot identify the true nature of the project before it is undertaken. (13) Ac-
cording to this viewpoint, if this asymmetry is not resolved, the management will
obtain less for the sold securities than the "fair value"; and the difference between
the fair price and the actual price is the agency cost associated with informational
(12) Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meclding. "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure" Journal of Financial Economics, (3), October,
1976, P. 308.
(13) Amir Barnea, Robert A. Haugen and Lemma W. Senbet, "Market Imperfections, Agency
Problems and Capital Structure: A Review", Financial Management. Summer, 1981, p.9.
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asymmetry.
If a certain firm is wholly owned by its manager, he will neither need any
incentives nor will he require any monitoring in order to act in the interest of
another party; accordingly, agency costs associated with outside equity are zero.
In partially-owned firms there is an inverse relation between the owner-manager's
share in the firm's equity and his incentive to consume part of the firm's resources
in the form of perquisites and, consequently, the need to monitor his behaviour.
Thus, the more the manager's share in the firm's equity the less the agency costs
associated with outside equity and vice versa. On the other hand, if a firm is
wholly owned by people who are not involved in its management, they will hire
a professional management team who require more monitoring costs than would
otherwise be the case. In this case, it is expected that the managerial labour
market will exert some pressures on the firm to sort and compensate managers
according to their performance; these pressures can be in different forms such
(14)
as:
(a) Potential new managers are concerned with the mechanics by which their
performance will be judged, and they seek information about the responsiveness
of the system in rewarding their performance.
(b) In the existence of a competitive managerial labour market, if the firm's
reward system is not responsive to performance, the firm loses managers and the
best are the first to leave.
Agency costs associated with debt are represented in the inclusion of differ-
ent covenants in the indenture provisions, which enable bondholders to limit the
management's behaviour. The costs involved in this case are the costs of writing
the detailed provisions, the costs of enforcing them and the reduced profitability
of the firm because of the limited ability of the management to take optimal deci-
(14) Eugene F. Fama, "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm", in Michael C. Jensen
and Clifford W. Smith, Jr. (eds), The Modern Theory of Corporate Finance (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1984) p. 138.
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sions in certain issues. (15) There are also bankruptcy costs which increase as the
probability of bankruptcy increases; these costs are represented in the difference
between the face value of debt claims and the value realised from the sale of the
firm's assets after deducting all legal and other expenses. If debtholders are aware
of these costs, they will pass them to the owner(s) in the form of reduced prices
for debt claims.
4.2.4. Small-Business Cost of Capital:
One of the perspectives that may be adopted in assessing the cost of capital
to small businesses is the comparison with large businesses, i.e. discussing the
size-related factors that affect the cost of capital. In this regard, two main factors
may contribute to raising the cost of capital to small businesses: (a) the costs of
floating small security issues are higher, as a percentage, than those of floating
large security issues; and (b) the cost of bank loans is relatively Itighet ivst m1\
businesses as transaction costs do not vary proportionately with loan size. An-
other factor is the location of the business, especially retail establishments, which
might add more risk to the business, thereby raising its cost of capital. (16) In
other words, location is vital for retail establishments, and mistakes in forecasting
the location success are costly for a single-outlet retailer compared with a chain
of retailers which has more flexibility in changing the location.
The cost of capital to small businesses can, also, be assessed from the perspec-
tive of agency costs especially those associated with informational asymmetry. In
this respect, it is argued that the small firm has a greater ability and a greater
incentive to take actions which transfer wealth from its creditors. This will in-
crease agency costs of debt which will have two effects: first, an increase in the
direct cost of borrowing when lenders demand high interest rates; and second,
(15) Michael Jensen and William Meckling, op. cit.. p. 338.
(16) Roland I. Robinson, The Financing of Small Business in the United States", in Stuart W.
Bruchey (ed.), Small Business in American Life (New York: Columbia University Press,
1980) p. 285.
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an increase in the indirect cost of borrowing represented in restrictive covenants
which limit the management's ability to operate efficiently; and this will lead to
a decrease in the firm's value. (17) Also, the cost of equity capital may be higher
when asymmetric information is severe; this happens when some small firms have
superior investment opportunities but have trouble in conveying such information
to outsiders. (18) In this case, new equity issued at "low" market prices will dilute
the original-equity value and raise the cost of equity capital.
For the small firm which is wholly owned by its manager, it might be argued
that the cost of equity capital to such a firm is relatively low, as agency costs
associated with equity financing are virtually nil. Such an argument may be
questionable because the sole owner-manager incurs an implicit cost in order to
avoid the agency costs associated with external equity financing. Such an implicit
cost is represented in sacrificing some, or even all, of life's luxuries in order to
be more devoted to his business as well as saving money to be reinvested in the
business.
(17) R. Richardson Pettit and Ronald F. Singer, "Small Business Finance: A Research Agenda",
Financial Management, Autumn, 1985, p.55.
(18) S.C. Myers and N.S. Majluf, "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when Firms
have Information that Investors do not have", Journal of Financial Economics June, 1984,
pp.187-222. cited in Ibid., p. 56.
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Although Egypt is considered as a developing country, it is more developed
than most Arab countries in terms of economic structure as its economic base
is more diversified. In comparison with other Arab countries, there are several
favourable factors from the point of view of development. These factors are: (1)
(a) The labour participation rate of 33.5 percent is the highest in all Arab coun-
tries.
(b) The University attendence is higher than that in other Arab countries.
(c) Egypt's population accounts for 40 percent of the population of the Arab East
and 36 percent of the total Arab population in its widest definition (including
Somalia).
(d) Egypt is the only Arab country which has a long industrial tradition and a
diversified industrial structure; in this regard it is the most advanced of all Arab
countries.
(e) The percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) accounted for by the man-
ufacturing sector in Egypt is the highest in the Arab world.
On the other hand, the rapid increase in Egypt's population has its adverse
effects on the development plans and the country's foreign trade. According to the
latest census, in 1986, Egypt's population amounted to 50.5 million including 2.25
million Egyptians abroad. (2) Given an annual increase of 2.8 percent, Egypt's
population is expected to exceed 70 million by the end of the century. Of the
total area of 386,000 square miles (about one million square kilometers) only 4
percent is inhabited and cultivated and the rest of Egypt is mainly desert. This
gives an average population density of 48 persons per square kilometer, and a
population density of 1,170 persons per square kilometer for the inhabited area.
These factors explain why the Government is undertaking significant programmes
(1) Roberto Aliboni et al. (eds). Egypt's Economic Potential (London: Croom Helm. 1984)
pp. 84-5.
(2) Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics (CAPMS), Statistical Year Book:
1952-1987 (Cairo: CAPMS, 1988) (in Arabic) p. 19.
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in the following areas:
(a) Land reclamation in order to expand the cultivable territory.
(b) Birth control measures in order to curb the population increase.
(c) Erecting new cities in the uninhabited areas in order to lessen the pressure on
the Nile Valley and the Delta.
5.1. Agriculture: 
The agriculture sector used to be and still remains the most important sector
in the Egyptian economy. During the eighteenth century the few crops grown in
Egypt were mainly for the consumption needs of the limited population. During
the nineteenth century, agriculture in Egypt witnessed considerable development
thanks to the efforts of Mohammed All who achieved substantial changes in the
agricultural sector; his achievements inc1uded:(31
(a) The introduction of cotton cultivation in the Nile Delta.
(b) The introduction of new varieties of cotton.
(c) Raising and strengthening the banks of the Nile river in order to protect
summer crops from flood water.
(d) Deepening the Delta canals to ensure an adequate water supply during the
whole year.
(e) Building dams across these canals to raise the water level.
5.1.1. Land Ownership: 
Before 1952 there was an obvious maldistribution of land ownership among
Egyptians. In 1913, 0.8 percent of land owners held 44.2 percent of the land; at
the same time 91 percent of the proprietors owned 26 percent of the land. (4)
(3) Charles Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century: An Economic Survey (London: Oxford University
Press. 1954) pp. 21-2; Richard F. Nyrop (ed.). Egypt: a Country Study (Washington,
D.C.: Department of Army, 1983) pp. 16-17.
(4) Khalid Ikram (Coordinating Author), Egypt: Economic Management in a Period of
Transition (Published for the World Bank. Baltimor: the Johns Hopkins University Press,
1980) p. 13.
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In 1947, more than 70 percent of proprietors owned one feddan or less and their
total holdings accounted for one eighth of the cultivated land. (5) By the 1950s,
3 percent of land owners held 55 percent of the cultivated land, and the 60 largest
owners held farms averaging almost 2000 hectares while most farms were below
2 hectares. (6)
In 1952, the Revolution's Government turned its first attention towards the
agricultural sector in order to diminish the difference between large and small
land holdings. The first measure taken in this respect was the Land Reform
Law no. 178 of 1952 which limited the land holding to 200 feddans per person.
The implementation of this law resulted in a considerable change in the structure
of land holdings, as the owned land was redistributed in such a way as to give
landless farmers the chance to be land owners. Moreover, in 1961 Land Reform
Law no. 127 was passed to limit land holding to 100 feddans per person, thus
adding a further adjustment in the structure of land ownership. The distribution
of land ownership in Egypt, after the implementation of this law, is shown in the
following table:
(5) Richard Nyrop. op. cit., P.132.
(6) Rodney Wilson. Trade and Investment in the Middle East (London: the Macmillan Press
Ltd.. 1977) p. 23.
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Table 5.1. Distribution of land ownership in Egypt after the implementation
of the Land Reform Law no. 127 of 1961
Bracket Land owners Area owned
Thousand persons % Thousand feddans %
Less than 5 feddans 2,919 94.1 3,172 52.1
5 feddans — 80 2.6 526 8.5
10 feddans — 65 2.1 638 10.6
20 feddans — 26 0.8 818 13.5
50 feddans — 6 0.2 430 7.1
100 feddans — 5 0.2 500 8.2
Total 3,101 100 6,084 100
Source: CAPMS, Statistical Year Book: 1952-1983 (Cairo: CAPMS, 1984) p. 75.
This table shows that the structure of land ownership in Egypt, after 1961, is
quite different from that which prevailed before 1952, as small ownerships are the
dominant brackets in terms of both the number of owners and the owned area.
On the one hand, owners of less than 5 feddans acount for 94.1 percent of total
land owners and 52.1 percent of the owned area; on the other hand, owners of
100 feddans account for only 0.2 percent of total land owners and 8.2 percent of
the owned area. In this regard, it can be claimed that such a measure may be
welcomed from the standpoint of social justice, but the advantages are doubtful
from the standpoint of economies of scale. In other words, the breaking of land
ownership into small properties may make it difficult to use modern technologies
in the cultivation of land. As shown in table 5.1, the first bracket is represented
by 2,919 thousand owners of 3,172 feddans; this gives an average of 1.1 feddans
per person. In this case the mechanization of agriculture may raise the cost of
production so that it may become prohibitive.
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5.1.2. Land Reclamation: 
Given the limited cultivated area and the increasing population, land recla-
mation represents a central target for the Government in order to increase the
agricultural production and, simultaneously, create new jobs in rural areas. In
fact land reclamation in Egypt started as early as the nineteenth century when
the successive Governments' attention was directed towards the desert in order
to increase the cultivable area. Between 1892 and 1952, 400 thousand feddans
were reclaimed by the Government, large landlords and specialized companies. (7)
After 1952 more attention was given to land reclamation, and the total reclaimed
area between 1952 and 1986/87 amounted to 1,293.9 thousand feddans; 63.5
percent of this area was reclaimed between 1952 and 1967/68, and 36.5 per-
cent was reclaimed between 1968/69 and 1986/87. (8)
 The currrent Five-Year
Plan (1987/88-1991/92) estimates the reclaimable area until the year 2002 to
be 2,818.1 thousand feddans. (9) The area to be reclaimed during the Plan is
627 thousand feddans; this area is distributed as 137 thousand feddans to be re-
claimed by the private sector, and 490 thousand feddans to be reclaimed by the
Government. (10) By 1992 the cultivable area is expected to be 6,466.6 thousand
feddans, which is the sum of the currently cultivated area (5,839.6 thousand fed-
dans) and the area to be reclaimed during the plan (627 thousand feddans). In
fact the cultivated area does not represent the cropped area, as more than one
crop can be cultivated each year. For instance, the cultivated area in 1987 was
5,839.6 thousand feddans while the cropped area was 11,184.9 thousand feddans
(i.e. the cropped area is almost double the cultivated area); hence, the expected
cropped area in 1992 is about 12,933 thousand feddans. In this respect, the ques-
tion which arises is: does this mean that Egypt is self sufficient in the agricultural
(7) Robert Mabro, The Egyptian Economy: 1952-1972 (London: Oxford University Press,
1974) p. 98.
(8) Calculated from CAPMS (1988), P.82.
(9) The Five-Year Plan: 1987/88-1991/92, Cairo: Ministry of Planning, 1988, p. 464.
(10) Ibid., p. 468.
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production? The answer is no because Egypt imports more than 70 percent of its
needs of wheat, albeit it exports other kinds of crops especially cotton, fruit and
vegetables.
5.2. Industry: 
Egypt has a long industrial tradition which has resulted in a diversified in-
dustrial base and experienced entrepreneurs. During Mohammed Al's reign
(1805-1849) many industries were established in Egypt, but this period was
characterized by the State ownership of almost all industries, and this resulted
in a limited share of the private sector in the industrial activity. Although Mo-
hammed Ali's main purpose was to supply the army and navy with the necessary
equipment, there were many civil industries such as textiles, sugar, oil, paper ...
etc. Besides the provision of equipment and other commodities to the army, the
industrialization during Mohammed Ali's reign had other indirect benefits such
as reducing imports and providing the Treasury with new revenue. Nevertheless,
this industrialization attempt failed because of several reasons such as: (11)
(a) The quality of many manufactured goods was inferior and the costs of pro-
duction were higher than in Europe.
(b) There was European interference in Egypt, which was not allowed to protect
its own industries from European competition.
(c) The ineffectiveness of the State in controlling the economy and implementing
policy.
(d) The inability to create institutions that could ensure the efficient performance
of the economy.
(e) Resources were diverted to the military establishment and industry suffered
from labour shortages and financial restraints.
(f) There was a difficulty in resolving the conflict between related development
(11) Robert Mabro and Samir Radwan, The Industrialization of Egypt 1939-1973: Policy and
Performance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976) pp. 16-18.
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objectives competing for scarce resources.
5.2.1. The Evolution of Private-Sector Industry: 
,
After the experiment of Egypt's industry under Mohammed Ali, the Egyptian
economy had become export-oriented. Cotton was the main component of Egypt's
exports, and most of the limited number of industries established then were related
to cotton. In order to give impetus to industry, the private sector was encouraged
through foreign investment in Egypt. The introduction of foreign investment to
Egypt had its negative effects on the economy due to the remission of capital
abroad and payment on foreign debt contracted by private investors.
In 1920 Banque Misr (Bank of Egypt) was established as the first indigenous
bank to be wholly owned by Egyptians. The main concern of Banque Misr was
to sustain the then existing industrial companies as well as establishing new ones,
especially textile companies. Also, the establishment of Banque Misr encouraged
wealthy Egyptians to establish industrial firms, as the Bank was their prospective
source of finance. The involvement of Banque Misr in the establishment of in-
dustrial companies was well regarded by the Egyptians, as such involvement was
envisaged as a good support to the economy in general and the industrial sector
in particular. However, the outbreak of World War II had its negative effects on
world economies, especially the banking sector, and Bank Misr faced a liquidity
crisis in 1940 which was overcome thanks to the Government's intervention to
sustain the Bank. After the crisis of 1940, the "aggressive" investment policy of
Banque Misr was held back, and it could not regain power until the mid-1950s.
On the whole, during the 1930s and 1940s Egyptian industry experienced some
positive and some negative consequences of the Great Depression and World War
II; these are: (12)
(a) The emergence of skilled workers and foremen, as the Allied armies employed
(12) Adapted from Khalid Ikram. op. cit.. p. 236.
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100,000-200,000 men in various plants and workshops.
(b) The emergence of entrepreneurial talent in response to import shortages.
(c) The experiences of the Great Depression and World War II reinforced import-
substituting industrialization, as entrepreneurs and capitalists acquired better
knowledge about the local market and its needs.
(d) During the War Egyptian industry gained some protection from foreign com-
petition due to the disruption of foreign trade.
(e) On the other hand, the disruption of foreign trade prevented Egyptian indus-
try from importing equipment and spare parts necessary for new investment and
the replacement of worn-out machinery.
5.2.2. The Emergence of Public-Sector Industry: 
Until mid-1950s the private sector dominated Egyptian industry, as well as
other aspects of the economy, and the State ownership was confined to a limited
number of industries as well as infrastructure and social services. In 1957 the
Government took some measures to reduce the existence of foreign investments in
the country; these measures were known as the "Egyptianization". Egyptianiza-
tion means transferring the ownership of companies from foreigners to Egyptians,
i.e. the shares of joint ventures and foreign companies were transferred from for-
eigners to Egyptians. In 1960 a wave of nationalizations began, starting with
banks and insurance companies and extending to industrial companies.
By and large, the 1960s witnessed the transformation of the Egyptian economy
from an economy dominated by the private sector to an economy dominated by the
public sector. The dominance of the public sector resulted in a planned economy;
the first Five-Year Plan (1960-1965) was successful, but the second one never
took place due to the 1967 war and the mobilization of resources to rebuild the
army. The dominance of the public sector can be demonstrated via its share in
gross value-added in the manufacturing industry as shown in the following table:
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Table 5.2. Public sector's share in gross value-added in manufacturing,
1966/67 (percentage)
Manufacturing establishments
employing 10 persons and more
All manufacturing establishments
Industry
Public
sector's
share
Industry
Public
sector's
share
Petroleum
Electrical machinary
Basic metals
Tobacco
Textiles
Paper
Rubber
Chemicals
Beverages
Transport equiment
Non-electrical machinery
Food
Metalic products
Non-metalic products
Furniture
Wood
Wearing apparel
Leather
Printing
100
97
96
96
95
95
95
95
91
88
86
81
79
79
72
68
66
47
16
Petroleum
Tobacco
Basic metals
Chemicals
Rubber
Textiles
Paper
Electrical machinery
Beverages
Non-electrical machinery
Non-metalic products
Food
Transport equipment
Metalic products	 1
Leather
Furniture
Wood
Wearing apparel
Printing
100
94
94
94
93
92
91
90
88
75
65
60
59
61
20
20
20
14
14
Source: Robert Mabro and Samir Radwan, The Industrialization of Egypt 1939-1973:
Policy and Performance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976) p. 97.
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Table 5.2 shows that the various groups of manufacturing industry are dealt
with in the context of establishments employing 10 workers or more (usually
referred to as the "modern sector" or the "formal sector"), and in the context of
all manufacturing establishments including those employing less than 10 persons
(usually referred to as the "informal sector"). If dominance is deemed to mean
a share in gross value-added of more than 50 percent, public-sector dominance
of the manufacturing industry is obvious in both categories of establishments.
However, the dominance of the public sector is more obvious in establishments
employing 10 persons or more than it is in all manufacturing establishments; the
reasons may be:
(a) The relatively large size of public-sector companies, as the nationalization
measures concentrated on large companies rather than small ones.
(b) The tendency of private-sector establishments to be more concentrated in the
informal sector.
(c) The limited room left for the private sector in economic activities in general
and in industrial activities in particular.
In terms of industrial activities, table 5.2 shows that the public sector's share
in gross value-added ranged between 100 percent in petroleum and 14 percent
in wearing apparel and printing. Within this range the private sector dominated
some activities, namely leather, furniture, wood, wearing apparel and printing;
the reason may be that these activities are relatively easy to enter, and they do
not require a significant capital outlay. On the whole, the average share of the
public sector in gross value-added is 81.16 percent for establishments employing
10 persons or more, and 64.95 percent for all manufacturing establishments. This
is evidence of the overwhelming role of the public sector and the minor role of the
private sector, which prevailed during the 1960s and the early 1970s.
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5.3. Banks: 
Egyptian banks, like other institutions in the country, experienced different
stages of ownership. The evolution of the Egyptian banking sector seems to follow
the same pattern as other sectors, especially the industrial sector. In fact this is
not unusual, as the banking sector represents the main source of finance for all
economic activities, and it is the first sector to attract any government's attention
when it decides upon any measures to be implemented in the economy.
5.3.1. The Dominance of Private-Sector Banks: 
Until the late 1950s the Egyptian banking sector was dominated by privately-
owned banks. Moreover, almost all these institutions were either branches of
foreign banks or foreign-owned ones initiated in Egypt. The main banks estab-
lished in Egypt, until 1920, are shown in the following table:
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Table 5.3. The main banks established in Egypt until 1920
Year of
establish-
ment
Institution Location Ownership
1856 The Egyptian Bank Cairo Foreign-owned
1864 The Anglo-Egyptian Cairo Sponsored by Agra and
Bank Mastermans Bank (an
important Anglo-Indian
concern) and a French
finance company
1867 The Ottoman Bank Alexandria a branch of the Ottoman Bank
1870 The Yokohama Cairo Japanese branch
Specie Bank
1872 The Ottoman Bank Port Saeid a branch of the Ottoman Bank
1875 The Credit Lyonnais Port Saeid an office of the Credit Lyonnais
1880 Credit Foncier Cairo French
Egyptien
1R81 Societte Financiere Cairo French
1887 Cassa di Sconto e di Cairo Italian
Risparimo
1887 The Ottoman Bank Cairo an office of the Ottoman Bank
1895 Bank d'Athenes Cairo Greek
1898 The National Bank
of Egypt
Cairo Mainly British-owned with
the share of two local
cotton exporting firms
1902 The Agriculture Cairo owned by the National
Bank Bank of Egypt
1920 Banque Misr Cairo Egyptian
Source: Compiled from Rodney Wilson, Banking and Finance in the Arab Middle East
(London: Macmillim Publishers. Ltd., 1983) pp. 19-29.
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It is noticed in table 5.3 that Banque Misr was the only indigenous bank to
be wholly owned by Egyptians; the rest of the banks were either foreign-owned or
branches of foreign banks. Even the bank which bears the uame of Egypt, i.e. the
National Bank of Egypt, was mainly foreign-owned with limited participation of
Egyptians. Apart from financing the cotton crop, foreign banks had little interest
in the financing of productive sectors, mainly industry, due to the relatively high
risk associated with financing such sectors. Consequently, foreign banks gave more
attention to the financing of the trade sector, as the credit provided to this sector
achieved a higher turnover and higher profits. The fact that the majority of banks
were branches of foreign banks suggests that they had to operate according to
the policies established by their headquarters abroad; such policies were deemed
to comply with the interests of the banks rather than the interests of Egypt's
economy.
5.3.2. The Emergence of Public-Sector Banks: 
After the nationalization of the Suez Canal company and the tripartite aggres-
sion in 1956, the Government decided to restrict foreign interests in the country
in general and in the banking sector in particular. In this regard Law no. 22 of
1957 was passed Egyptianizing all banks operating in Egypt; this law stipulated
that banks' shares must be owned only by Egyptians. Also in 1957 Law no. 163
was passed in order to regulate banking and credit operations; in essence, this
law established the rules that govern the functioning of the Central Bank as well
as the banks to be registered with it.
However, it seems that the Egyptianization of the banking sector did not
satisfy the Government's desire to control such an important sector; hence, the
nationalization of the banking sector began in 1960. The nationalization of banks
started with Banque Misr and the National Bank of Egypt (NBE) in 1960; in
1961 the rest of the banks were nationalized, and this process was accompanied by
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some liquidations and amalgamations among small banks. By 1963 the Egyptian
banking sector was brought under the control of the State, as it consisted of only
public-sector banks. As far as the Central Bank was concerned, the NBE had
been acting as a central bank until 1960 when the bank-note-issue department
of the NBE was reconstituted as the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE), and the
NBE continued to operate as a commercial bank. (13) The main drawback of
nationalizing the banks was that they experienced a lack of flexibility, because
these institutions had to comply with several laws that govern their functioning
as banks and as public-sector entities. (14)
In 1964 a specialization measure was implemented amongst the Egyptian
banks, known as the "sectoral specialization", according to which the banking
operations of public-sector comapnies were distributed among commercial banks
in order to concentrate the operations of each sector with one bank. 1971
some amalgamations among banks were implemented, in order to achieve more
efficiency and benefit from the economies of scale. The Bank of Port Saeid was
amalgamated with Banque Misr, the Industrial Bank was amalgamated with the
Bank of Alexandria and the Credit Agricole Hypothecaire d'Egypte (the Agri-
cultural Hypothecary Credit [Bank] of Egypt) was amalgamated with the Credit
Foncier Egyptien (the Egyptian Real-Estate Credit [Bank]). Also in 1971 the
sectoral specialization was abolished and substituted by the "functional special-
ization", according to which each bank was assigned the financing of a specific
economic activity. (16)
 In this regard, the NBE was assigned the financing of
foreign trade, Banque Misr was assigned the financing of home trade and agri-
culture, the Bank of Alexandria was assigned the financing of industry and the
(13) Law no. 250 of 1960, amended by Law no. 277 of 1960.
(14) Law no. 163 of 1957 concerning banks and credit, Law no. 58 of 1971 concerning civil
employees. Law no. 60 of 1971 concerning public-sector companies and Law no. 61 of
1971 concerning public-sector employees.
(15) CBE, Economic Review, (XXIV) no. 3, Cairo: CBE, 1984, p. 284.
(16) Republican Decree no. 2422 of 1971.
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Credit Foncier Egyptien was assigned the financing of housing and construction.
It is worth mentioning that such a specialization was applied to the banks' deal-
ings with public-sector companies, and the private sector was left free to deal with
all banks.
The implementation of the functional specialization among commercial banks
was designed to achieve full control and coordination, among different sectors of
the economy, within the context of a planned economy. Nevertheless, such a spe-
cialization brought about some negative consequences such as: (17)
(a) An unbalanced performance among banks, i.e. the bank which was assigned
the financing of an activity which was in a continuous need of finance (e.g. indus-
try) faced liquidity shortages. On the other hand, the bank which was assigned
the financing of an activity which enjoyed a higher turnover (e.g. trade) experi-
enced excess liquidity.
(b) The lack of a competitive spirit among these banks as regards public-sector
customers. Also some banks did little to attract private-sector customers, as the
financing of public-sector companies exhausted most of their resources.
In 1975, however, the functional specialization was abolished in order to give
the banks more freedom in dealing with different sectors, and to revive the spirit
of competition among these banks. (18)
5.4. The Open-Door Economic Policy:
Egypt was in a state of war from 1948 until 1973; during this period Egypt
was involved in four wars, the last of them was in 1973. Egypt's involvement in
these wars necessitated substantial amounts of military expenditure as shown in
the following table:
(17) Mahrous A. Hamm, "An Appraisal of Lending Policies in the Egyptian Commercial Banks"
(Cairo: Ain Shams University. M.B.A. thesis, 1980) (in Arabic) p.150.
(18) Republican Decree no. 663 of 1975.
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Table 5.4. The economic burden of defence expenditure in Egypt.
Year Total spending
(Smillion)
Spending per capita
($)
Percentage of
GNP
1963/64 437 16 8.6
1968 690 22 12.5
1969 805 24 13.0
1970 1,262 38 19.6
1971 1,495 43 21.7
1972 1,510 43 20.2
1973 2,757 77 31.0
1974 3,117 111 22.8
1975 6,103 163 N. A.
1976 4,859 128 N. A.
N. A. = not available.
Source: Rodney Wilson. The Economies of the Middle East (London: The Macmillan Press
Ltd.. 1979) p. 33.
It is noticeable in table 5.4 that defence expenditure, both total and per capita
spending, was increasing until 1975. In 1976 both total spending and spending
per capita decreased; the reason is that military spending after 1973 was mainly
for the substitution of equipment and rebuilding the army rather than preparing
for a war. However, defence expenditure had obvious opportunity costs, as such
expenditure could have generated extra production and extra income had it been
used in other productive sectors. Moreover, the state of war had other indirect
negative effects on other economic activities such as tourism and the Suez Canal
which was closed during the period 1967-1975. On the other hand, defence
expenditure, as a percentage of the Gross National Product (GNP), increased
until it reached its peak in 1973 when it accounted for 31 percent of GNP. This
is an indication of the magnitude of defence expenditure incurred during the
period shown in table 5.4. By and large, the main consequences of incurring
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such expenditure were the negative effects on the economy's performance and
contracting foreign debt, especially military debt.
After the 1973 war, the Government reckoned that achieving a reasonable
economic development and growth could not be achieved in the context of a
socialist-oriented economy. Hence, it was decided to open the economy to Arab
and foreign investors, as well as the indigenous private sector, via a policy known
as the Open-Door Economic Policy (ODEP). In this respect a law was passed
in 1974, known as Law no. 43 of 1974 concerning the investment of Arab and
foreign funds and free zones, which was amended by Law no. 32 of 1977. The
areas available for Arab and foreign investment are enumerated in the Law as
follows: (19)
(a) Industry, mining, energy, tourism, transportation and other areas.
(b) Reclamation and cultivation of desert and barren land, animal husbandry and
fishing projects.
(c) Housing and urban extension projects, which include the division of land and
erecting new buildings and their public utilities.
(d) Investment companies whose objective is the investment of funds in the areas
specified by this Law.
(e) Investment-and-business banks and reinsurance companies whose activities
are confined to foreign-exchange transactions.
(f) Banks that undertake transactions in local currency, as long as they are joint
ventures, with the local Egyptian share being not less than 51 percent.
(g) Construction activities outside the cultivated area and the boundaries of ex-
isting cities.
(h) Contracting activities undertaken by joint-stock companies with an Egyptian
share of not less than 50 percent.
(i) Technical consultancy activities undertaken by joint-stock companies, provided
(19) Article 3 of Law no.43 of 1974, as amended by Law no. 32 of 1977.
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that their activities are relevant to the areas enumerated in this Law.
It is noticeable that Arab and foreign investors can launch new projects in
almost all areas of the Egyptian economy. Moreover, the Law established several
incentives and guarantees in order to encourage different investors to invest their
money in Egypt in compliance with the State's policies and plans. These incen-
tives and guarantees are: (20)
(a) The projects are not to be nationalized or confiscated; also the assets of these
projects cannot be seized, blocked or sequestrated without a judicial rule.
(b) Companies established according to the provisions of this Law will be con-
sidered as private-sector companies regardless of the legal status of indigenous
participants; also the legislation and statutes that govern the public sector and
its employees are not applicable to these companies.
(c) Companies established according to this Law are not obliged to observe Law
no. 73 of 1973 concerning the conditions and procedures of electing workers' repre-
sentatives to the boards of directors of public-sector companies, quoted companies
and private societies and establishments. The companies' statutes shall provide
for the workers' participation in their management.
(d) Projects established according to the provisions of this Law will be exempted
from corporate tax and other taxes for a five-year period; this can be extended
to eight years according to a proposal from the board of directors of the Pub-
lic Authority for Investment and Free Zones (PAIFZ) and with the Cabinet's
approval. Tax exemption will be for ten years for the projects engaged in recon-
struction, land reclamation and erecting new cities outside the cultivated area
and the boundaries of existing cities; this exemption may be extended to fifteen
years by a Republican Decree based on a proposal from the board of directors of
the PAIFZ.
The above-mentioned guarantees and incentives stimulated many investors,
(20) Articles 7,9,10 and 16 of Law no. 43 of 1974, as amended by Law no. 32 of 1977.
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both indigenous and foreign, to launch new projects in Egypt. By the end of De-
cember 1987 there were 1,355 projects, established according to the forementioned
Law, as shown in the following table: 	
'
Table 5.5. Projects established in Egypt under the provisions of Law no. 43
of 1974, as amended by Law no. 32 of 1977, until December 31, 1987.
Sectors Number of
projects
Authorized capital
LE million
Target cost
LE million
Industry 571 2,644.5 6,819.6
Finance* 256 1,829.0 2,050.1
Agriculture and livestock 105 349.3 760.9
Construction 197 688.0 1,494.4
Services 226 1,200.6 2,560.3
Total 1,355 6,711.4 13,685.3
* Embraces banks and investment companies
Source: Public Authority for Investment and Free Zones (PAIFZ), Cairo, 1988.
Table 5.5 shows that the projects started in the industrial sector outnumber
the projects engaged in any other sector; if their percentage is calculated, the
industrial projects will account for 42.1 percent of total projects. This seems to
comply with the Government's policy of encouraging local industries in order to
satisfy the local demand as well as that for export. On the other hand, the projects
started in agriculture and livestock are the least numerous, as they account for
only 7.8 percent of total projects. The reason for the smaller number of agricul-
tural projects may be the relatively long period required for reclaiming the land
and cultivating it. This does not affect the tax-exemption period, as this period
starts from the beginning of the first financial year which succeeds the starting of
the activity (according to the Law). In fact the agricultural sector needs more in-
vestment than any other sector, save industry, as the agricultural output, mainly
from food crops, lags behind the population's needs. Also, as mentioned earlier,
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the cultivated area represents only 4 percent of Egypt's total area; taking into
consideration the annual increase in population, the importance of productive
sectors is quite obvious. Concerning other sectors, the financial projects come in
the second place (after the industrial projects), accounting for 18.9 percent of the
total, service projects in the third place (16.7 percent) and construction projects
in the fourth place (14.5 percent). In this regard, it is worth mentioning that of
the 1,355 projects, 849 started their activities by December, 1987, accounting for
62.7 percent of total projects, and the rest are still under construction. Also, the
highest percentage of the projects that started their activities is in the service
sector (65 percent), and the lowest is in the agricultural sector (43.8 percent). (21)
This may be due to the difference in the period required for them to materialize,
which favours the service sector rather than the agricultural sector. Such a factor
may be behind the Government's obvious involvement in land reclamation, from
which the private sector often refrains.
5.5. Current Status and the Future: 
5.5.1. The Current Status of the Egyptian Economy: 
The current status of the Egyptian economy can be assessed by demonstrating
the shares of different sectors in GDP as shown in the following table:
(21) Percentages are calculated from more detailed data collected from the PAIFZ. Cairo, 1988.
114
Table 5.6. Distribution of GDP in 1986/87, at 1981/82 prices
Sectors LE million % Annual growth %
Agriculture 4,670.0 16.7 '	 2.9
Industry and mining 4,128.7 14.8 7.3
Petroleum 3,866.5 13.8 (2.1)
Electricity 240.8 0.9 9.8
Construction 1,241.7 4.4 (2.5)
Total commodity sectors 14,147.7 50.6 2.3
Transportation and storage 2,176.9 7.8 6.1
Suez Canal 662.6 2.4 1.5
Trade 3,428.5 12.2 4.3
Finance 1,873.0 6.7 6.0
Insurance 46.9 0.2 7.1
Restaurants and hotels 299.4 1.1 16.1
Total productive services
	 , 8,487.3 30.4 5.3
Real estate 579.8 2.1 8.0
Public utilities 112.8	 . 0.4 19.9
Social and personal services 1,190.0 4.2 7.5	 .
Social insurance 46.4 0.2 17.8
Government services 3,393.0 12.1 7.4
Total social services 5,322.0 19.0 7.8
Grand total 27,957.0 100 4.2
o = negative growth
Source: The Five-Year Plan: 1987/88-1991/92, Cairo: Ministry of Planning, 1988, p. 29.
It is noticed in table 5.6 that commodity sectors account for more than half
the GDP generated in the fiscal year 1986/87 (50.6 percent compared with 30.4
percent for productive services and 19.0 percent for social services). The agri-
cultural sector has the highest share in GDP among commodity sectors (and
all other sectors), accounting for 16.7 percent of GDP and the industrial sector
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comes in the second place accounting for 14.8 percent. The annual growth in the
agricultural sector (2.9 percent) is notably less than that of the industrial sector
(7.3 percent). This may be due to: (a) industrial projects, stimulated by the
ODEP, are more than fivefold the agricultural projects, as shown earlier in table
5.5; (b) many land reclamation projects have not materialized yet; and (c) the
agricultural output is vulnerable to insects and changes in the weather. Also, it is
noticed in table 5.6 that the annual growth in commodity sectors is less than that
of other sectors (2.3 percent compared with 5.3 percent for productive services
and 7.8 percent for social services). In fact the growth in commodity sectors was
hindered by the negative growth in the petroleum and construction sectors (mi-
nus 2.1 percent and minus 2.5 percent respectively), which diluted the reasonable
growth achieved in industry and electricity.
Hence, it can be said that the Egyptian economy tends to be commodity-
oriented rather than service-oriented, as the share of commodity sectors in GDP
is 50.6 percent vis-a-vis 49.4 percent for service sectors. Nevertheless, Egypt
needs to achieve more output and more growth in commodity sectors, in order to
increase exports and reduce imports. Such an achievement may help in tackling
the following problems: (22)
(a) In 1987 the total external debt amounted to $34.4 billion, and the debt service
ratio for the same year was 23.2 percent.
(b) Also in 1987, the trade deficit amounted to $4.33 billion, and the current
account deficit to $0.32 billion.
(c) The current account deficit is expected to be aggravated by highly-priced
cereal imports, depressed oil prices, uncertainty over workers' remittances and
the need to keep up debt servicing.
(d) A gross deficit in the 1988/89 budget of LE 7.2 billion which is expected to
(22) Compiled from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Country Profile: Egypt (London:
the Economist Publications Ltd.. 1988) pp.20-44; EIU, Egypt: Country Report. No.l. 1989
(London: the Economist Publications Ltd., 1989) pp. 2-5.
116
be equivalent to 15.8 percent of GDP.
(e) Food imports cost over $2 billion a year.
(f) The rate of price inflation during the period 1981-1987 lies in the range of
16-18 percent, which was an imported inflation, mainly due to the depreciation
of the exchange rate for the Egyptian Pound.
(g) Although the share of industrial exports in visible exports grew from 5.1
percent in 1981/82 to 8.2 percent in 1986/87, the growth of industrial production
slowed down from 10 percent during the 1970s and the early 1980s to about 7
percent in 1985/86 and 1986/87.
5.5.2 Future Expectations for the Egyptian Economy: 
The future expectations for the Egyptian economy may be envisaged through
the planned GDP as well as the planned investment. In this regard, it is worth
mentioning that the first development plan that came into effect since the 1.960s
was the 1982/83-1986/87 plan, and the second plan is the current Five-Year plan
(1987/88-1991/92). This latter plan expects the GDP in the fiscal year 1991/92
to be as follows:
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Table 5.7. Planned GDP in 1991/92, at 1986/87 prices
Sectors LE million % Annual growth %
Agriculture 10,550.0 19.5 '	 4.1
Industry and mining 10,397.0 19.2 8.4
Petroleum 1,898.0 3.5 2.3
Electricity 729.0 1.4 7.1
Construction 2,647.0 4.9 5.9
Total commodity sectors 26,221.0 48.5 5.8
Transportation and storage 3,963.5 7.3 5.8
Suez Canal 855.5 1.6 1.1
Trade, finance and insurance 12,624.0 23.3 5.5
Restaurants and hotels 668.0 1.2 10.9
Total productive services 18,111.0 33.4 5.6
Housing and public utilities 1,409.0 2.6 11.4
Other services 8,385.0 15.5 5.4
Total social services 9,794.0 18.1 6.2
Grand total 54,126.0 100 5.8
Source: The Five-Year Plan, p. 113.
The most distinctive feature of the planned GDP, as shown in table 5.7, is
that commodity sectors are expected to account for only 48.5 percent of GDP in
1991/92 compared with 50.6 percent in 1986/87. The main reason is the decline
in the share of petroleum in GDP from 13.8 percent in 1986/87 to only 3.5 percent
in 1991/92, as petroleum is not expected to represent a significant sector during
the 1990s. On the other hand, shares in GDP of the rest of the commodity
sectors are expected to be higher than their shares during the 1980s, with the
most significant increase anticipated in industry and mining. As regards service
sectors, productive services are the only sectors to expect an increase in their
share in GDP (33.4 percent in 1991/92 compared with 30.4 percent in 1986/87),
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which offsets the decrease in the shares of both commodity sectors and social
services. Also, the overall growth rate of GDP is expected to be 5.8 percent in
1991/92 compared with 4.2 percent in 1986/87, with the highest growth rate to be
achieved in commodity sectors (5.8 percent in 1991/92 compared with 2.3 percent
in 1986/87).
The increasing attention given to commodity sectors, mainly industry and
agriculture, stems from the Government's desire to reduce imports of some com-
modities and increase exports of others. Also, the Government tries to avoid
dependence on uncontrollable revenues from some sources such as oil, Suez Canal
tolls and workers' remittances. Among other objectives, the Five-Year Plan
1987/88-1991/92 aims at improving the status of the balance of payments via
the following measures: (23)
(a) A target annual increase of 14 percent in industrial exports, which are expected
to account for 44 percent of total commodity exports by 1991/92 compared with
30 percent in 1986/87.
(b) A target annual increase of 7 percent in agricultural exports, which are ex-
pected to account for 17 percent of total commodity exports by 1991/92.
(c) A target annual increase of 17.8 percent of tourism revenues, which will be
achieved via sophisticated promotional campaigns.
(d) Reducing imports of luxury commodities, and achieving self sufficiency in
other commodities by increasing local production from import-substituting in-
dustries.
The objectives demonstrated in the current Five-Year Plan will be achieved
with a planned investment of LE 45,816.6 million as shown in the following table:
(23) The Five-Year Plan. 2.11.. cit.. Pp. 378-9.
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Table 5.8. Planned investment for the period 1987/88-1991/92
Sectors Public sector Private sector Both sectors
LE million % LE million 70 LE million %
Commodity sectors 14,584.5 52.4 9,600.0 53.3 24,184.5 52.8
Productive services 5,527.5 19.9 1,700.0 9.5 7,227.5 15.8
Social services 7,704.6 27.7 6,700.0 37.2 14,404.6 31.4
Tot al 27,816.6 100 18,000.0 100 45,816.6 100
Source: Adapted from the Five-Year Plan, p. 272.
Table 5.8 shows that commodity sectors are expected to absorb more than half
the planned investment compared with 15.8 percent for productive services and
31.4 percent for social services. Also, it is noticed that the planned investment
for the public sector of LE 27,816.6 million outweighs the expected investment
from the private sector of LE 18,000 million, accounting for 60.7 percent and 39.3
percent of the total planned investment respectively. However, the private sector
is expected to have a major share in the planned investment for some sectors as
follows: (24)
(a) The private sector is expected to undertake investments worth LE 2.7 billion,
accounting for 53.7 percent of the planned investment for agriculture and land
reclamation of LE 4.9 billion.
(b) The private sector is expected to undertake investments worth LE 6.4 billion,
accounting for 52.2 percent of the planned investment for industry of LE 12.2
billion.
(c) The private sector is expected to undertake investments worth LE 220 million,
accounting for 51.4 percent of the planned investment for tourism of LE 428
million.
(24) Ibid.. pp. 490-91.
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Chapter Six
Finance Resources
in Egypt
6.1. Banks
6.1.1. The Egyptian Banking System
6.1.2. Commercial Banks
6.1.3. Investment-and-Business Banks
6.2. Insurance Companies
6.3. Profit-Sharing Finance
6.3.1. Islamic Banks
6.3.2. Other Sources of Profit-Sharing Finance
6.1. Banks: 
6.1.1. The Egyptian Banking System: 
,
Before 1974 the Egyptian banking system consisted of public-sector banks
only, and these banks undertook the financing of all economic activities in the
country. After the adoption of the ODEP in 1974 private-sector banks emerged;
these include indigenous private-sector banks, joint-venture banks and branches
of foreign banks. By June 1986 the total number of banks operating in Egypt
amounted to 99 banks, 98 of which are registered with the Central Bank of Egypt
(CBE) and the other one is a free-zone bank which undertakes off-shore opera-
tions. The Egyptian banking system is illustrated in the following figure:
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It can be noticed that almost all banks operating in Egypt are under the con-
trol of the CBE, and the only exception is one bank operating in the free zone.
The rest of the banks fall into three main categories: Commercial banks, spe-
cialized banks and investment-and-business banks (IB banks) established under
the provisions of law no. 43 of 1974 (amended by law no. 32 of 1977). From
the standpoint of ownership, these banks fall into three categories: public-sector,
joint-stock Egyptian companies and branches of foreign banks. Commercial banks
represent the major activity, accounting for 45 percent of all banks registered
with the CBE, IB banks account for 33.6 percent and specialized banks account
for 21.4 percent. On the other hand, it might be inferred, from figure 6.1., that
public-sector banks are no longer dominating the banking activity in Egypt on the
grounds that all public-sector banks (both commercial and specialized) amount
to 25 banks vis-a-vis 73 other banks. But this inference may prove untrue if the
geographical spread is investigated in terms of the number of branches, as shown
in the following table:
Table 6.1. Distribution of bank branches in Egypt according to
legal form and type of activity, 1986
Legal form Public-sector Banks established under the Total*
Type
of activity
banks provisions of Law no. 43 of 1974
Commercial banks 625 199 824
Specialized banks 153 — 153
IB banks — 86 86
Total* 778 285 1,063
* Excluding branches abroad.
Source: Compiled and calculated from Ibid., pp. 42-57.
Table 6.1 shows that public-sector banks still dominate the banking activity
in Egypt in terms of the number of branches. If commercial banks are consid-
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ered, branches of public-sector banks amount to 625 branches (76 percent of the
total of commercial-bank branches) compared with 199 branches of banks estab-
lished under the provisions of Law no. 43 of 1974 (24 percent of the total of
commercial-bank branches). Also, public-sector banks dominate the whole activ-
ity of specialized banks, accounting for 153 branches. As for the total number of
banks in all activities, the public-sector-bank branches are 778 branches, account-
ing for 73 percent of all-activity branches compared with 285 branches for Law
43 banks which account for merely 27 percent of all-activity branches. On the
other hand, it can be noticed that banks established under the provisions of Law
no. 43 of 1974 did not enter the activity of specialized banks; this may be due
to the nature of the loans of specialized banks which have a long maturity and a
low profit margin. This phenomenon has two implications: (a) non-public-sector
banks usually seek safe and profitable activities; and (b) the Government has to
interfere in the banking activity in order to secure sufficient finance for productive
businesses, especially in the agricultural and industrial fields.
Before discussing the different types of banks, it is worth mentioning that the
following types of banks will be excluded:
(a) The DIB which was discussed in chapter one.
(b) Agricultural banks and real-estate banks, as they are irrelevant to the financ-
ing of small-scale industrial firms (SSIFs).
(c) The free-zone bank (not registered with the CBE) which carries out off-shore
operations.
6.1.2. Commercial Banks: 
As mentioned above, commercial banks represent the major proportion of
the banking activity in Egypt. In terms of the number of banks, commercial
banks account for 45 percent of all banks working in Egypt; and in terms of
the number of branches, they account for 77.5 percent of all bank branches in
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Egypt. Commercial banks, also, include four public-sector banks which represent
the big four in the Egyptian banking system, with the longest experience and
the most substantial ammounts of resources compared with other kinds of banks.
The magnitude of the activity of commercial banks can be illustrated in their
consolidated balance sheet as shown in the following table:
Table 6.2. Consolidated balance sheet of commercial banks in Egypt,
June, 30, 1987
Assets/Liabilities LE million %
Assets:
Cash 715.0 1.6
Securities and investments 4,332.7 9.4
Due on banks in Egypt 11,959.0 26.1
Due on banks abroad 6,080.5 13.2
Loans and discounting 20,142.4 43.9
Other assets 2,670.4 5.8
Total assets 45,900.0 100
Liabilities:
Net worth 1,263.2 2.8
Provisions 2,006.8 4.4
Bonds and long-term loans 203.2 0.4
Due to banks in Egypt 3,157.2 6.9
Due to banks abroad 3,624.2 7.9
Deposits 30,803.9 67.1
Other liabilities 4,841.5 10.5
Total liabilities 45,900.0 100
Source: CBE. "Annual Report: 1986/87", Cairo: CBE, 1987, p. 42.
Table 6.2 shows that commercial banks have substantial amounts of funds
represented in their balance-sheet total of LE 45.9 billion; the significance of this
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figure becomes clear when it is compared with the State-budget total of LE 23.06
billion for the fiscal year 1987/88." ) The major components of this consolidated
balance sheet are the balance sheets of public-sector banks, (the big four). All of
these banks rank among the largest banks in the Arab world in terms of total
assets.
The most significant component of this commercial-bank balance sheet is the
deposits, which account for 67.1 percent of total liabilities; these deposits are
deemed to finance the banks' advancement of credit after catering for liquidity
requirements. However, these banks have to comply with the restriction imposed
by the CBE regarding the upper limit for the loans they can advance; this limit
is currently 65 percent of total deposits, which is known as the credit ceiling. The
implementation of this restriction is evident in the size of loans and discounting
which represent 65.4 percent of total deposits. Nevertheless, commercial banks
can offset the credit-ceiling restriction by increasing their investments, as they
can participate in the establishment of projects. (2) Unfortunately, the magni-
tude of commercial-bank investments cannot be derived from their consolidated
balance sheet, shown in table 6.2, as the securities include Government securities
that constitute part of liquidity requirements. Accordingly, the most significant
component to be investigated is loans and discounting shown in the following
table:
(1) CBE, -Annual RI port: 1987/88," Cairo: CBE. 1988, p. 102.
(2) Article 15 of Law no.120 of 1975.
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Table 6.3. Distribution of commercial-bank loans and discounting,
according to sectors and types of activity, in Egypt, June, 30, 1987
Sectors/Types of activity LE million' %
Sectors:
Government 4,242.0 21.1
Public-sector companies 5,362.0 26.6
Private enterprises 9,751.4 48.4
Households 527.5 2.6
Foreign 259.5 1.3
Total loans and discounting 20,142.4 100
Types of activity:
Agriculture 559.9 2.8
Industry 7,017.6 34.8
Trade 7,501.3 37.3
Services 4,137.4 20.5
Unclassified sectors 926.2 4.6
Total loans and discounting 20,142.4 100
Source: Ibid., p. 45.
It is noticeable that the figures shown in table 6.3 embrace bill discounting
as well as loans, presumably because the discounting of bills represents a credit
advance to the customers. The distribution of loans according to sectors shows
that the major sectors receiving commercial-bank loans are private enterprises
(48.4 percent), public-sector companies (26.6 percent) and the Government (21.1
percent). The loans advanced to private-sector enterprises amount to more than
the sum of loans advanced to both the public sector and the Government. This
can be regarded as a consequence of the emergence of a significant private sector
in the Egyptian economy after the adoption of the ODEP in 1974. Concerning
the loans to both the public sector and the Government, they can be said to be
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almost confined to public-sector banks that have financial resources large enough
to undertake such financing.
Concerning the distribution of loans according to the types of activity, it is
noticeable that the major receivers of commercial-bank loans are trade, industry
and services, accounting for 37.3 percent, 34.8 percent and 20.5 percent respec-
tively. Loans to agriculture will not be discussed in this context, as they are
insignificant due to the existence of agricultural banks all over the country. As
far as industry is concerned, loans to this activity are more significant than those
advanced to services; this can be due to many services being mainly in the Gov-
ernment's hands, such as health, education, transport and communications, and
these services being financed directly from the State budget. On the other hand,
loans to industry lag behind those advanced to the trade activity; this may be
due to one or more of the following reasons:
(a) Loans for the trade activity are mainly short-term, which achieves a higher
turnover as compared with loans to the industrial activity.
(b) Loans for the trade activity are more profitable than those advanced to the
industrial activity, as the interest-rate structure set by the CBE establishes a min-
imum of 16 percent and no maximum for loans to the trade activity, compared
with a minimum of 11 percent and maximum of 15 percent for both industry and
agriculture. (3)
(c) The reluctance of commercial banks to get involved in long-term financing,
mainly industrial financing, and the risk associated therewith.
Hence, it can be claimed that commercial banks tend to prefer short-term,
rather than long-term, loans as inferred from the high share of loans accounted
for by the trade activity. Ironically, the CBE set a high interest rate on loans to
the trade activity in order to curb the credit advanced to it; but this resulted in
the opposite outcome because trade enterprises could afford such a high cost of
(3) CBE, "Animal Report: 1986/87". Cairo: CBE. 1987, p. 96.
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borrowing, as they could pass it on fairly easily to their customers. In this regard,
it might be argued that commercial banks depend mainly on customers' deposits
and they must cater for any withdrawals from these deposits. Such an argument
seems to be refutable, as commercial banks can advance medium-and long-term
loans (MTLT loans) without fear of liquidity shortages because:
(a) A reasonable proportion of their deposits is represented in non-volatile de-
posits, i.e. time deposits and saving deposits. During the period 1981-1985, for
instance, the average percentage of time deposits to total commercial-bank de-
posits was 30.8 percent, and the average percentage of saving deposits was 10.4
percent. (4)
(b) The liquidity requirement (a minimum of 30 percent of total deposits) is set
by the CBE in order to enable these banks to meet their customers' withdrawals
from deposits.
(c) The withdrawal of funds by the customers usually intersects with the deposit-
ing of funds; this results in a minimum level of deposits at any time during the
year.
(d) Apart from being state-owned, public-sector banks are more qualified than
private-sector ones to advance MTLT loans, as they are well established and have
significant resources, especially their equity base.
6.1.3. Investment-and-Business Banks: 
These banks were introduced to Egypt in the 1970s after the opening of the
economy in 1974. According to the law, the main purposes of investment-and-
business banks (IB banks) are: (5)
(a) the pooling and promotion of savings;
(b) establishing investment companies and other companies; and
(4) Calculated from: National Bank of Egypt. Economic Bulletin. (XXXIX). no.3. 1986.
p. 190.
(5) Article 17 of Law no.120 of 1975.
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(c) the financing of Egypt's foreign trade.
According to this definition, the activites of IB banks are expected to be,
-
more or less, different from those of commercial banks; these activities are shown
in the following consolidated balance sheet:
Table 6.4. Consolidated balance sheet of IB banks in Egypt,
June, 30, 1987
Assets/Liabilities LE million
Assets:
Cash 65.8 0.6
Securities and investments 399.6 3.6
Due on banks in Egypt 2,024.9 18.2
Due on banks abroad 2,427.0 21.8
Loans and discounting 5,124.8 46.1
Other assets 1,085.4 9.7
Total assets 11,127.5 100
Liabilities:
Net worth 962.0 8.7
Provisions 651.5 5.9
Bonds and loans 14.5 0.1
Due to banks in Egypt 2,549.7 22.9
Due to banks abroad 1,905.6 17.1
Deposits 3,893.4 35.0
Other liabilities 1,150.8 10.3
Total liabilities 11,127.5 100
Source: Ibid.. p. 48.
It is noticeable in table 6.4 that the liabilities of IB banks have a different
distribution, as compared with those of commercial banks, mainly deposits and
due to banks both in Egypt and abroad. In this regard, IB banks seem to be
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less dependent on deposits than commercial banks, as the deposits account for 35
percent of their liabilities while they account for 67.1 percent of commercial-bank
liabilities. Concerning the funds due to banks, both in Egypt and abroad, they
are more significant than deposits, as they account together for 40 percent of
total liabilities compared with 14.8 percent for commercial banks. On the other
hand, the funds due on banks, both in Egypt and abroad, have the same relative
importance as that of the funds due to banks (40 percent of total assets), which
is nearly the same as in commercial banks (39.3 percent of total assets). Hence,
it can be inferred that IB banks are more dependent on inter-bank activities
than commercial banks, and these activities are deemed to be mainly for clearing
purposes. At the same time, it can be inferred that commercial banks tend to
be creditors, rather than debtors, to other banks; and this might imply that
commercial banks lend to, or deposit funds in, other banks.
As far as the assets are concerned, table 6.4 shows that the most significant
component of these assets is loans and discounting, which account for 46.1 percent
of total assets compared with 43.9 percent for commercial banks. Yet the most
interesting point to notice is that securities and investments account for only 3.6
percent of the assets of IB banks, while they account for 9.4 percent of the assets
of commercial banks. This shows that IB banks are more inclined to concentrate
on loans rather than investments, although they are, by definition, investment
banks. In this regard, it might be argued that the insignificance of investments
can be offset by concentrating on MTLT loans to productive sectors, mainly
industry. Such an argument cannot be correct in the light of the distribution of
loans advanced by IB banks as shown in the following table:
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Table 6.5. Distribution of loans and discounting advanced by IB banks,
according to sectors and types of activity, in Egypt, June, 30, 1987
Sectors/Types of activity LE million' %
Sectors:
Government 735.8 14.3
Public-sector companies 225.1 4.4
Private enterprises 2,781.0 54.3
Households 108.6 2.1
Foreign 1,274.3 24.9
Total loans and discounting 5,124.8 100
Types of activity:
Agriculture 83.3 1.6
Industry 699.4 13.7
Trade 1,485.2 29.0
Services 1,251.3 24.4
Unclassified sectors 1,605.6 31.3
Total loans and discounting 5,124.8 100
Source: Ibid.. p. 52.
The sectoral distribution of the loans advanced by IB banks, in table 6.5,
shows that private enterprises represent the leading sector, as they account for
more than half of these loans. The second major sector is the foreign sector which
accounts for 24.9 percent of ID loans, while it accounts for only 1.3 percent of
commercial-banks loans. This may be because IB banks are mainly joint-stock
banks or branches of foreign banks, which facilitates their dealings with foreign
sectors especially if such dealings require foreign currencies. On the other hand,
loans to the Government and public-sector companies are much less significant,
as they account for 14.3 percent and 4.4 percent of IB loans compared with 21.1
percent and 26.6 percent of commercial-bank loans, respectively. This is because
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commercial banks include public-sector banks with which the dealings of the
Government and public-sector companies concentrate.
Concerning the distribution of loans according to the 'types of activity, table
6.5 shows that the "unclassified sectors" account for the highest proportion of
these loans (31.3 percent). In this regard, it is worth mentioning that it was
impossible for the author to obtain any details about these "unclassified sectors";
hence, this item will be excluded from the discussion. As regards other activities,
the trade activity is of major importance, similar to commercial banks with a rel-
atively lower percentage, and the same expected reasons hold. The most striking
point is that the industrial activity has a minor share, as it accounts for only 13.7
percent of these loans, compared with 29.0 percent for trade and 24.4 percent
for services. Taking into consideration these figures as well as the minor share
of investments, in the consolidated balance sheet of IB banks, the orientation of
these banks is quite clear. The main reason for the major share in the loans
advanced by IB banks, accounted for by the trade activity, seems to be a loophole
in the Law; in defining IB banks, Law n.120 of 1975 mentioned that these banks
‘`may also undertake the financing of Egypt's foreign trade". This phrase seems
to indicate a secondary objective for TB banks, but it turned out to represent the
main objective of these banks although they are, by definition, investment banks.
During the final stages of this study some more detailed data became avaiable;
these data emphasize the inferences drawn above as regards the inclination of both
commercial banks and IB banks to prefer short-term loans. Such an emphasis will
be demonstrated via the distribution of loans advanced by both types of banks,
according to maturity, as shown in the following table:
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Table 6.6. Distribution of loans, advanced by both commercial banks
and IB banks, according to maturity, June, 30, 1987
(excluding discounting)
Items LE million
Secured short-term loans 6,042.0 24.0
Unsecured short-term loans 13,311.0 52.7
Total short-term loans (up to one year) 19,353.0 76.7
Secured MTLT loans 3,923.0 15.5
Unsecured MTLT loans 426.0 1.7
Total MTLT loans (more than one year) 4,349.0 17.2
Matured and unrepaid loans 1,549.0 6.1
Total loans 25,251.0 100
Source: Adapted from : CBE,"Annual Report: 1987/88", Cairo: CBE, 1988, p. 132.
Table 6.6 is quite clear in showing the dominant share accounted for by short-
term loans (76.7 percent of total loans), and the minor share accounted for by
MTLT loans (17.2 percent of total loans). As regards security, short-term loans
tend to be unsecured; if secured short-term loans are considered, they will account
for only 31.2 percent of total short-term loans. In fact, this is not unusual as
those short-term loans are for one year or less, and they are assumed to finance
temporary or self-liquidating operations. On the other hand, MTLT loans tend
to be secured; if secured MTLT loans are considered, they will account for 90.2
percent of total MTLT loans. Concerning bill discounting, it represents a tiny
fraction of these banks' credit; from tables 6.3 and 6.5 total loans and discounting
amount to LE 25,267.2 million, and from table 6.6. total loans amount to LE
25,251.0 million which results in the amount of discounted bills being LE 16.2
million. To the author's knowledge, the discounting of bills in the Egyptian banks
is mainly for six months or less, which means that bill discounting constitutes
part of short-term credit. These results indicate that: (a) MTLT loans represent
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a minor activity for both commercial banks and IB banks; and (b) these banks
usually require colateral for their MTLT loans.
,
6.2. Insurance Companies: 
In spite of the emergence of private-sector insurance companies after 1974, the
insurance activity in Egypt is still dominated by public-sector companies. The
dominance of these companies is embodied in their significant financial resources,
their branch spread all over the country and their fairly long experience. The
insurance sector in Egypt consists of:
(a) three public-sector insurance companies;
(b) one public-sector reinsurance company;
(c) three private-sector insurance companies; and
(d) a Government authority for insurance supervision, whose objective is to mon-
itor the activities of all insurance companies in Egypt.
Insurance companies in Egypt perform almost all insurance activities, which
makes available to them huge amounts of funds. Of course, these companies have
to invest a major proportion of their funds in different assets, provided that they
set aside enough provisions for compensations to be claimed by policyholders.
According to the latest avaiable data, the activities of insurance companies in
Egypt are shown in their consolidated balance sheet as follows:
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Table 6.7(a): Consolidated balance sheet of public-sector insurance
companies in Egypt, June, 30, 1986
Assets/Liabilities LE Million
'
Assets:
Real estate 103.7 7.8
Shares, bonds and certificates of deposits 486.7 36.5
Loans 64.7 4.8
Deposits with banks 392.9 29.4
Deposits with the CBE and provisions for
Government bonds 4.4 0.3
Cash 26.8 2.0
Policyholders' debit balances 66.9 5.0
Insurance and reinsurance companies 114.5 8.6
Debtors and other debit balances 66.5 5.0
Equipment, furniture and vehicles 8.0 0.6
Total assets 1,335.1 100
Liabilities:
Net worth 29.6 2.2
Policyholders' funds 736.2 55.2
Provisions 161.4 12.1
Insurance and reinsurance companies 196.7 14.7
Creditors and other credit balances 211.2 15.8
Total liabilities 1,335.1 100
Source: Adapted from: Egyptian Authority for Insurance Supervision (EATS), The Year
Book: 1985/86 (Cairo: EATS, 1987) (in Arabic) pp. 353-60.
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Table 6.7(b): Consolidated balance sheet of private-sector insurance
companies in Egypt, June, 30, 1986
Assets/Liabilities LE million
Assets:
Real estate 6.1 6.6
Shares, bonds and certificates of deposits 17.0 18.7
Loans 0.3 0.3
Deposits with banks 31.4 34.5
Cash 5.0 5.5
Policyholders' debit balances 16.8 18.5
Insurance and reinsurance companies 2.1 2.3
Debtors and other debit balances 9.8 10.8
Equipment, furniture and vehicles 2.6 2.8
Total assets 91.1 100
Liabilities:
Net worth 8.4 9.3
Policyholders' funds 33.9 37.2
Provisions 10.1 11.0
Insurance and reinsurance companies 20.4 22.5
Creditors and other credit balances 18.3 20.0
Total liabilities 91.1
.
100
5.(:_ce: Ibid., pp. 407-13.
Tables 6.7(a) and 6.7(b) show that the insurance sector in Egypt, in terms of
financial resources, is less significant than the banking sector. In this regard, the
sum of the consolidated balance sheet, of both public-sector and private-sector
insurance companies, accounts for 3.1 percent of the balance sheet of commercial
banks and 12.8 percent of the balance sheet of IB banks. However, it cannot
be claimed that the insurance sector is negligible as a source of finance, espe-
cially MTLT finance, for businr...c enterprises in general and SSIFs in particular.
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Compared to commercial banks and IB banks, insurance companies enjoy more
stable financial resources, as they are less vulnerable to sudden withdrawals of
funds. In assessing the role of insurance companies as a source of finance the
discussion will focus on assets, as the liabilities are less argumentative.
Concerning public-sector companies, it is noticeable in table 6.7(a) that they
invest a large proportion of their funds in profitable assets, namely shares, bonds,
certificates of deposits (CDs), deposits and loans. If these items are added up, they
will amount to LE 1,048.0 million accounting for 78.5 percent of total assets. The
least significant of these items is loans, which account for only 4.8 percent of total
assets. Details of these loans show that almost 20 percent of them are advanced
to policyholders and buyers of flats, but the use of the remaining percentage is
not known. On the other hand, the most significant item is represented in shares,
bonds and CDs, accounting for 36.5 percent of total assets; the second major item
is deposits with banks, which accounts for 29.4 percent of total assets. Details
of the assets show that CDs alone amount to LE 271.6 million, accounting for
20.3 percent of total assets. Given that CDs are considered as deposits, then if
their amount is added to that of the deposits, they will account together for 49.7
percent of total assets. Hence, public-sector insurance companies invest almost
half of their funds in deposits, as these deposits are regarded as being risk-free
investment; moreover, interest on deposits is tax-exempted in Egypt. (6) These
results suggest that public-sector insurance companies could have used part of
their funds in lending to some business enterprises or even having an equity stake
in them. Consequently, it seems that risk averseness is the main factor behind
the investment policies of these companies.
As regards private-sector insurance companies, there is no noticeable differ-
ence between them and their public-sector counterparts concerning their invest-
ment policies. In this respect, table 6.7(b) shows that the most significant item
(6) Article 4 of Law no 157 of 1981.
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of the assets of private-sector companies is the deposits with banks, which ac-
counts for 34.5 percent of total assets. Details of the deposits show that CDs
alone amount to LE 14.3 million, accounting for 15.7 percent of total assets. As
CDs are considered as deposits, their amount should be added to that of the de-
posits with banks, which results in these two items accounting together for 50.2
percent of total assets. On the other hand, the least significant item is loans
which account for only 0.3 percent of total assets; moreover, it seems that these
loans are advanced to policyholders as they are secured by life-insurance policies.
Hence, it can be said that private-sector insurance companies are no better than
their public-sector counterparts, as regards their investment policies. Neverthe-
less, private-sector companies might have reason for being risk-averse, as they are
fairly new in the realms of insurance, as well as having less financial resources
compared with public-sector companies. On the whole, it can be argued that
the financing resources available to insurance companies represent a scaled-down
finance. In other words, insurance companies have reasonable amounts of funds
that can be invested on a long-term basis; instead, they deposit these funds with
banks and these banks, in turn, use these deposits in lending on a short-term
basis. Such a scaled-down finance deprives business enterprises of a reasonable
source of MTLT finance.
6.3. Profit-Sharing Finance: 
Profit-sharing finance is the Islamic substitute for interest-bearing finance, as
dealing with interest is prohibited in Islam. Instead of discussing the different
aspects of this financing method, this section is concerned with demonstrating its
main sources and their significance in Egypt. The main source of profit-sharing
finance for buisness enterprises is Islamic banks, albeit some forms of it can be
obtained from individuals.
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6.3.1. Islamic Banks: 
Islamic banks perform almost all banking activities either on a profit-sharing
,
basis or on a cost-plus basis, as substitutes for interest. The most commonly
known of these activities are Mudarabah, Murabahah and Musharakah; these
financing methods are defined as follows: (7)
Mudarabah: according to this method, capital is provided by one party and the
other party provides the enterprise. If the project achieves profits, these profits
will be divided between the two parties according to agreed-upon proportions;
in case of loss only the supplier of capital incurs this loss, as the entrepreneur's
loss will be represented in his unrewarded labour. If capital is provided by more
than one party, profits are to be divided among them according to agreed-upon
,
proportions; in case of loss each one's share in this loss will be proportionate to
his share in the project's capital.
Murabahah: This method can be regarded as a substitute for both trade credit
and documentary credit. In this case the bank purchases a specified commodity
on behalf of its customer who, in turn, agrees to pay the bank on a cost-plus basis
either in a lump sum or in instalments. The mark-up which the customer pays to
the bank should be specified in advance before the purchase of the commodity.
Musharakah: according to this method, the bank and the customer (the
entrepreneur) enter into a temporary partnership, usually for more than one year,
where both of them share the project's capital. If the project achieves profits,
these profits will be divided between them according to agreed-upon proportions,
after allocating part of these profits for the entrepreneur as a reward for his labour;
in case of loss each party's share in this loss will be proportionate to his share in
the project's capital. There is, however, another characteristic which is peculiar
(7) Adapted from: Muhammad Abdul-Mannan, Islamic Economics: Theory and Practice
(Kent: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., 1986) pp. 164-5; Ziauddin Ahmed, Munawar Iqbal
and M. Pahim Khan (eds), Money and Banking in Islam (Islamabad: Institute of Policy
Studies, 1983) pp. 9-14.
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to this financing method, that is the bank (as a partner) has the right to interfere
in the business's management.
In Egypt, there are three Islamic banks, which perform almost all Islamic-
banking activities; these banks are:
(a) Faisal Islamic Bank, which was established by a special law (8) in 1977, and
it is registered with the CBE as a commercial bank.
(b) Islamic International Bank for Investment and Development, which was estab-
lished in 1980, and it is registered with the CBE as an investment-and-business
bank.
(c) Nasser Social Bank, which was established in 1971; this bank has not been
under the control of the CBE, but procedures are under way to register it with
the CBE.
The following table shows some indicators of the activities of Islamic banks
in Egypt, according to the available data:
(8) Law no. 48 of 1977.
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Table 6.8. Some comparative indicators of Islamic-bank activities
in Egypt, 1985
Faisal Islamic Islamic Inter- Nassei Social Total
Bank national Bank Bank -
Items LE
million
% LE
million
% LE
million
% LE
million
%
Total balance sheet 1,725.3 55.3 946.1 30.3 450 14.4 3,121.4 100
Employed capital 1,338.5 59.1 637.5 28.2 288.2 12.7 2,264.2 100
Deposits 1,324.3 62.2 624.4 29.3 180.6 8.5 2,129.3 100
Net worth 100 57.8 11 6.4 61.9 35.8 172.9 100
Operating branches 10 23.8 5 11.9 27 64.3 42 100
Planned branches 12 52.2 8 34.8 3 13.0 23 100
Interest-free loans N. A. N. A. 0.04 N. A. 60 N. A. 60.04 N. A.
N. A. = not available.
Source: Adapted from: Islamic Economics Centre, "The Role of Islamic Banks in
Mobilizing Resources and Local Development", Cairo: Islamic International Bank
for Investment and Development, 1986 (in Arabic) p. 14.
This table shows that Islamic banks in Egypt have a balance-sheet total of LE
3,121.4 million and deposits of LE 2,129.3 million after a relatively short time since
their inauguration. If compared with other banks in the same year, Islamic banks'
balance-sheet total will account for 50.5 percent of that of IB banks and 10.0
percent of that of commercial banks; also Islamic banks' total deposits account
for 104 percent of those of IB banks and 10.7 percent of those of commercial
banks. (9) These figures suggest that Islamic banks have the opportunity and
the ability to operate and, even, grow alongside other banks in Egypt; also, this
reflects the willingness of Egyptian individuals and businessmen to deal with these
banks.
(9) Islamic Economics Centre, "The Role of Islamic banks in Mobilizing Resources and Local
Development', Cairo: Islamic International Bank for Investment and Development. 1986
(in Arabic) p.15.
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Table 6.8 gives some general indicators of the activities of Islamic banks rather
than a basis for assessing the performance of each individual bank. In terms of
financial resources, Faisal Islamic Bank is the most significant bank and Nasser So-
cial Bank is the least significant; this is evident from comparing the balance-sheet
total, employed capital and deposits. In terms of total branches, both operating
and planned, Nasser Social Bank takes the lead with 30 branches, compared with
22 branches for Faisal Islamic Bank and 13 branches for the Islamic International
Bank. Concerning interest-free loans to help the needy, Nasser Social Bank is the
pre-eminent with LE 60 million interest-free loans, which account for 13.3 per-
cent of its balance-sheet total and 96.9 percent of its net worth. At the same time
those loans amount to only LE 0.04 million in the Islamic International Bank, and
those of Faisal Islamic Bank are not known. In fact, the main purpose of Nasser
Social Bank is the advancement of interest-free loans, as well as helping individ-
uals to set up their own businesses. This growth and spread of Islamic banks in
a relatively short period of time induced other banks to establish new branches
that accept deposits and provide finance, according to the methods adopted by
Islamic banks; some observers estimate that there are about 40 branches of this
kind in Egypt.
6.3.2. Other Sources of Profit-Sharing Finance: 
The success of the experiment of Islamic banks in Egypt can be attributed
mainly to the willingness of many people to invest their savings on a profit-sharing
basis, instead of depositing them in return for fixed interest. Islamic banks accept
deposits from those people in order to invest them in their customers' projects and
share the return with the depositors, according to agreed-upon proportions. This
approach appealed to some businessmen who prefer not to deal with banks and,
at the same time, cannot finance their businesses depending only on their own
funds. Consequently, many businessmen approached their relatives and friends
for finance on a profit-sharing basis, and those businessmen found an encouraging
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response from their relatives and friends. Within a few years this method of
finance became well known among businessmen as well as the public, who repre-
sented the non-institutional source of profit-sharing finance in Egypt. From the
individuals' point of view, providing funds to business enterprises on the bases of
profit sharing is more profitable than depositing these funds with Islamic banks
that will be entitled to a proportion of these profits, as these banks represent
the intermediary between the depositors and business enterprises. From the en-
trepreneurs' point of view, obtaining funds from individuals on the basis of profit-
sharing relieves them of the formalities associated with obtaining such funds from
Islamic banks, as those individuals might show more flexibility especially if they
are family members or friends.
As profit-sharing finance became fairly popular, some entrepreneurs estabab-
lished new companies, known as investment companies, for the purpose of re-
ceiving funds from the public and investing them on behalf of those people on
a profit-sharing basis. These companies continued to proliferate and grow, so
much so that they became major competitors to Islamic banks as well as as other
banks. The main reason for the rapid growth of investment companies was the
influx of funds into them attracted by the high percentage distributed as a profit
on the deposited funds; this percentage was well above that distributed by Islamic
banks, as well as the interest on deposits in all other banks. Because investment
companies did not publish their financial accounts or any other data, little was
known about their real number and the magnitude of their activities. However, it
is estimated that there are six large companies and 100-300 small obscure firms,
and their total deposits are estimated to be LE 12 billion. (10) During 1987 and
early 1988 some of these companies faced serious financial difficulties that are
said to be the consequences of unsuccessful speculation in international financial
markets; these difficulties caused major worries among the hundreds.of thousands
(10) MU. Country Profile: Egypt (London: the Economist Publications Ltd.. 1988) p. 48.
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of depositors. The spread of rumours, as well as the escalation of disputes, about
the activities of investment companies, aggravated the depositors' worries and
many of them decided to withdraw their money. Accordingly, a new law was
passed in June, 1988 which is known as Law no. 146 of 1988; this law establishes
some regulations, concerning receiving funds for the purpose of investing them,
such as: (11)
(a) The receiving of funds for investment is confined to publicly quoted companies
established for this purpose.
(b) These companies must issue investment documents for the funds they receive.
(c) The investment documents entitle the holders to a share in the profits or
losses.
(d) Investment-document holders have priority over shareholders in case of liqui-
dation.
(e) The existing companies, or individuals, that will not comply with the Law
and opt to liquidate their activities, must repay the depositors' money within two
years.
Hence, it can be said that the promulgation of Law no.146 of 1988 marked
the end of non-institutional sources of profit-sharing finance for business enter-
prises, represented in individuals. According to the Law, businessmen cannot
approach individuals for finance on the basis of profit-sharing, as this is confined
to the companies that are set up especially for such an activity. Consequently, for
an entrpreneur to obtain profit-sharing finance he has to approach institutional
sources represented in Islamic banks. As regards investment companies, they are
expected to be concerned mainly with establishing new projects, albeit they might
enter into partnerships with some entrepreneurs.
(11) Articles 1. 6 and 18 of Law no. 146 of 1988.
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7.1. Defining a Small Business: 
Smallness is a relative concept, i.e. a certain business cannot be described as
small unless it is compared with a larger one; consequently, how big is a small
business will depend on how big a large business is. This relativity of smallness
resulted in countless definitions given to small businesses in different countries, or
in different times in the same country, or even to different kinds of businesses in
the same country at the same time. Instead of arguing the pros and cons of each
definition, different definitions will be discussed in a broad sense by classifying
them in two main categories in order to infer their main characteristics as well as
their advantages and disadvantages. Subsequently, the definitions of small-scale
industrial firms (SSIFs) in Egypt will be examined in order to choose the most
relevant definition for the purpose of this study or to suggest an appropriate one.
7.1.1. Two Types of Definitions:
The two main categories of small-business definitions are quantitative and
qualitative. Quantitative definitions adopt some yardsticks whereby they estab-
lish cut-off points after which the business ceases to be small; such cut-off points
are expressed in terms of the number of employees (or workers), the annual sales
(or turnover) or the value of the firm's total assets. Neither the criterion of the
annual sales nor that of total-asset value can easily be compared with those of
other countries, because of the problems of inflation and unstable exchange rates.
Hence, the only comparable criterion is the number of employees; even though this
criterion varies from country to country, or even in the same country according
to the purpose of the definition. In the U.K., for instance, the Bolton Commit-
a,
tee established a mixmum of 200 employees for small-scale manufacturing firms
k
(SSMFs). (1) Also in the U.K. the 1981 Companies Act established a maximum
number of weekly employees, together with other criteria, of 50 employees for all
(1) Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Sinai! Firms. Cum'. 4811. London: HMSO. 1971,
P. 3.
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small businesses; (2) but in the United States the maximum number of employees
for SSMFs is 500. (3) In the case of developing countries, the maximum number
of employees for SSMFs is 50 workers in some African countries and 100 workers
in some Asian countries.(4)
Qualitative definitions, on the other hand, define a small business according
to some special characteristics as follows: (5)
(a) It has a relatively small share of its market.
(b) It is managed by its owners or part-owners in a personalised way, rather than
through the medium of a formalised management structure.
(c) It is independent in the sense that it does not form part of a large enterprise.
(d) The owner-managers should be free from outside control in taking principal
decisions.
(e) Capital is supplied and ownership is held by an individual or a small group.
(f) The area of operations is mainly local.
(g) It lacks access to the stock market.
On the whole, the following table shows the different criteria for defining
a small business, as adopted by a sample of both industrialised countries and
developing countries:
(2) Jim Dewhurst and Paul Burns, Small Business: Finance and Control (London: Macmillan
Press Ltd.. 1983) p. 5.
(3) Hal B. Pickle and Royce L. Abrahamson. Small Business Management, 4th ed. (New York:
John Wiley and Sons. 1986) p. 11.
(4) Dennis Anderson. "Small Industry in Developing Countries", World Bank working paper
no. 518. Washington D.C.: The World Bank. 1982. p. 8.
(5) Michael Chesterman, Small Businesses. 2nd ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell Ltd., 1982)
p. 5; Graham H. Ray and Patrick J. Hutchinson. The Financing and Financial Control
of Small Enterprise Development (Aldershot: Gower Publishing Co. Ltd., 1983) p. 2: Hal
B. Pickle and Royce L. Abrahamson. op. cit.. p. 10.
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Table 7.1. Criteria for determining the sizes of enterprises
Criterion Developing countries Industrialised countries
Number of employees
Assets employed
Sales turnover
Employees and turnover
Employees and assets
Turnover and assets
Employees, sales and assets
6 countries
10 countries
1 country
1 country
16 countries
1 country
4 countries
/	 9 countries
1 country
—
2 countries
3 countries
—
—
Total sample 39 countries 15 countries
Source: K.E. Auciello et al., Employment Generation Through Stimulation of Small
Industries: An International Compilation of Small-Scale Industry Definitions (Atlanta:
Georgia Institute of Technology, 1975), in Malcolm Harper, Small Business in the Third
World (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1984) p. 2.
The main characteristics of the various definitions of small businesses can be
derived from the preceding context as follows:
(a) They differ between developed countries, on the one hand, and developing
countries on the other.
(b) They differ from one country to another.
(c) They may differ in the same country according to the purpose of the definition.
(d) Developing countries are more inclined to adopt quantitative definitions, as
compared with developed countries.
(e) Although developed countries employ capital-intensive technologies, the range
of the number of employees for SSMFs (200-500) is notably larger than the same
range in developing countries (50-100) which employ labour-intensive technolo-
gies; and this may reflect the difference in the perception of how big a large
business is.
(f) The terms employees and workers are used interchangeably, but the term em-
ployees is deemed to comprise workers as well as the administrative staff.
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(g) Some qualitative criteria, namely the small market share, are loose and diffi-
cult to perceive.
However, qualitative definitions seem to be more universal and more conve-
nient than quantitative definitions because:
(a) Quantitative definitions, except those based on the number of employees, are
vulnerable to inflation and need to be adjusted periodically.
(b) Quantitative definitions are too difficult to be compared among different coun-
tries, mainly because of the problem of unstable exchange rates.
(c) Quantitative definitions establish rigid cut-off points after which the business
becomes "large"; and this shift in the business's size may be because it employs
one more worker, or because its assets or sales exceed the limit by a very small
amount of money.
Nevertheless, it can be argued that the definition of a small business should
be local, in the sense that the definition which is valid for an industrialised coun-
try should not be adopted by a developing country. Also in terms of locality,
the definition of a small business may differ from one industrialised country to
another, and from one developing country to another, depending on the degree of
industrialisation as well as the prevailing size of large businesses. If international
comparisons are to be made as regards the status of small businesses, the firm
size should be held constant, i.e. the issue of firm size should be neutralized.
7.1.2. Defining SSIFs in Egypt:
There are two criteria adopted in Egypt to define SSIFs, namely the number
of workers and the value of fixed assets. The most commonly adopted criterion is
the number of workers; accordingly, SSIFs are defined as those employing 10 to
49 workers each, and those employing fewer than 10 workers each are considered
as handicraft establishments. The other criterion (i.e. the value of fixed assets) is
adopted by the DIB, which defines SSIFs as those firms with fixed assets, exclud-
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ing land and buildings, of more than LE 0.55 million to LE 1.1 million, aeccrrcling
o+lie1987 prices. (6) Also according to the DIB's definition, establishments with
fixed assets, excluding land and buildings, of LE 0.55 million or less are con-
sidered as very small industrial firms which may be a synonym for handicraft
establishments; these figures are adjusted annually according to inflation. These
definitions imply that large-scale industrial firms (LSIFs) are those firms employ-
ing 50 workers or more each, or those firms with fixed assets, excluding land and
buildings, of more than LE 1.1 million ac_cosding-to 1987 prices.
It can be noticed that the above-mentioned definitions establish rigid cut-
off points between SSIFs and handicraft establishments, on the one hand, and
between SSIFs and LSIFs on the other. Hence, it may be argued that both defi-
nitions are questionable because:
(a) Handicraft establishments cannot be defined according to the number of work-
ers or the value of their fixed assets, as such establishments acquire their identity
from the distinct products they provide rather than any other criterion.
(b) SSIFs usually have the potential of being expanded, while handicraft estab-
lishments are expected to remain small, as their success stems mainly from their
smallness and the production means they employ, i.e. their dependence on human
skill.
(c) Such definitions create the problem of borderline firms; in other words, a firm
may be considered as a handicraft establishment if it employs 9 workers even if
it is completely similar to other firms with 10 workers each. On the other hand,
a firm may be regarded as a large one if it employs 50 workers, even if it is no
different from other similar firms with 49 workers each.
(d) There may be some firms with fewer than 10 workers each but which employ
sophisticated expensive machinery; such firms may be regarded as handicraft es-
(6) An interview with the vice-general manager for small-scale industry credit, Cairo: DIB,
December. 1987.
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tablishments according to the number of workers they employ, but may qualify
as LSIFs according to the value of their machinery. On the other hand, there
may be some firms with more than 49 workers each but which employ primitive
cheap machinery; such firms may be regarded as LSIFs according to the number
of workers they employ, but may qualify as handicraft establishments according
to the value of their machinery.
On the whole, the objective of defining SSIFs in Egypt is not quite clear;
such a purpose may be: (a) distinguishing handicraft establishments in order to
direct certain assistance programmes to them; or (b) distinguishing SSIFs in order
to direct certain assistance programmes to them; or (c) distinguishing LSIFs in
order to exclude them from certain assistance programmes. Consequently, SSIFs
might be better defined in qualitative terms, in such a way as to establish a clear
distinction between them and either handicraft establishments or LSIFs. In this
regard, a business may be classified as a handicraft establishment if, at least, two
of the following conditions apply:
(a) the activity is performed at home
(b) the production process is completely dependent on simple tools and/or human
skill
(c) the business produces a distinct product which is not produced, with the same
quality, by mechanized factories.
On the other hand, a business may be classified as a LSIF if, at least, one of
the following conditions apply:
(a) the business is a publicly-quoted company (or a public-sector company)
(b) the business has more than one plant
(c) the business is engaged in a heavy-industry activity.
According to the above-mentioned criteria, SSIFs are those firms that do not
qualify either as handicraft establishments or as LSIFs. As far as Egypt is con-
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cerned, this definition is expected to have the following advantages:
(a) Avoiding the rigid cut-off points either in terms of the number of workers or
in terms of the value of fixed assets, thereby solving the problem of borderline
firms.
(b) Widening the span of SSIFs so that a larger number of firms can benefit from
Government asistance programmes, if any.
(c) The classification of industrial firms is expected to be easier than would other-
wise be the case; in other words, the data will be collected about these firms only
once instead of the periodical revision of the number of workers and the value of
fixed assets.
(d) It avoids the classification problems of the same business, associated with
quantitative definitions; i.e. a firm may be reclassified as a large one merely be-
cause it employed one more worker or because it replaced a piece of old equipment
with a new and more expensive one.
(e) It shows how big are LSIFs in Egypt as indicated by the above-mentioned cri-
teria, which might be normally applicable to SSMFs in the developed countries.
Public-sector companies, however, are excluded from the definition because they
are self-sustained, i.e. they have all the privileges of being state-owned.
(f) Finally, this definition could apply to other developing countries that share
some similarities with Egypt, especially in the realms of business-size structure.
Also the above-suggested definition can match whatever objective is sought
in defining SSIFs; in other words:
(a) if the purpose of defining SSIFs is to direct certain assistance programmes to
them, both handicraft establishments and LSIFs can be excluded; or
(b) if the purpose is to distinguish handicraft establishments in order to direct
certain assistance programmes to them, they can be identified according to the
above-mentioned criteria; or
(c) if the purpose is just to exclude LSIFs from certain assistance programmes,
154
both handicraft establishments and SSMFs can be identified either separately or
collectively.
,
However, it might be argued that widening the span of SSIFs means more
demand for, and more burden on, Government assistance programmes that might
be insufficient for a larger number of businesses. Such an argument seems to be
refutable, on the grounds that a large proportion of business enterprises in devel-
oping countries in general need to be supported and motivated in order to grow or
even to survive. Also, it might be argued that the technology employed must be
taken into consideration when defining SSIFs, on the grounds that SSIFs employ
intermediate technologies rather than advanced ones. It is true that SSIFs tend to
employ intermediate technology, but the employment of such a technology might
not be considered as a distinctive characteristic of SSIFs for the following reasons:
(a) Employing intermediate technology might be due to the unavailability of an-
other technology, for one reason or another, rather than the size of the firm.
(b) Advanced technology is not necessarily confined to LSIFs, as many own-
ers/managers of SSIFs are keen to adopt contemporary production means in order
to avoid lagging behind LSIFs as regards product quality.
(c) The term "advanced technology" itself is a relative concept, in the sense that
what is considered as advanced technology is one country may not be considered
so in another; also, what is considered as advanced technology at one time may
not be considered so at another.
Nevertheless, this study regards SSIFs in Egypt as those firms employing
10-49 workers, as it is the definition according to which the data were collected.
7.2. Objectives and Scope of the Survey:
It is worth mentioning that the objectives and scope of the study, in general,
are discussed in chapter one; the objectives of the survey, on the other hand, are
as follows:
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(a) Presenting a general assessment of SSIFs in Egypt.
(b) Examining the accessibility of SSMFs to institutional finance, namely bank
credit.	 ,
(c) Exploring the attitudes of the owners/managers of SSMFs, towards the dif-
ferent sources of finance.
(d) Exploring the different types of finance employed by SSMFs and the difficul-
ties associated therewith.
(e) Conducting a further detailed investigation of some SSMFs.
Accordingly, the survey-based part of this study consists of four chapters as
follows:
Chapter eight: a general assessment of SSIFs in Egypt
Chapter nine : dependence on bank credit among SSMFs
Chapter ten : types and sources of finance employed by SSMFs
Chapter eleven: case studies
Concerning its scope, the main concern of the survey is private-sector SSMFs,
rather than all SSIFs. The concentration of the survey on private-sector firms
is due to: (a) public-sector companies in general are state-owned and are not
expected to face major problems, especially in the area of finance; (b) public-sector
SSIFs are decreasing through time, presumably because of rapid expansion; and
(c) public-sector SSIFs do not represent a major part of all SSIFs in Egypt. In
1971, for instance, there were 224 public-sector SSIFs vis-a-vis 3,495 private-
sector SSIFs; in 1981 there were only 180 public-sector SSIFs vis-a-vis 4,361
private-sector SSIFs. (7) If the percentages of public-sector SSIFs are calculated,
these firms will account for 6.0 percent and 4.0 percent of all SSIFs for the two
years respectively. Also, the survey is confined to SSMFs because of the enormous
significance of these firms as compared with the rest of SSIFs. In Egypt, there
(7) Ola A.H. El-Sheikh, "Small-Scale Industries in the Egyptian Economy: an Analytical
Study- (Cairo University, Maters Thesis, 1985) (in Arabic) p. 51.
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are 3,162 SSIFs consisting of 3,145 SSMFs, 16 small-scale mining firms, and one
small-scale petroleum firm. (8)
 According to these figures, SSMFs account for
99.5 percent of all SSIFs, while both mining firms and petroleum firms account
together for only 0.5 percent of all SSIFs.
7.3. Sources and Methods of Collecting the Information: 
7.3.1. The Questionnaire:
The major part of the information, employed in the succeeding four chapters,
was collected via a questionnaire directed to the owners/managers of SSMFs.
This questionnaire consisted of 40 questions, 38 of which were multiple-choice
questions, the last two being open-ended questions. The design of the question-
naire took into consideration that: (a) the questions are worded in such a way
as to make it easy for the respondents to understand and answer these ques-
tions in a clear fashion; (b) the alternative responses represent the status quo
in Egypt; and (c) there should be room for any unexpected responses. On the
other hand, the open-ended questions have two purposes: (a) to cater for the re-
sponses that could not be pre-determined in the form of alternative responses; and
(b) to give the respondents the chance to add any relevant information that was
not included in the rest of the questions. However, the questionnaire was tested
on some colleagues and businessmen in Egypt, and their remarks and comments
led to the amendment of some questions before distributing the questionnaire to
the respondents.
7.3.2. The Population: 
As far as the survey is concerned, the target population is SSMFs in Egypt,
and the sampled population is SSMFs in greater Cairo as shown in the following
table:
(8) Compiled and calculated from appendix two.
157
Table 7.2. Distribution of the target population and the sampled population
according to the number of firms, the number of workers
and the production value, December, '1987.
Area Firms Workers Production
Number % Number % LE million %
Cairo 1,337 42.5 28,654 41.0 716.7 31.3
Giza 226 7.2 5,099 7.3 283.0 12.4
Qaliubeya 387 12.3 8,895 12.7 158.1 6.9
Greater Cairo 1,950 62.0 42,648 61.0 1,157.8 50.6
The rest of Egypt 1,195 38.0 27,175 39.0 1,129.6 49.4,
Total of Egypt 3,145 100 69,823 100 2,287.4 100
Source: Compiled and calculated from appendix two.
This table shows that greater Cairo accounts for 62.0 percent of all SSMFs
in Egypt, compared with 38.0 percent for the rest of the country, and Cairo city
alone accounts for 42.5 percent of SSMFs in Egypt. Also, it is noticed that the
share of greater Cairo in the production value (50.6 percent) is relatively low
compared with its share in the number of firms and in the number of workers.
However, Giza governorate is an exception as its share in the production value
(12.4 percent) is relatively high compared with its share in the number of firms
and in the number of workers (7.2 percent and 7.3 percent respectively). If the
average annual production per firm is calculated, it will be LE 536.0 thousand
for Cairo, LE 1,252.2 thousand for Giza and LE 408.5 thousand for Qaliubeya.
If the average annual production per worker is calculated, it will be LE 25.0
thousand for Cairo, LE 55.5 thousand for Giza and LE 17.8 thousand for Qali-
ubeya. On the other hand, the average annual production for SSMFs in greater
Cairo is LE 593.7 thousand per firm and LE 27.2 thousand per worker; whereas
this value for SSMFs in the rest of Egypt is LE 945.3 thousand per firm and
LE 41.6 thousand per worker. This relatively low productivity in greater Cairo
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implies that SSMFs in this area encounter some problems, among which may be
the problem of finance. However, the relatively low productivity of SSMFs in
greater Cairo, both per firm and per worker, is aggravated by the /ow productiv-
ity in Qaliubeya, where the textile industry concentrates. According to informal
sources, private-sector firms engaged in the textile industry face serious problems,
mainly in raw-material supplies, which resulted in many of these firms operating
at low capacity or being shut down completely. Another characteristic of greater
Cairo is that it comprises both areas where the DIB has branches and areas where
there are no such branches. For these reasons, greater Cairo was chosen as the
sampled population.
7.3.3. The Sample: 
The sample size was calculated as follows: 19)
„ _ 1/w(1 — w)
..3 DP — n
w(1 — w) 
and n = (S E)2
where:
SE = the standard error of the proportion with the particular attribute
ir . the proportion with the particular attribute in the population
n = the sample size
Dependence on bank credit represents the particular attribute in the popu-
lation, which was the basis for calculating the sample size. The proportion of
SSMFs in the population that depend on bank credit was expected to be less
than 50 percent; hence this proportion was roughly estimated to be 40 percent.
On the other hand, the desirable standard error for this proportion was 5 percent;
accordingly, the sample size was calculated as follows:
0.4 (1 — 0.4)
n —	 — 96 firms(0.05)2
(9) C.A. Moser, Survey Methods in Social Investigation (London: Heinruan Educational
Books Ltd., 1965) p. 116.
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In order to cater for nonresponse, 100 questionnaires were distributed but
only 86 were collected. Of the 86 questionnaires 5 were discarded because of the
inconsistent responses given by the respondents; there were, therefore, 81 valid
questionnaires giving a response rate of 84.4 percent, which can be considered
as acceptable. However, the sample is expected to have some degree of bias due
to: (a) the non-cooperative respondents who either gave inconsistent responses
or did not respond at all; and (b) the way of selecting the firms was not 100
percent random because of the lack of a reliable sample frame. However, such
a bias is not expected to have a significant effect on the survey results, because
the sampled population is large enough and diversified enough. In other words,
the sampled population represents 62.0 percent of the target population, as well
as comprising firms of various attributes and characteristics that can be found in
SSMFs in Egypt.
The basis of selecting the surveyed firms was firm size, therefore other at-
tributes were not considered in selecting these firms. Consequently, the results
obtained from some questions do not necessarily represent estimations for these
attributes in the population; these attributes are the type of activity, date of
starting the activity and the legal form. However, the significance of these at-
tributes stems from their correlation with other aspects as regards the financing
of SSMFs and the problems associated therewith.
The information collected via the questionnaire was analysed using the Statis-
tical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS—X) in order to produce frequency tables
and crosstables. The employment of statistical measures such as correlation was
not adopted. This was because the author was advised to limit the work to
crosstabulation as: (a) the data itself did not qualify for the employment of such
measures; and (b) crosstables were considered as correlation measures. (10)
(10) An interview with Dr. W.R. Williams, the Computer Centre, Durham University, Octo-
ber, 1988.
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7.3.4. Other Sources of Information:
In addition to the questionnaire, there were other primary sources that were
, .
approached in order to collect the further information required for the survey. The
most significant of these sources was the interviews with the owners/managers of
SSMFs and handicraft establishments, for the purpose of collecting detailed in-
formation about these businesses for the case study part of the survey. The
case studies included in the survey were not chosen randomly but, rather, were
chosen from businesses whose owners/managers were either relatives of some of
the author's friends or known to him. In this regard, it is worth mentioning
that no conclusions will be drawn depending only on these case studies, as they
do not represent the population from which they were selected. Accordingly,
these case studies were envisaged to be supplementary to the questionnaire, in
the sense that their purpose was to provick or furtlier investigation of some
important aspects of SSMFs in addition to questions of finance. The case stud-
ies of handicraft establishments had two purposes: (a) to examine the validity
of defining handicraft establishments according to the number of workers; and
(b) to assess their expansion potential. In addition, there were case studies from
banks whose purpose was to assess the banks' decisions to approve or reject loan
applications from some SSMFs; the sources for such case studies were the banks'
documents to which the author was given access by the bank staff. In aggregate,
the survey contains nine case studies as follows:
(a) five case studies of SSMFs;
(b) two case studies of handicraft establishments; and
(c) two case studies from banks.
The rest of the sources provide information relevant to the financing of SSMFs,
as well as the general assessment of these firms; these sources were:
(a) Annual reports of the CBE which contain information about the interest-rate
structure and the banking sector in general.
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(b) Annual reports of the DIB which contain information about the Bank's ac-
tivity, especially the financing of SSMFs.
(c) Interviews with bank staff, mainly the DIB's staff, in order to collect more
information about the financing of SSMFs.
(d) The Public Authority for Industrialization (PAI), a subsidiary of the Ministry
of Industry, which has computerized data about SSIFs in Egypt.
(e) The Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMS), which
is the only official Government agency to publish statistics on almost all economic
and social facets of Egypt, including industrial and population censuses.
(f) Some researches on small businesses in Egypt, but these researches were ap-
proached only in cases of the unavailability of the required data from their primary
sources.
7.4. Difficulties Encountered During the Survey:
The difficulties encountered during the survey were mainly related to collect-
ing informatiron from SSMFs. The main problem was the reluctance of some
businessmen to cooperate with researchers whom they "suspect" of being asso-
ciated with the authorities. In this regard, there are two Government agencies
with which every businessman in Egypt has to deal, the Social Insurance Agency
(SIA) and the Tax Agency (TA). Each of these agencies has branches and offices
in each town and in each district of large cities.
The SIA is a subsidiary of the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs, whose
main concern is to make sure that every employee in the country is insured.
Consequently, every employee must be registered with the SIA and pay a monthly
subscription, either himself or via his/her employer, which has two implications:
(a) the employee's wage will increase by the amount of subscription; and (b) it
becomes difficult for the employer to fire any employee without good reasons.
Some private-sector employers try to avoid registering their workers, or some of
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them, with the SIA in order to save the subscription fee and to make it easy for
themselves to fire the unwanted workers. Such employers do not want the SIA
officers to know the real size of their work force, so the SIA officers visit factories
unexpectedly to check the numbers of workers against the numbers registered with
them. At the same time, some businessmen claim that the SIA officers register
any one in the factory as a worker, even if he/she is a trainee or a volunteer from
the owner's family.
The TA is a subsidiary of the Ministry of Finance, and its main purpose
is to make sure that every individual and every businessman pays income tax.
Therefore, every individual and every businessman must report his annual income
to the TA, but some businesses, especially new ones, do not take the initiative
and report their incomes to the TA. That is why the TA officers (tax assessors)
visit both new and old businesses in order to: (a) estimate the incomes of new
businesses and claim the due taxes; and (b) check whether there is an expansion
in the business's activity and estimate the increment in the business's income
thereof. In this regard, some businessmen claim that tax assessors visit new
businesses a long time after starting the activity, and overestimate the business's
income without taking into consideration the low income during the first years of
activity.
This situation caused a lack of liaison between businessmen, on the one hand,
and both SIA officers and TA officers on the other. Hence, almost all businessmen
in Egypt suspect any "stranger" who visits the business and asks about any aspect
of the business's activity, especially if the enquiry involves figures such as the
number of workers, the annual income, the annual turnover or any balance-sheet
figure. To solve this problem the author had to: (a) give some questionnaires to
his friends and acquaintances in different areas of business location, as they can
have access to the businesses in their areas because they are not "strangers"; and
(b) to ask some friends to introduce him to the respondents and interviewees in
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their areas, and assure them that he is not an SIA officer or a tax assessor. For
these reasons, and because of the limited time, the survey involved more than a
score of people, all of whom had either a first university degree or a higher degree.
Moreover, the author encountered the following difficulties:
(a) It was impossible to obtain copies of the balance sheets of the surveyed SSMFs
because these firms, usually, do not produce audited financial accounts; even if
there are estimates of such accounts, there is no way to obtain them.
(b) Only a few owners/managers agreed to be interviewed by the author for the
purpose of case studies; even those who did were reluctant to give the required
detailed information.
(c) Some Government agencies refused to give the required data, although it was
not confidential, without the intervention of high-rank Government officers.
(d) The latest available industrial census was the 1979 census, and this forced the
author to obtain some data from previous researches.
(e) It was very difficult to obtain information about banks' lending policies or
their lending practices, even with the intervention of some friends in the banks
themselves.
(f) The author could not have access to any information related to the sources
and uses of pension funds.
(g) There are no statistics about business failure in Egypt.
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Chapter Eight
A General Assessment of Small-Scale
Industrial Firms in Egypt
8.1. SSIFs Before 1974
8.2. SSIFs After 1974
8.2.1. The Status of SSIFs Among Private-Sector Firms
8.2.2. Regional Distribution of SSIFs in Egypt
8.3. Fostering SSIFs in Egypt
8.3.1. Productive Cooperatives
8.3.2. The Institute of Small-Scale Industries
8.3.3. The Engineering and Industrial Design Development Centre
8.3.4. Industrial Estates
8.1. SSIFs Before 1974:
The main purpose of this section is to demonstrate the status of SSIFs before
,
the adoption of the ODEP, in 1974, which gave impetus to the private sector in
almost all areas of the Egyptian economy. The status of SSIFs will be demon-
strated within the context of private-sector industrial firms, as compared with
public-sector industrial firms. However, there is no reliable data about SSIFs
before 1967 when a comprehensive census of industrial firms took place. In this
regard, it is worth mentioning that the period 1960-1973 was characterised by
the dominance of public-sector firms, namely those employing 50 workers or more.
Hence, and according to the available data, the years 1967 and 1971 are chosen to
indicate the relative status of SSIFs, both public-sector and private-sector, before
the opening of the economy in 1974. This is shown in the following table:
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The first and clearest point to notice, from the previous table, is that the
private sector is much more significant than the public sector concerning SSIFs
and they swap roles concerning large-scale industrial firma' (LSIFs). Another point
to notice is that there is no significant difference between the two years concerning
the relative importance of the public sector and the private sector in both SSIFs
and LSIFs. In 1967, the private sector dominated SSIFs, accounting for 93.4
percent of the firms and 89.8 percent of the workforce; and the public sector
dominated LSIFs accounting for 63.6 percent of the firms and 90.3 percent of the
workforce. In 1971, public-sector SSIFs decreased in both number and relative
importance, and at the same time, public-sector LSIFs increased in both number
and relative importance. This phenomenon might be due to: (a) consolidations
among public-sector SSIFs; or (b) the growth of some public-sector SSIFs that
entered the bracket of LSIFs; or (c) new nationalizations of some industrial firms;
or (d) more than one of the preceding reasons. Also, in 1971, private-sector SSIFs
decreased in number in spite of their increased relative importance; and private-
sector LSIFs decreased in both number and relative importance. Concerning
private-sector SSIFs, their decrease might be due to: (a) the growth of some
SSIFs that entered the bracket of LSIFs; or (b) the failure of some of them; or
(c) both reasons.
8.2. SSIFs in Egypt After 1974: 
The adoption of the ODEP in 1974 stimulated many investors to launch new
projects in different areas of the Egyptian economy in general and the industrial
sector in particular. Between 1974 and 1979 there were 225 new industrial projects
established under the provisions of Law no.43 of 1974 (amended by Law no. 32
of 1977), accounting for 40.5 percent of the total number of 555 projects. (1) Also
(1) Calculated from data collected from the Public Authority for Investment and Free Zones
(PAIFZ). Cairo. 1988.
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in 1979 the status of SSIFs was as follows: (2)
(a) There were 6,139 industrial firms in Egypt, 83 percent of which were private-
sector firms and 17 percent public-sector firms.
(b) SSIFs accounted for 91.5 percent of private-sector industrial firms, and only
17 percent of public-sector industrial firms.
(c) The number of SSIFs, both private-sector and public-sector, was 4,853 firms
accounting for 79 percent of the total number of 6,139 industrial firms.
8.2.1. The Status of SSIFs Among Private-Sector Firms: 
Before discussing the status of private-sector SSIFs it might be useful to
demonstrate the status of all private-sector industrial firms, compared with public-
sector industrial firms, as shown in the following table:
Table 8.2. Distribution of the industrial firms in Egypt according to the
number of firms, number of workers and production value, 1987
Sectors Firms Workers Production value
Number % Number % LE million %
Private sector
Public sector
9,551
872
91.6
8.4
219,680
579,213
27.5
72.5
13,390.0
9,722.7
58.0
42.0
Total 10,423 100 798,893 100 23,112.7 100
Source: Compiled and calculated from appendix two.
As shown in table 8.2, private-sector industrial firms outnumber public-sector
ones, accounting for 91.6 percent of total industrial firms compared with 8.4
percent for public-sector firms. On the other hand, the majority of the workforce
engaged in industrial activity are enrolled in public-sector firms accounting for
•n•••n•n•••••••••...411
72.5 percent of the total number of workers vis-a-vis 27.5 percent for private-sector
firms. These figures suggest that public-sector industrial firms are mainly large,
(2) Compiled and calculated from CAPMS. Census of Industrial Production, 1979 (Cairo:
CAPMS. 1984) (in Arabic) pp. 114-31.
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while private-sector firms are mainly small; consequently, it is to be expected that
public-sector firms dominate the industrial sector in terms of production value.
Nonetheless, the figures shown in table 8.2 partly contradict such an expectation,
as private-sector firms overtake public-sector ones accounting for 58 percent of
total production value compared with 42 percent for public-sector firms. The
latter figures raise the question of efficiency in terms of the productivity of both
firms and workers in both sectors; this is shown in the following table:
Table 8.3. Comparative average size and productivity of private-sector and
public-sector industrial firms in Egypt, 1987
Sectors
Average number
of workers
per firm(a)
Average annual
production
per firm
LE 000(b)
Average annual
production
per worker
LE 000(c)
Private sector
Public sector
23
664
1,402
11,150
61
17
(a) Calculated as number of workers
number of firms
(b) Calculated as production value
production value (c) Calculated as
number of workers
Source: Calculated from table 8.2.
The previous table shows the following:
(a) In terms of firm size there is a substantial difference between the average size
of a public-sector firm and that of a private-sector one, as the average size of the
former is about 29 times that of the latter.
(b) In terms of the average annual production the difference is notably narrowed,
as the average annual production of a public-sector firm is only eight times that
of a private-sector firm.
(c) Concerning the average annual production per worker the situation is reversed,
as the average annual production of a private-sector worker is almost fourfold that
number of firms
170
of a public-sector worker.
These results seem to have serious implications as regards the comparative
efficiency of both sectors. The most significant of these implications is that pub-
lic sector firms tend to be overmanned, i.e. they employ more people than the
activity would require. In fact this phenomenon is a consequence of: (a) the
Government's obligation, especially during the 1960s and the 1970s, to provide
a job for everyone of working age, especially educated people; and (b) the laws
that govern employment in the public-sector and Government agencies, as such
laws make it virtually impossible for public-sectore employers to fire any worker.
Hence, it can be claimed that in comparison the private sector enjoys a relatively
reasonable amount of flexibility, especially in its employment policy, which makes
it more efficient than the public sector.
Given the relative importance of private-sector industrial firms within the
industrial activity in general, and given that this study is concerned with private-
sector SSMFs, this raises the issue of the relative importance of SSIFs among
private-sector industrial firms as a whole. This is shown in the following table:
Table 8.4. The relative importance of SSIFs among private-sector
industrial firms in Egypt, 1987
Categories Firms Workers Production value
Number % Number , % LE million %
SSIFs
Other private-sector
industrial firms*
3,162
6,389
33.1
66.9
70,294
149,386
32.0
68.0
2,298.6
11,091.4
17.2
82.8
Tot al 9,551 100 219,680 100 13,390.0 100
* Embraces LSIFs and industrial firms employing less than 10 workers.
Source: Compiled and calculated from appendix two.
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Table 8.4 shows that SSIFs represent about one third of the number of private-
sector industrial firms, and 32 percent of the workforce engaged in private-sector
industrial firms in Egypt. Concerning the production value, SSIFs account for
only 17.2 percent of the industrial production generated by the private sector,
compared with 82.8 percent for other private-sector industrial firms. These latter
figures imply that the relatively low share in private-sector industrial production,
accounted for by SSIFs, is due to: (a) their smallness, which results in relatively
low capabilities; and/or (b) their relative inefficiency, as compared with other
private-sector industrial firms. If this relatively low share is a result of smallness,
it will be regarded as an inevitable consequence which should be neutralized; but
if this relatively low share is assumed to be due to inefficiency, such an assumption
should be tested. Hence, the relative efficiency of SSIFs will be tested in terms of
productivity, as shown in the following table:
Table 8.5. Comparative average size and productivity of SSIFs and
other private-sector industrial firms in Egypt, 1987
Categories
Average number
of workers
per firm(a)
Average annual
production
per firm
LE 000(0
Average annual
production
per worker
LE 000(c)
SSIFs
Other private-sector
industrial firms
22
23
727
1,736
33
74
number of workers(a) Calculated as
number of firms
production value(b) Calculated as
number of firms
production value (c) Calculated as
Source: Calculated from table 8.4.
Before discussing the issue of relative efficiency there is another issue which
is worth discussing, that is, the average size of firm for both SSIFs and other
number of workers
172
private-sector industrial firms. In this respect, table 8.5 shows that the average
number of workers per firm is 22 workers for SSIFs and 23 workers for other
private-sector industrial firms. However, an average number of 22 workers per
firm seems to be plausible for SSIFs, as these firms are defined in Egypt as those
employing 10-49 workers. On the other hand, an average number of 23 workers per
firm for the rest of private-sector industrial firms implies that: (a) the inclusion
of firms employing less than 10 workers, as well as those employing more than
49 workers, has a noticeable effect in diluting the average size per firm, and/or
(b) many LSIFs tend to be near to the border line of SSIFs, in terms of the number
of workers, i.e. 50 workers. Concerning the average annual production per firm for
SSIFs, it is less than half that of other firms (LE 727 thousand compared with LE
1,736 thousand), which implies that: (a) the average annual production per firm
for LSIFs is large enough to offset the effect of the inclusion of firms employing
less than 10 workers; and/or (b) SSIFs are less efficient than other private-sector
industrial firms, mainly LSIFs.
As far as workers' productivity is concerned, the average annual production
per worker for SSIFs is less than half that in other private-sector industrial firms
(LE 33 thousand compared with LE 74 thousand), which indicates the relatively
low productivity of workers in SSIFs. Such a low productivity may be due to
either one or more of the following factors:
(a) A less-advanced technology employed by SSIFs, as compared with that em-
ployed by LSIFs.
(b) A deteriorating condition of the machinery employed by SSIFs, which results
in a low level of output.
(c) A lack of finance which results in discontinuity of raw-material supply and
bottlenecks in production lines.
(d) A lack of finance which results in a delay in equipment maintenance and
replacement.
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(e) The existence of redundant workers who cannot be fired either for legal reasons
or for sentimental reasons.
Also in line with productivity, it was inferred from table 8.3 that private-sector
industrial firms are more efficient than their public-sector counterparts in terms
of the average annual production per worker. Hence, in the light of the above-
mentioned inferences, it can be said that the relative efficiency of private-sector
industrial firms can be attributed to LSIFs rather than SSIFs.
8.2.2. Regional Distribution of SSIFs in Egypt: 
Small businesses in general are expected to be more widespread than large
businesses, as the requirements needed to establish a small business, especially
finance, are much less than those needed to establish a large one. Hence, SSIFs
are not expected to be concentrated in one region or more in Egypt, thus par-
ticipating in a balanced regional development. However, the regional distribu-
tion of SSIFs depends, among other factors, on: (a) the regional distribution
of the population and the labour force, as the former represents the market for
the products of SSIFs and the latter represents the main production factor; and
(b) the regional distribution of banking services represented in bank branches in
each region. These factors are shown in tables 8.6(a) and 8.6(3) below:
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Table 8.6(a): Percentage distribution of SSIFs, population
and labour force in Egypt, by region
Region SSIFs
%
Population
%
Labour force
%
Northern Egypt(a) 34.4 42.9 43.9
Greater Cairo(b) 61.8 25.5 27.0
Southern Egypt ) 2.3 27.8 25.1
Suez canal area(d) 1.3 2.6 2.9
Frontier governorates(e) 0.2 1.2 1.1
Total 100 100 100
(a) consists of 8 governorates: Alexandria, Beheira, Gharbeya, Daqahleya, Kafr El-Sheikh,
Damietta. Menofeya and Sharqeya.
(b) consists of 3 governorates: Cairo. Giza and Qaliubeya.
(c) consists of 7 governorates: Fayoum. Beni Suef, Menya, Asiute, Sohag, Qena and Aswan.
(d) consists of 3 governorates: Port Saeid, Suez and Ismaeileya.
(e) consists of 5 governorates: Matrouh, North Sinai, South Sinai, New Valley and the Red
Sea area.
Source: Distribution of SSIFs is compiled and calculated from appendix two; distribution
of both population and labour force are compiled and calculated from CAPMS. Population,
Housing and Establishment Census. 1986 (Cairo: CAPMS. 1987) p. 20 and pp. 48-51
respectively.
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Table 8.6(b): Regional distribution of banking service in Egypt,
as related to SSIFs
Region SSIFs branches, Bank Brancli/SSIF
ratio(a)
SSIF/branch
ratio(b)Number % Number %
Northern Egypt 1,090 34.4 302 33.2 0.3 3.6
Greater Cairo 1,954 61.8 370 40.6 0.2 5.3
Southern Egypt 72 2.3 150 16.5 2.1 0.5
Suez canal area 40 1.3 50 5.5 1.3 0.8
Frontier
governorates 6 0.2 _ 38 4.2 6.3 0.2
Total 3,162 100 910 100 0.3 3.5
number of branches(a) Calculated as: number of SSIFs
(b) Calculated as: number of SSIFs numbet of inauches
Source: Distribution of SSIFs is compiled and calculated from appendix two; distribution
of bank branches is compiled and calculated from CBE, "Credit and Banking
Developments during the period: July, 1984 — June, 1986", Cairo: CBE, 1987 (in Arabic)
pp. 42-57.
Before drawing any inferences from tables 8.6(a) and 8.6(b) it is worth notic-
ing that:
(a) While the distribution of SSIFs is based on 1987 data, the latest data available
for population, labour force and bank branches is the 1986 data; however, this is
not expected to affect the accuracy of calculations and comparisons.
(b) The division of Egypt into the above-mentioned regions is the commonly used
division, albeit northern Egypt is often referred to as Lower Egypt and southern
Egypt is often referred to as Upper Egypt
(c) Both specialized banks and free-zone banks are excluded from table 8.6(b).
Concerning specialized banks, they are of three types: real-estate banks, agricul-
tural banks and industrial banks; both real-estate banks and agricultural banks
are irrelevant to the financing of SSIFs and there is only one industrial bank (the
DIB) which was discussed in chapter one. As for free-zone banks, there is only one
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bank which performs off-shore activities and it is not registered with the CBE.
Table 8.6(a) shows that the regional distribution of the labour force almost
,
matches the regional distribution of population, except for greater Cairo and
southern Egypt. The share of greater Cairo in labour force exceeds its share
in population, and it is the other way round for southern Egypt. This implies
that: (a) greater Cairo, especially Cairo city, represents an area of attraction for
inter-regional immigration, mainly for people of working age; (b) southern Egypt
represents the major source for labour-force immigration to the greater Cairo
area; and (c) southern Egypt has a fairly low share of development programmes,
which is reflected in a lack of employment opportunities.
Concerning SSIFs, their regional distribution does not match the regional
distribution of both population and labour force, as they tend to be concentrated
in greater Cairo, especially Cairo city, which accounts for 42.5 percent of all SSIFs
in Egypt. (3) Such a concentration can be regarded as a consequence, rather than
a cause, of lopsided development which gives more attention to specific regions of
the country. In other words, the concentration of modern services in greater Cairo
attracts more businesses to this area, which provides some externalities to such
businesses. These externalities result from: (a) easy access to airports, seaports
and Government agencies; (b) the availability of modern communication means
and infrastructure; and (c) other externalities resulting from the establishment of
other businesses. In contrast to greater Cairo is southern Egypt, which accounts
for 27.8 percent of population and 25.1 percent of labour force, while it accounts
for only 2.3 percent of SSIFs. These figures seem to justify the inference drawn
above as regards the lesser development of southern Egypt and the immigration
from this region to greater Cairo. The rest of the regions do not seem to have
a noticeable imbalance in the distribution of population, labour force and SSIFs
except for frontier governorates, because SSIFs do not exist in South Sinai and
(3) Calculated from appendix two.
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the Red Sea area.
As far as the banking service is concerned, table 8.6(b) shows that SSIFs in
,
Egypt do not seem to face any shortage of such a service. Apart from the DIB's
three branches, there are 910 bank branches to serve 3,162 SSIFs, which results in
0.3 bank branch for each SSIF or 3.5 SSIFs corresponding to each bank branch.
Also, it is noticed that the distribution of bank branches, in table 8.6(b), has
more or less the same mode of concentration as that of the distribution of SSIFs
in table 8.6(a). That is to say that bank branches tend to be more concentrated
in greater Cairo followed by northern Egypt, southern Egypt, the Suez canal area
and frontier governorates. Nevertheless, if the sufficiency of banking service is
considered, the situation will be almost reversed. In this regard, it can be noticed
that greater Cairo is the poorest region, as there are 370 bank branches to serve
1,954 SSIFs, i.e. there is 0.2 bank branch for each SSIF or 5.3 SSIFs corresponding
to each bank branch. At the opposite extreme, frontier governorates represent
the worst region as regards their share of SSIFs and bank branches, but they
have the best banking service. In other words, there are 38 bank branches to
serve only 6 SSIFs, which results in 6.3 bank branches for each SSIF or 0.2 SSIF
corresponding to each bank branch. Also, southern Egypt enjoys a much better
banking service, compared with greater Cairo and northern Egypt, in the sense
that there are 150 bank branches to serve 72 SSIFs which results in 2.1 bank
branches for each SSIF or 0.5 SSIF corresponding to each bank branch. Hence,
it can be claimed that the major reason for the concentration of SSIFs in greater
Cairo is the above-mentioned externalities rather than the availability of banking
services.
8.3. Fostering SSIFs in Egypt: 
There were some attempts to assist and foster SSIFs in Egypt, especially after
the 1952 Revolution and the Government's reorientation towards comprehensive
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economic and social development. However, the concept of SSIFs was then con-
ceived to include artisans and handicraft establishments as well as small factories
using primitive machinery. Consequently, the majority of programmes were di-
rected to handicraft establishments and "productive families", in spite of bearing
the name of SSIFs. This section will be concerned with the main attempts to as-
sist SSIFs in Egypt after 1952, as there is no reliable data about any programmes
prior to that date.
8.3.1. Productive Cooperatives: 
The Government's first attempt to foster SSIFs took the form of cooperatives;
and this effort was embodied in setting up the Establishment for Productive Co-
operation and Small-Scale Industries (EPCSSI) in 1960. This Establishment was
concerned with vocational training and the development of the production of the
very small factories in different regions of Egypt. The EPCSSI also rendered the
service of providing very small producers with machinery and raw materials on a
credit basis as well as helping them in marketing their products. Yet, the busi-
nesses which benefited from the services rendered by the EPCSSI were handicraft
establishments and very small industrial firms, especially those with products de-
pending on local raw materials such as: textiles, rug weaving, bamboo products
and honey production.
In 1969 the EPCSSI was given another title, the Public Authority for Develop-
ing Handicraftsmen (PADH). It then became the central organization concerned
with planning and follow-up, and the supervision of local industrial cooperatives
was allocated to the local administration of each governorate. (4)
8.3.2. The Institute of Small-Scale Industries (ISSI): 
This Institute was established in 1963 with collaboration between the EPCSSI
(4) Bank of Alexandria. "Means and Methods of Developing Small-Scale Industries in Egypt",
Economic.
 Bic11ctin, (17). 1985 (in Arabic). p. 53.
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and the International Labour Organization (ILO); but the beginning of its activ-
ities was in 1965. In 1969, the ISSI started to face troubles as the ILO stopped
providing it with the necessary help. Being unable to carry on performing its
functions, the ISSI was consolidated with the Engineering and Industrial Design
Development Centre (EIDDC) in 1976. (5)
8.3.3. The Engineering and Industrial Design Development Centre 
(EIDDC): 
This centre was established in Cairo in 1969 as an affiliate of the Ministry of
Industry. After being consolidated the ISSI in 1976, another branch was opened
in Cairo as well. The EIDDC is concerned with rendering technical services to
SSIFs such as: (6)
(a) Design and development of products.
(b) Industrial design.
(c) Equipment design.
(d) Plant layout.
(e) Giving SSIFs access to the facilities of the Centre such as laboratories, work-
shops and equipment.
In 1977, the World Bank conducted a survey of SSIFs in Egypt and suggested
that the EIDDC should develop more services to SSIFs in collaboration with
the DIB. Since then the services of the EIDDC have been extended to include
training foremen and engineers in SSIFs as well as making visits to SSIFs in order
to discover the problems which they face, and help them to solve such problems.
In 1983, a new branch of the EIDDC was inaugurated in Alexandria to extend
(5) Ola A.H. El-Sheikh, "Small-Scale Industries in the Egyptian Economy: an Analytical
Study" (Cairo University, Master's thesis, 1985) (in Arabic) p. 204.
(6) Ezel-Din Al-Sharqawy. "The Role of the Engineering and Industrial Design Development
Centre in Providing Consultation to Small-Scale Industries", a paper submitted to the
Symposimn on Promoting Small-Scale Industries in Egypt, held in collaboration between
the Fredrick Ebert Society (Germany) and the Institute of National Planning (Egypt),
Cairo: 1-4 April, 1984 (in Arabic) pp. 2-3.
180
services to other governorates outside the Cairo area. (7)
8.3.4. Industrial Estates: 
The adoption of the ODEP by the Egyptian Government in 1974 resulted in
several industrial projects, both indigenous and joint-venture, being established
in Egypt. To encourage such projects, the Government took the initiative to
establish industrial estates outside the inhabited area, the most important of
which is the 10th of Ramadan city, located about 35 miles (56 kilometers) north of
Cairo. Many of the investors and businessmen faced some difficulties in launching
SSIFs in the city of the 10th Ramadan due to their limited financial resources
compared with investors in LSIFs. In 1987, the Government tried to rectify the
situation and launched a programme establishing an SSIF industrial estate in this
area. This programme is intended to provide land, buildings and infrastructure
to SSIFs in return for instalment payment corresponding to the real cost of such
facilities. After being completed, this part of the 10th of Ramadan city will be
the first pre-planned SSIF-industrial estate in Egypt.
In addition to the forementioned efforts to foster SSIFs, there were two un-
successful attempts to foster SSIFs in Egypt. (8) The first one was to establish
three industrial estates outside the congested area of Cairo, but all efforts were
discontinued due to the 1967 war. The second attempt was to establish the Arab
Institute for Small-Scale Industries; this Institute was supposed to be under the
supervision of the Industrial Development Centre of Arab States (IDCAS) which
is an affiliate of the Arab League. This attempt ended in a fiasco, as well, due to
the deterioration of the relationship between Egypt and Arab countries after the
peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979.
From the previous discussion, it can be noticed that the EPCSSI was con-
(7) Ibid.. p. 8.
(8) Aziny M. Al "Means and Methods of Developing Small-Scale Industries in Egypt". Cairo:
DI13, 1981 (in Arabic) pp. 44-5.
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cerned mainly with artisan activities which took the form of "productive coop-
eratives". Moreover, the EPCSSI was declared, after 1967, to be concerned only
with establishments employing less than 10 workers, so that SSIFs gained no as-
sistance from it. Concerning the ISSI, it was unsuccessful due to the lack of aid
from the ILO.
The remaining organization to assist SSIFs is the EIDDC which can be con-
sidered as the only source of assistance to SSIFs, other than the DIB. The problem
with the EIDDC is that it is located in Cairo, with only one branch in Alexandria;
and this may confine it to a limited area. This limited spread of the EIDDC may
result in a shortage of services rendered to SSIFs, and this shortage may be due
to: (a) the cost and effort which the owners/managers of SSIFs incur in order to
approach the EIDDC; and (b) the lack of information about the EIDDC available
to SSIFs in other regions.
As regards the SSIF industrial estate in the 10th of Ramadan city, it is located
in the area where SSIFs concentrate; and this will aggravate the unbalanced
development among different regions. However, it is worth mentioning that there
are some points to be borne in mind in anticipating the success potential of this
industrial estate; these are:	
..a.
(a) The availability, and efficiency, of the nkessary infrastructure.
(b) The availability, and sufficiency, of all necessary information required by the
interested businessmen.
(c) The procedures and documents required by Government agencies in order to
give businessmen access to the industrial estate and, consequently, the time which
elapses until SSIFs can start production.
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Chapter Nine
Dependence on Bank Credit
Among Small-Scale Manufacturing Firms
9.1. The Firms which Depend on Bank Credit
9.2. The Firms which do not Depend on Bank Credit
9.2.1. Firm Size and Dependence on Bank Credit
9.2.2. Legal Form and Dependence on Bank Credit
9.2.3. The Alternative Sources to Bank Credit
9.3. Finance Preferences Among SSMFs
It is worth mentioning that, in Egypt, employing bank credit is not a common
practice among small businesses in general and SSMFs in particular. The survey
of SSMFs revealed that only 30 firms depend on bank credit and 51 firms do not,
accounting for 37 percent and 63 percent of the sample respectively. (1) Hence, it
is necessary to investigate the attitudes of the firms which depend on bank credit
and those of the firms which do not.
9.1. The Firms which Depend on Bank Credit: 
In order to highlight the attitudes and judgements of the firms which depend
on bank credit, three questions must be answered: (a) do these firms shop around
for a loan?; (b) if not, do they go to a specific bank(s)?; and (c) if so, why do
they go to this specific bank(s)? The answer to the first question is that only 23.1
percent of these firms approach more than one bank before applying for a loan
while 76.9 percent go directly to a specific bank. (2) The reasons for dealing with
a specific bank are shown in the following table:
Table 9.1. Percentage distribution of the reasons for dealing with
a specific bank, as given by the owners/managers of SSMFs
The specified
banks
It is the
only available
bank
%
It is the
only bank
we know
%
We have had
past dealings
with it
%
It does not
deal with
interest
%
Total
%
The DIB
A specific
commercial bank
A specific
Islamic bank
20.0
57.1
0.0
60.0
14.3
0.0
20.0
28.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
100
100
100
100
Source: Questions 10 and 11.
(1) Analysis of question number 8.
(2) Analysis of question number 9.
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This table shows that the majority of the firms which deal with the Devel-
opment Industrial Bank (DIB) (60 percent of them) do so because it is the only
bank they know. This implies that these firms either used not to deal with banks
before the inauguration of the DIB, in 1976, or they were established after 1975.
A further analysis of the data showed that all the firms which go directly to the
DIB were established after 1975. (3) This finding suggests that the establishment
of the DIB had the outcome of stimulating only new SSMFs to deal with it , but
did not influence older ones to do so. For those firms which deal with DIB because
it is the only available bank (20 percent), this may be either because they had
approached other banks but failed to obtain finance, or because they knew from
others that they can only approach the DIB for finance; in either case it demon-
strates the usefulness of the DIB. Concerning the firms which deal with the DIB
because they have had past dealings with it (20 percent), it seems that such firms
were among the first customers to obtain finance from the DIB, because they were
established soon after 1975.
On the other hand, 57.1 percent of the firms, which deal with a specific
commercial bank, stated that they do so because it is the only available bank,
and 14.3 percent stated that they do so because it is the only bank they know.
A further analysis of the data showed that both groups were established after
1975; (4) hence , both groups can be considered as one group accounting for 71.4
percent of the firms which deal with a specific commercial bank. This implies
that: (a) these firms had approached other banks but failed to obtain finance,
and among those other banks may be the DIB; or (b) the particular bank is the
only bank which has a branch in the area; or (c) they have been introduced to this
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bank by other customers and contiked dealing with it. As for the SSMFs which
stated that they deal with a specific commercial bank because they have had past
(3) Crosstatbulation of questions 2 and 10.
(4) Crosstabulation of questions 2. 10 and 11.
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dealings with it (28.6 percent), a further analysis of the data showed that these
firms were established during the 1960s, (5)
 when they had no choice but to deal
with public-sector commercial banks. Finally, it is an axiom that all the firms
which deal with a specific Islamic bank do so because it advances interest-free
finance which complies with the piety of the owners/managers. These firms were
established after 1975 and so were Islamic banks in Egypt with the exception of
the Nasser Social Bank which was established in 1971 (as discussed in section
6.3.1 of chapter six).
Concerning SSMFs which do not adhere to a specific bank, 44 percent of them
obtained credit from more than one bank; (6) the reasons which they gave are
shown in the following table:
Table 9.2. Percentage distribution of the reasons for obtaining credit from
more than one bank, as given by the owners/managers of SSMFs
Reasons %
To benefit from the advantages of each bank 54.5
To guarantee the financing of the firm in emergency cases 36.4
We deal with the bank which offers better terms 9.1
Total 100
Source: Question number 13.
Table 9.2. shows a positive sign of financial awareness among the own-
ers/managers of the concerned firms, as more than half of them (54.5 percent)
realise that not all banks have the same advantages and disadvantages. Also, 36.4
percent of these firms deal with more than one bank, as a precaution should one
of these banks reject the firm's application for credit in a critical time. The rest of
these firms, which seek the best lender in almost each single financing operation,
account for only 9.1 percent of the concerned firms. However, it can be said that
(5) Ibid.
(6) Analysis of question number 12.
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they are similar to the first group but expressed their attitude in different terms;
in other words, they were more explicit about cost-related factors.
,
Another aspect of the relationship between this group of firms and banks
should be considered; this is represented in whether they misconceive some facets
of their dealings with banks. This is shown in the following table:
Table 9.3. Percentage distribution of SSMFs, which depend on bank credit,
according to their perception of relative interest rates
Relative interest rates as perceived by SSMFs %
The same as that charged to public-sector companies 11.5
Higher than that charged to public-sector companies 23.1
Do not know 65.4
Tot al	 1 10 1
Source: Question number 20.
This table shows that the majority of the concerned firms' owners/managers
are not aware of how interest rates are set, as 65.4 percent of them do not know
whether banks charge them the same interest rates as those charged to public-
sector companies. Moreover, 23.1 percent of those owners/managers believe that
they are discriminated against in terms of the interest charged on their loans as
compared with public-sector companies. It appears that only 11.5 percent of the
owners/managers realise that such discrimination does not exist. In fact, only the
latter minority of owners/managers knows the truth, because the Central Bank
of Egypt (CBE) sets the structure of interest rates on loans, as regards different
economic activities (industry, agriculture, trade and services), rather than on a
public-sector/private-sector basis. This is in order to curb the credit advanced
to certain activities and boost the credit advanced to others. Hence, it can be
inferred that those owners/managers who regard their businesses as discriminated
against gave their responses on a subjective basis. This might be attributed to
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their belief that the DIB and some commercial banks, as public-sector banks, are
biased towards public-sector companies; moreover, such a belief might include the
CBE itself as a Government agency. 	 ,
Another aspect of the relationship between SSMFs, which depend on bank
credit, and banks is represented in the way of charging the interest on loans as
conceived by these firms. This is shown in the following table:
Table 9.4. Percentage distribution of SSMFs, which depend on bank credit,
according to their perception regarding the charging of interest on loans
The way of charging interest as perceived by SSMFs %
Fixed for the duration of the loan 69.2
Variable during the duration of the loan 15.4
Do not know 15.4
Total 100
Source: Question number 21.
As shown in table 9.4. the majority of the SSMFs, which depend on bank
credit (69.2 percent), mentioned that the interest rates charged on their loans
are fixed for the duration of the loan; this conforms to reality as interest rates in
Egypt are not floating. On the other hand, 15.4 percent of these firms mentioned
that these interest rates are variable, usually upwards, during the duration of
the loan. This may happen only when the CBE establishes a new interest-rate
structure which applies to the loans contracted after the date of declaring the
new interest-rate structure. Accordingly, the owners/managers of these firms
are expected to have faced such variable interest rates when they renewed some
existing loans, at a time when the CBE had changed the interest-rate structure.
Finally, the remaining 15.4 percent of the concerned firms stated that they do
not know whether interest rates are fixed or variable; and this implies that the
owners/managers of these firms either do not get involved in loan contracts or do
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not ask the lending bank about the interest rate to be charged.
9.2. The Firms which do not Depend on Bank Credit:
,
As mentioned earlier, SSMFs which do not depend on bank credit account for
63 percent of the surveyed firms. This phenomenon is deemed to be more impor-
tant than the attitudes of the firms which depend on bank credit towards their
lenders. Consequently, the phenomenon of not employing bank credit needs a
thorough investigation in order to assess the real reasons, rather than the symp-
toms, of such a phenomenon. The first step towards achieving this objective
is assessing the reasons for not depending on bank credit as given by the own-
ers/mangers of the surveyed firms.
Table 9.5. Percentage distribution of the reasons for not depending on
bank credit, as given by the owners/managers of SSMFs
Reasons for not depending on bank credit %*
1. Banks impose difficult terms on the business 37.7
2. Loans are interest-bearing finance 29.0
3. Lengthy lending procedures 10.2
4. High interest rates 10.2
5. Do not like to deal with banks 7.2
6. Have sufficient funds 4.3
7. Do not know how to deal with banks 1.4
Tot al 100
* Multiresponse.
Source: Question number 26.
It is worth mentioning that the reasons, shown in table 9.5, are given numbers
in order to facilitate the classification and assessment of these reasons. Hence, the
reasons for not depending on bank credit, as shown in table 9.5, can be classified
in two categories: (i) reasons attributed to banks; and (ii) reasons attributed to
the firms' owners/managers.
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(i) The first category incorporates reasons 1, 3 and 4 which account, together, for
58.1 percent of all the responses. This percentage might indicate that the limited
access, for SSMFs, to bank credit is attributed to the banks rather than the firms
themselves; but such an inference cannot be taken for granted without further
investigation. Concerning the owners/managers who mentioned that banks im-
pose difficult terms on them (37.7 percent of the responses), they mean, mainly,
the collateral required for bank loans, the banks' request for financial accounts
and the requirement of a sound finanical position as measured by ratio analysis
carried out by bank staff. For those owners/managers who stated that the lending
procedures are lengthy (10.2 percent of the responses), they mean, mainly, the
time which elapses between submitting the loan application and the loan approval
and the time involved in completing the legal procedures of pledging the firm's
assets as collateral for the loan.
The above-mentioned reasons, though interrelated, seem to be plausible, espe-
cially the legal procedures of pledging the assets, which represent a common source
of complaint, so much so that bank staff themselves complain of these lengthy
procedures. Concerning the requirement of financial accounts, the firms' own-
ers/managers consider it a problem because they neither prepare such accounts
nor keep formal accounting books; and this represents a source of disturbance
to bank managers and staff who spend more time and effort in analysing the
data presented to them by small businesses. As for the owners/managers who
described interest rates on bank loans as high (10.2 percent of the responses),
they compare the cost of bank credit with the cost of retained profits, which they
regard as a cost-free source of finance. This may be because they are unaware
of the opportunity cost associated with retained profits which makes them the
most expensive source of finance, as discussed in chapter four. Even when those
owners/managers compare the cost of bank credit with the cost of trade credit,
they regard the former as more expensive than the latter; but, as discussed in
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chapter two, trade credit may be noticeably more expensive if the cost of the lost
discount, if any, is taken into account. Also, the complaint of high interest rates
is refutable on the grounds that interest rates on loans to both the agricultural
sector and the industrial sector, set by the CBE, range from 11 percent to 15
percent; meanwhile the interest rate on loans to the trade sector has a minimum
of 16 percent and no maximum. (7) If the interest rates on loans to both the
agricultural sector and the industrial sector are compared with the Bank Rate of
13 percent and the highest interest rate on deposits of 13.25 percent, (8) these
loans are relatively cheap. Hence, it can be said that the complaint of high in-
terest rates is based on a misconception of the cost of different sources of finance
as well as a lack of acquaintance with the interest-rate structure prevailing in
Egypt. Nevertheless, if banks require compensating balances for their loans, this
requirement will increase the cost of borrowing, as discussed in chapter two.
(ii) The second group of reasons incorporates reasons 2, 5, 6 and 7 which ac-
count, together, for 41.9 percent of all responses. The most significant reason in
this group is that loans are interest-bearing finance (29 percent of the responses)
which reflects the adherence of those owners/managers to the prohibition of in-
terest of interest in Islam. A further analysis of the data revealed that the firms
which stated these reasons employ all the mentioned sources of finance but loans,
either from the DIB or from commercial banks. (9) One of the most interesting
reasons, given by the owners/managers for not depending on bank credit, is that
they do not like to deal with banks (7.2 percent of the responses); and this reflects
an existing hostility between some owners/managers and banks. Such a hostility
may be because those owners/managers have some information about other busi-
nessmen who faced difficulties in dealing with banks and/or because they regard
banks as bureaucratic Government agencies, that resemble tax agencies and social
(7)CBE, hAnnual Report: 1986/1987", Cairo: CBE, 1987, p. 96.
(8)Ibid., p. 97.
(9) Crosstabulation of questions 26 and 27.
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insurance agencies, with which those owners/managers almost always have prob-
lems. As regards those owners/managers who mentioned that they have sufficient
funds (4.3 percent of the responses), they mean that they have enough retained
profits. A further analysis of the data showed that those firms depend only on
retained profits as a substitute for bank loans. (10) Finally, the reason we who do
not know how to deal deal with banks" (1.4 percent of the responses) was men-
tioned by one respondent who seems to be unacquainted with the availability of
bank credit and/or the firm itself is newly established; a further analysis showed
that this firm was established after 1975. (11)
These results suggest that the reasons for the inaccessibility of some SSMFs to
bank credit, which can be attributed to banks are reasons 1 and 3 (which account
for 47.9 percent of the responses); but the majority of the reasons (which account
for 52.1 percent of the responses) can be attributed to the owners/managers of
the surveyed SSMFs. Consequently, it can be said that it is the attitudes of those
owners/managers, rather than the reluctance of banks, which impede the acces-
sibility of SSMFs to bank credit. In other words, the main reasons for such an
inaccessibility, on the part of the owners/managers, are: (a) their piety, which
prevents them from employing interest-bearing finance; and (b) their misconcep-
tion of the nature and cost of bank credit, as compared with other sources of
finance.
However, banks cannot be relieved of their responsibility towards small busi-
nesses in general and SSMFs in particular. In this regard, it seems that the
owners/managers who mentioned reason 1 had tried to obtain bank credit but
could not meet the banks' terms. Also, it seems that the owners/managers who
mentioned reason 3 used to deal with banks and gave up afterwards because of
the lengthy procedures. As mentioned above, the reasons attributed to banks
(10) Ibid.
(11) Crosstabulation of question 2 and 26.
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account for 47.9 percent of the responses. This percentage cannot be considered
as insignificant, especially if those reasons represent difficulties which these banks
can eliminate, without undermining sound banking practices, in order to give
more access to small businesses to bank credit.
Having assessed the reasons for not depending on bank credit, on the part
of SSMFs, it may be appropriate to investigate the other factors that may limit
the accessiblity of SSMFs to bank credit. Such factors represent some of the
characteristics of these firms which may make them ineligible for institutional
finance in general and bank credit in particular. These factors, from the author's
point of view, are firm age, firm size and the firm's legal form; after testing the
first factor it was found insignificant and was rejected. Accordingly, the remaining
factors, that might influence the firm's accessibility to bank credit, are firm size
and the firm's legal form.
9.2.1. Firm Size and Dependence on Bank Credit: 
In order to facilitate the testing of the effect of firm size on its access to bank
credit, the surveyed SSMFs are divided into two groups; the first group represents
the firms employing 10-24 workers and will be regarded as the smaller-small
firms, and the second group represents the firms employing 25-49 workers and
will be regarded as the bigger-small firms. The relationship between firm size and
dependence on bank credit is shown in the following table:
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Table 9.6. Percentage distribution of the surveyed SSMFs according to
their dependence, or non-dependence, on bank credit
as based on their relative size -
The firm's relative size Does the firm depend on bank credit? Total
Yes % No % %
10 —24 workers 26.0 74.0 100
25 — 49 workers 56.0 44.0 100	 ,,
Source: Questions 3 and 8.
It can be noticed, from table 9.6, that there is a correlation between firm size
and dependence on bank credit as just over a quarter of the smaller-small firms
depend on bank credit while more than half of the bigger-small firms depend on
bank credit. Hence, these figures suggest that smaller-small firms have limited
access to bank credit as compared with bigger-small firms. The main reason for
such limited accessibility is that these firms, or the majority of them, are rela-
tively new and this may have one or more of the following implications:
(a) Smaller-small firms are less acquainted with the credit facilities which banks
can provide.
(b) There is no need, for the time being, for institutional finance as their pro-
duction operations are still limited and can be financed from non-institutional
sources.
(c) Banks are sceptical in lending to such new firms because they have no track
record and less information is available about them.
(d) Smaller-small firms themselves are sceptical in seeking institutional finance
and regard dealing with banks as hazardous.
9.2.2. Legal Form and Dependence on Bank Credit: 
The relevance of the firm's legal form to its depending, or not depending, on
bank credit stems from the legal and financial consequences associated with debt,
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and these consequences vary according to the legal status of the owner(s) and the
manager(s). The relationship between the firm's legal form and its dependence
on bank credit is shown in the following table:	 ,
Table 9.7. Percentage distribution of the surveyed SSMFs according to
their dependence, or non-dependence, on bank credit
as based on their legal forms
Legal form Does the firm depend on bank credit? Total
Yes % No %
Sole proprietorship 40.0 60.0 100
Ordinary partnership 17.6 82.4 100
Limited partnership 83.3 16.7 100
Source: Questions 4 and 8.
The data shown in table 9.7 can be classified into two groups: (a) the firms
which tend to depend on bank credit; and (b) the firms which tend not to depend
on bank credit. The first group is represented in limited partnerships, where 83.3
percent of them depend on bank credit while only 16.7 percent do not; the sec-
ond group incorporates both sole proprietorships and ordinary partnerships where
only 40 percent and 17.6, respectively, depend on bank credit. If the second group
is considered, the figures seem to contradict what many people believe: that part-
nerships, in general, are more eligible for bank credit than sole proprietorships,
as they are supposed to have more equity capital which provides a safety base
against which banks can lend to such firms. On the other hand, table 9.7 shows
that limited partnerships are significantly more dependent on bank credit than
ordinary partnerships. The reasons for these phenomena may be:
(a) The partners in ordinary partnerships are infinitely responsible for the firm's
debts, and this makes them more cautious in getting involved in debts.
(b) Although the owner in a sole proprietorship is also infinitely responsible for
the firm's debts, he enjoys more freedom in decision making, compared with the
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partner in an ordinary partnership, especially if this owner is the manager of the
firm at the same time.
(c) A limited partnership tends to have more partners than an ordinary partner-
ship, who provide more equity base which makes such a firm more eligible for
bank credit.
(d) Ordinary partnerships in Egypt tend to be confined to family members, and
this makes a minor increment, or even none at all, in the partners' personal assets
over the owner's assets should these firms be sole proprietorships. This situation
may give the banks reasons to be more cautious in lending to ordinary partner-
ships whose finance needs may be more than those of sole proprietorships.
So far it has been shown that there is a correlation between both the size of the
firm and its legal form, on the one hand, and its dependence, or non-dependence,
on bank credit on the other. In this respect it may be appropriate to examine
which one of the two factors has a more significant effect on the firm's dependence,
or non-dependence, on bank credit; this is shown in the following table:
Table 9.8. Percentage distribution of the relative size of the surveyed SSMFs
as based on their legal forms
Number of workers	
.,
Legal form 10— 24 25 — 49 Total
% % %
Sole proprietorship 85.7 14.3 100
Ordinary partnership 54.5 45.5 100
Limited partnership 54.5 45.5 100
Source: Questions 3 and 4.
First of all, the analysis of question number 3 showed that 68.4 percent of the
surveyed firms employ 10-24 workers, and 31.6 percent employ 25-49 workers.
In this regard, it can be noticed that SSMFs tend to be more concentrated in
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the smaller-small section of table 9.8, especially sole proprietorships. In other
words, the majority of sole proprietorships, 85.7 percent of them, are concen-
trated in the smaller-small size; while both ordinary partnerships and limited
partnerships have the same distribution between the smaller-small size and the
bigger-small size, accounting for 54.5 percent and 45.5 percent, respectively. Con-
sequently, if firm size is the main factor which affects the firm's dependence, or
non-dependence, on bank credit, then sole proprietorships are expected to have
the least proportion of dependence on bank credit and both ordinary partnerships
and limited partnerships have, more or less, the same proportion of dependence on
bank credit. However, table 9.7 shows that the proportion of sole proprietorships
which depend on bank credit is more than twice that of ordinary partnerships,
and the proportion of limited partnerships which depend on bank credit is more
than twice that of sole proprietorships and more than four times that of ordinary
partnerships. These results suggest that the legal form of the firm has more effect
than its size on the firm's dependence on bank credit; the same reasons mentioned
above, in the context of legal form, hold. On the whole, the effect of firm size and
the firm's legal form, on its dependence on bank credit, may explain the reasons
attributed to the banks for not depending on bank credit; these reasons were
discussed in section 9.2 above.
9.2.3. The Alternative Sources to Bank Credit: 
Having assessed the factors which affect the firms' dependence on bank credit,
it is an essential requisite to investigate the alternative financing sources employed
by these firms as substitutes for bank credit. In other words, for those firms which
do not depend on bank credit, it is necesary to find out whether they employ
alternative institutional or non-institutional sources of finance as this will help to
define their attitudes towards certain sources of finance. The alternative financing
sources, as employed by the surveyed SSMFs, are shown in the following table:
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Table 9.9. Percentage distribution of the financing sources
employed by SSMFs as substitutes for bank credit
•
Alternative sources to bank credit %*
Retained profits 46.1
Loans from family members and friends 2.6
Profit-sharing finance 9.2
Trade credit 36.8
Loans from the partners 5.3
Tot al 100
* Multiresponse.
Source: Question number 27.
Table 9.9. shows that the most significant substitutes for bank credit are
retained profits and trade credit which account for 46.1 percent and 36.8 percent
of the responses respectively. Because these percentages represent multiresponses,
this means that each of these two sources is employed in combination with another
source or other sources. However, 28.8 percent of SSMFs, which do not depend
on bank credit, mentioned that they depend only on retained profits, 13.5 percent
of them depend only on trade credit and 32.7 percent of these firms depend on
both retained profits and trade credit as substitutes for bank credit. (12) These
figures show the popularity of both retained profits and trade credit among SSMFs
in Egypt. The main reason is that the owners/managers of small businesses
in Egypt, in general, regard such sources as cost-free finance because they are
concerned about the out-of-pocket cost rather than the opportunity cost. As far
as profit-sharing finance is concerned, it does not represent a significant substitute
for bank credit as it accounts for only 9.2 percent of the responses. Yet, it is worth
noticing that profit-sharing finance is employed by 7 firms, 3 of which obtain this
type of finance from individuals (mainly relatives) and the other 4 obtain it from
(12) Different analysis of question number 27.
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Islamic banks which represent the only institutional alternative to conventional
bank credit. The remaining alternative sources are loans from family members
and friends and loans from the partners. These do not represent significant sources
of finance as they account for only 2.6 percent and 5.3 percent of the responses,
respectively.
9.3. Finance Preferences Among SSMFs:
The main concern of this section is to define the best sources of finance from
the standpoint of the surveyed SSMFs which depend on bank credit and those
which do not. Such a definition may help to cast some light on the firms' attitudes
towards certain sources of finance, and the reasons they have for such attitudes,
in order to assess these firms' finance preferences. The preferred sources, as well
as the reasons for their preference, are shown in tables 9.10(a) and 9.10(b) below:
Table 9.10(a): Percentage distribution of the best sources of finance
from the standpoint of the surveyed SSMFs
The best sources of finance %*
Retained profits 58.3
Increasing the firm's equity capital 5.3
Loans from family members and friends 12.1
Loans from the DIB 3.0
Profit-sharing finance 5.3
Trade credit 16.0
Tot al 100
-
* iduitiresponse.
5111m: Question number 38.
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Table 9.10(b): The reasons for preferring certain sources of finance
as given by the surveyed SSMFs
The preferred
sources
,
Reasons for preference
Retained profits
Trade credit
1. It is a cost-free source of finance.
2. It is easier to obtain than loans.
3. It avoids the complications of dealing with banks.
4. It avoids the problems of loans.
5. Nobody will interfere in the management of the firm.
6. It is an interest-free source of finance (because
interest is prohibited in Islam).
7. We can avoid the risk associated with borrowing.
8. It is cheaper than loans.
9. It achieves self-sufficiency.
10. It is more acceptable, psychologically, than loans.
11. It is less risky than any other source.
12. We do not get worried about repayment.
13. We feel comfortable with it.
14. It means independence from people and banks.
15. I do not like to have a partner.
1. It relieves us of the problems of dealing with banks.
2. It is easier to obtain than loans.
3. It is more available than loans.
4. We do not get worried about repayment as is the
case with loans.
5. It is cheaper than loans.
6. It is an interest-free source of finance (because
interest is prohibited in Islam).
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1. We do not get worried about repayment.
2. It is a cost-free source of finance.
3. The business is still in its infancy.
1. It finances the purchase of machinery.
2. It is easy to approach.
1. It does not involve an interference in the management
of the firm.
2. It does not involve the payment of interest (which is
prohibited in Islam).
Family members
and friends
The DIB
Profit-sharing
finance
Table 9.10(b), continued
Source: Question number 39.
Once again, as table 9.10(a) shows, retained profits represent the most
favoured source of finance to SSMFs accounting for 58.3 percent of the responses.
As this percentage represents multiresponse, this means that retained profits are
mentioned to be the best source of finance together with another source or other
sources. A further analysis shows that retained profits are mentioned alone, as
being the best source of finance, by 58.7 percent of the surveyed SSMFs. (13) Yet,
table 9.10(b) shows plenty of reasons which the owners/managers gave for prefer-
ring retained profits to other sources of finance. The most interesting of these rea-
sons is that retained profits represent a cost-free source of finance because those
owners/managers, as mentioned earier, are concerned about the out-of-pocket
cost rather than the opportunity cost. The rest of the reasons can be divided into
three categories: (a) reasons that reflect the reluctance of the owners/managers
to employ bank credit because of the difficulties and risks associated with dealing
with banks; (b) reasons that reflect the desire of the owner-managers not to have
(13) Different analysis of question number 38.
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partners; and (c) reasons that reflect the piety of some owners/managers who shy
away from interest-bearing sources of finance.
The second favourite source of finance for the surveyed SSMFs is trade credit,
which accounts for 16 percent of the responses, shown in table 9.10(a), and which
is the only source, other than retained profits, to be mentioned alone as the
best source of finance (2.5 percent of the surveyed SSMFs). (14) Although the
reasons for preferring trade credit are not the same as those for preferring retained
profits, they have the same implications, except those of the unwillingness of the
owner-managers to have partners. On the other hand, when the respondents
mention that trade credit is easier to obtain than bank credit, they are referring to
informal and personal relationships with raw-material suppliers, namely private-
sector suppliers, as compared with the formal relationships with banks and public-
sector suppliers of raw materials. The main problem of dealing with public-
sector suppliers of raw materials is that these companies are alleged to enjoy a
monopolistic status, especially in the textile industry, and force SSMFs to accept a
"package deal" containing bad-quality materials as well as good-quality materials.
Concerning the loans from family members and friends, which account for 12.1
percent of the responses shown in table 9.10(a), they are employed, as is the case
with the rest of the sources, in combination with another source or other sources
of finance. In this regard, when some respondents mention that loans from family
members and friends are cost-free finance, they tell the truth because relatives
and friends, sometimes, do not require interest on their money when they lend
to the owner-manager, i.e. it is a sentimental relationship. As regards increasing
the firm's equity capital (5.3 percent of the responses), it is not as common as
retained profits due to: (a) the formalities and legal procedures associated with
it; and (b) the reluctance of many owner-managers to have partners in their
businesses. Profit-sharing finance has the same relative importance as increasing
(14) Ibid.
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the firm's equity capital (5.3 percent of the responses), but it is mentioned by
pious owners/managers who adhere to the prohibition of interest in Islam. Finally,
although the DIB accounts for only 3.0 percent of the responses shown in table
9.10(a), commercial banks are not mentioned at all. The main reasons may be:
(a) the DIB provides foreign-currency loans for the importation of machinery
and raw materials; and (b) some owners/managers of SSMFs have established
good relationships with the DIB's managers and staff who seem, according to the
author's observation, to be helpful and cooperative.
The preceding discussion was concerned about finance preferences among all
the surveyed SSMFs both those which depend on bank credit and those which do
not, but it does not reveal finance preferences within each group. In other words,
for those firms which have dealings with banks, do they prefer bank credit?;
and for those firms which do not have dealings with banks, do they prefer non-
institutional sources of finance? The answers to these questions are shown in the
following table:
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Table 9.11. Percentage distribution of the surveyed SSMFs according to
their preferred sources of finance as based on their dependence,
or non-dependence, on bank credit,
The best sources of finance
Does the firm depend
on bank credit? Total
%Yes % No %
Retained profits 37.7 62.3 100
Increasing the firm's equity capital 28.6 71.4 100
Loans from family members and friends 37.5 62.5 100
Loans from the DIB 100 0.0 100
Profit-sharing finance 71.4 28.6 100
Trade credit 52.4 47.6 100
Source: Questions 8 and 38.
As shown in table 9.11, the majority of the preferred sources of finance are
non-instutional ones which are favoured by both the firms which depend on bank
credit and those which do not. Concerning the first three sources, although the
majority of the firms which prefer them are those which do not depend on bank
credit, there are still some firms which depend on bank credit and, at the same
time, prefer these non-institutional sources, notably retained profits and loans
from family members and friends. Of course the firms which prefer loans from
the DIB are those which have dealing with it; but it should be noticed that the
firms which prefer loans from the DIB represent two thirds of the firms which
have dealings with it, (15) and this implies that some of the DIB's clients are not
satisfied with it. Also, it is noticed, in table 9.11, that none of the SSMFs men-
tioned that they prefer loans from commercial banks. This implies that the firms
which have dealings with commercial banks might wish to satisfy their financing
needs from other sources. As for profit-sharing finance, it is noticed that the
(15) Crosstaludation of questions 10 and 38.
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majority of the firms which prefer this type of finance have dealings with banks
(71.4 percent); these firms obtain profit-sharing finance from Islamic banks and
the rest obtain it from individuals (mainly relatives and friends). Surprisingly,
52.4 percent of the firms which prefer trade credit do employ bank credit and
only 47.6 percent do not. Besides showing the popularity of trade credit amongst
SSMFs, these figures imply that the owners/managers compare the complexity
of borrowing from banks with the simplicity of dealing with raw-material sup-
pliers, especially private-sector suppliers. Also, these figures suggest that some
owners/managers who go directly to a specific bank, especially a specific com-
mercial bank, do so because it is the only available bank rather than because
they are satisfied with it. On the whole, it is quite clear that non-institutional
sources of finance are more popular amongst, and more favourable to, SSMFs
than institutional sources, namely banks.
205
Chapter Ten
Types and Sources of Finance Employed by
Small-Scale Manufacturing Firms
10.1. Start-up Capital
10.2. Short-Term Finance
10.2.1. Sources of Short-Term Finance
10.2.2. Forms of Short-Term Finance
10.3. Medium-and Long-Term Finance
10.4. Foreign-Currency Finance
10.5. Lease Finance
10.6. Financing Firms' Expansion
10.6.1. The Relationship Between Expansion and Other Attributes
of the Firm
10.6.1.1. Dependence on Bank Credit
10.6.1.2. Firm Age
10.6.2. Sources for Financing Firms' Expansion
10.1. Start-up Capital: 
It is worth mentioning that the pre-startup stage, or seed-capital stage, will
"
not be considered in this context as it is assumed to be financed entirely by
the owner(s)' funds. Concerning the start-up stage, it may be financed by the
owner(s)' funds as well as other external sources such as banks, raw-material sup-
pliers, family members, friends ... etc. The sources of start-up capital employed
by the surveyed SSMFs are shown in the following table:
Table 10.1. Percentage distribution of the surveyed SSMFs according to
their employment of different sources of start-up capital
Sources of start-up capital
Owner(s)' funds only 43.2
Owner(s)' funds + loans 18.5
Owner(s)' funds + trade credit 27.2
Owner(s)' funds + loans + trade credit 9.9
Owner(s)' funds + trade credit + profit-sharing finance from friends 1.2
Total•
,	 .
100
Source . Question number 5.
This table shows that the most commonly used source of start-up capital is
that provided by the owner(s) of the firm, as 43.2 percent of the surveyed firms
depended only on this source. Concerning external sources of start-up capital,
trade credit is the most significant one employed by 27.2 percent of these firms,
while loans are employed by only 18.5 percent of the firms. If the percentage of the
firms which employed both loans and trade credit (9.9 percent) is added to those
which employed trade credit (27.2 percent) and those which employed loans (18.5
percent), then trade credit will account for 37.1 percent vis-a-vis 28.4 percent
for loans. As regards profit-sharing finance, it was employed by only one firm
in combination with trade credit, even though this profit-sharing finance came
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from friends rather than Islamic banks. These figures suggest that: (a) a major
proportion of the owners of SSMFs tend to be confined to their own resources to
start their businesses; and (b) institutional sources of finance play a minor role
in start-up financing. When the owners/managers, who did not depend on loans
to finance their start-ups, were asked why this was the case they mentioned the
same reasons for not depending on bank credit, as discussed in the last chapter.
Before drawing more inferences from these figures, it may be appropriate to
investigate the sources of the loans used as part of start-up capital; these sources
are shown in the following table:
Table 10.2. Percentage distribution of the surveyed SSMFs according to
their dependeb,. e on the different sources of start-up loans
Sources of start-up loans %
Family members 29.0
Friends 19.4
The DIB	 . 35.5
Commercial banks 16.1
Total 100
Source: Question number 6.
It is noticed, in table 10.2, that not all start-up loans came from institutional
sources, as 48.4 percent of SSMFs obtained such loans from non-institutional
sources represented in family members and friends. On the other hand, insti-
tutional sources of start-up loans are represented in loans from both the DIB
and commercial banks which are employed together by 51.6 percent of SSMFs.
These figures suggest that: (a) taking into consideration the figures shown in
table 10.1, non-institutional sources play a major role in start-up financing of
SSMFs; and (b) the DIB is the most significant supplier of institutional loans for
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start-up purposes. In fact the DIB provides start-up loans for two purposes: (1)
(a) the financing of buildings where the loan represents 60 percent of the esti-
mated value of the buildings, and the client pledges these buildings as collateral
for the loan; and (b) the financing of working capital for one production cycle
where the loan represents 75 percent of the estimated value for raw materials,
and the client pledges these raw materials as collateral for the loan. Yet, it is not
surprising that commercial-bank loans are employed by relatively few SSMFs,
as these banks, in contrast to the DIB, are more conservative in their lending
policies and concentrate on short-term, rather than long-term, loans. Moreover,
many commercial banks shy away from getting involved in the financing of start-
up situations. Taking into consideration the reluctance of many businessmen to
employ bank credit, one can easily understand the reasons for the minor role of
institutional finance in start-ups.
Another phase of start-up financing is investigating the sources of the
owner(s)' funds, or equity capital, used in the financing of SSMFs during the
start-up stage. For a sole proprietorship there is only one source of equity capital
represented in the owner of the firm himself; for partnerships there are different
sources of equity capital as shown in the following table:
(1) An interview with the vice-general manager for small-scale industry credit. Cairo: DIB,
February. 1988.
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Table 10.3. Percentage distribution of SSMF partnerships according to
the sources of start-up equity capital
Sources of start-up
equity capital
Ordinary
partnerships
,
Limited
partnerships
Both
partnerships
% % %
Family members 85.3 90.0 86.3
Friends 11.8 10.0 11.4
Other people 2.9 0.0 2.3
Total 100 100 100
Source: Questions 4 and 7.
As shown in table 10.3, partnerships in SSMFs tend to be family businesses,
as 86.3 percent of them obtained equity capital from family members, 11.4 percent
obtained equity capital from friends and a mere 2.3 percent of them approached
other people to be their partners. The main implication of these figures is that
the owners of these partnerships tend to keep their businesses within the family
rather than taking "strangers" as partners. In fact, many businessmen in Egypt
have such an attitude, which sometimes results in selling personal properties and
seeking personal loans, even if all these means result in a meagre equity capi-
tal to start with. Comparing ordinary partnerships with limited partnerships, it
is noticed in table 10.3 that limited partnerships are more dependent on family
members, and less dependent on friends and other people, than ordinary part-
nerships, although limited partnerships are expected to have more partners than
ordinary partnerships. The reason may be that the term "family", at least in
Egypt, has two meanings: (a) the narrow meaning which refers to the persons
who live with each other in the same house or flat, namely the parents and the
offspring; and (b) the broad meaning which refers to all the relatives who might
amount to scores of people. Consequently, it could be assumed that the part-
ners in ordinary partnerships are mainly family members in its narrow meaning,
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and the partners in limited partnerships are mainly family members in its broad
meaning.
10.2. Short-Term Finance: 
Business concerns in general, and SSMFs in particular, need short-term
finance for the purchase of raw materials and necessary components from the local
market or from abroad if these items are not available locally. Short-term finance
can be obtained from institutional sources such as banks or non-institutional
sources such as raw-material suppliers.
10.2.1. Sources of Short-Term Finance:
The main sources of short-term finance for SSMFs are commercial banks,
the DIB and raw-material suppliers. Islamic banks provide short-term finance
via Murrabahah, but they will not be referred to in this context because they
are mentioned by the respondents as sources of long-term, rather than short-
term, finance. The following table shows the sources of short-term finance for the
surveyed S S M Fs.
Table 10.4. Percentage distribution of the surveyed SSMFs according to
their dependence on different sources of short-term finance
Sources of short-term finance %*
The DIB 4.9
Commercial banks 19.8
Raw-material suppliers 75.3
Tot al 100
* Multiresponse.
Source: Question number 14.
This table shows that the most significant source of short-term finance is
raw-material suppliers, which accounts for more than 75 percent of the responses.
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According to table 10.4 the least significant source of short-term finance is the DIB
which accounts for less than 5 percent of the responses compared with 19.8 percent
for commercial banks. As these figures represent multiresponses, this means that
some of these sources, or even all of them, are used in combination with other
sources. A further analysis shows that 71.8 percent of the surveyed firms depend
only on raw-material suppliers, 14.1 percent depend only on commercial banks,
and none of them mentioned that they depend only on the DIB for short-term
finance. (2) Once again these figures emphasize the significance of trade credit
as a source of short-term finance compared with institutional sources of such
finance, especially the DIB. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that if the
DIB is not a significant source of short-term finance for SSMFs it is probably a
-significant source of medium-and long-term finance (MTLT finance), and this will
be examined later in this chapter. However, the question which might arise is: if
short-term finance from institutional sources is confined to the firms which depend
on bank credit, is short-term finance from non-institutional sources confined to
the firms which do not depend on bank credit? The answer is shown in the
following table:
Table 10.5. Percentage distribution of SSMFs according to
their dependence on the different sources of short-term finance
as based on their dependence, or non-dependence, on bank credit
Does the firm
depend on
Sources of short-term finance
TotalThe DIB Commercial banks Raw-material suppliers
bank credit? % % % %
Yes 10.0 40.0 50.0 100
No 0.0 0.0 100 100
Source: Questions 8 and 14.
(2) Different analysis of question number 14.
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It is a natural consequence that the firms which do not employ bank credit
depend completely on trade credit provided by raw-material suppliers; but the
interesting point is that half of the firms which depend on bank credit never-
theless employ trade credit as shown in table 10.5. These results suggest that:
(a) bank credit is insufficient in satisfying the needs of SSMFs for short-term
finance, and this point was emphasized above where only 14.1 percent of the
surveyed firms mentioned that they depend only on institutional sources, repre-
sented in commercial banks, for short-term finance; (b) non-institutional sources
of finance, represented by raw-material suppliers, are the dominant sources of
short-term finance for SSMFs in Egypt; and (c) commercial banks represent the
major institutional source of short-term finance for SSMFs in Egypt.
10.2.2. Forms of Short-Term Finance: 
While raw-material suppliers provide only trade credit, banks provide short-
term finance in different forms such as short-term loans, overdrafts, documentary
credits ... etc. The main forms of short-term finance, as employed by the surveyed
firms, are shown in the following table:
Table 10.6. Percentage distribution of SSMFs according to
their employment of the different forms of short-term finance
as based on their dependence, or non-dependence, on bank credit
Does the firm
depend on
bank credit?
Forms of short-term finance
Total
%
,
Short-term
loans
%
Overdrafts
%
Documentary
credits
%
Trade credit
%
Yes
No
23.9
0.0
15.2
0.0
17.4
0.0
43.5
100
100
100
Source: Quaitions 8 and 15.
213
It is worth noticing that trade credit accounts for 50 percent of the responses
of the firms which depend on bank credit, in table 10.5, while it accounts for 43.5
percent of the responses, of the same firms, in table 10.6. The reason is that
both question number 14 and question number 15 are multiresponse questions.
Apart from the firms which do not depend on bank credit, table 10.6 shows that
trade credit is still the dominant form of short-term finance for the firms which
depend on bank credit, accounting for 43.5 percent of the responses. As regards
the institutional forms of short-term finance, short-term loans are the most used
(and the traditional) form of short-term finance. On the other hand, overdrafts
are the least used form of short-term finance; yet, overdrafts are mentioned by
the respondents only as supplementary to other forms of finance while short-term
loans are most mentioned as the only form of short-term finance. (3) Cocerning
documentary credits, they are more significant than overdrafts as they are the
only means of financing the imported raw materials used by the surveyed SSMFs.
Finally, it can be said that short-term finance from banks is generally secured,
as 90 percent of the owners/managers of the surveyed firms mentioned that banks
require collateral for short-term loans, while only 10 percent mentioned that banks
do not require collateral for such loans. (4) Documentary credits are, by definition,
secured by the documents which accompany the imported merchandise such as
the bill of lading and the insurance certificate. Concerning overdrafts, they are
usually unsecured, as banks advance such facilities to the trust-worthy customers
who often have deposits with the same bank; however, overdrafts represent the
least employed form of short-term finance, as shown in table 10.6 above.
(3) Analysis of question number 15.
(4) Analysis of question number 16.
214
10.3. Medium-and Long-Term Finance: 
This section incorporates the main sources of medium-and long-term finance
(MTLT finance) which prevail among business enterprise's, in Egypt, in general
and among SSMFs in particular. Lease finance represents a form of MTLT finance
but it is dealt with in a separate section in order to show the characteristics
peculiar to the employment of lease finance by SSMFs in Egypt.
MTLT finance for SSMFs comes from two main sources: (a) institutional
sources represented in commercial banks, the DIB and Islamic banks; and
(b) non-institutional sources represented in the firms themselves (in the form
of retained profits), family members, friends and the partners. The main types of
MTLT finance, employed by the surveyed firms, are shown in the following table:
Table 10.7. Percentage distribution of the surveyed SSMFs according to
their employment of the different types of MTLT finance
Types of MTLT finance
'
%*
Retained profits 54.4
Loans from family members and friends 5.5
Loans from the DIB 15.6
Loans from commercial banks 10.0
Profit-sharing finance 6.7
Trade credit 1.1
Loans from the partners 6.7
Total 100
* Multiresponse.
Source: Question number 17.
The types of MTLT finance, shown in table 10.7, can be classified in two main
categories: institutional and non-institutional. The first category incorporates
loans from the DIB (15.6 percent of the responses), loans from commercial banks
(10.0 percent of the responses) and profit-sharing finance from Islamic banks
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(4.5 percent of the responses). In this regard, it should be noticed that profit-
sharing finance, as shown in table 10.7, represents profit-sharing finance from
both individuals and Islamic banks, but they are separated via further analysis
of the data. (5) Hence, all institutional types of MTLT finance account for only
30.1 percent of the responses, which shows the minor role of financial institutions
as sources of MTLT finance. Nonetheless, the DIB has a more significant role in
providing SSMFs with MTLT loans as compared with commercial banks; in this
respect, it is worth mentioning that:
(a) The maturities of MTLT loans from the DIB and from commercial banks are
relatively short, as 81 percent of the firms which depend on bank credit mentioned
that the maturities of MTLT loans are between 2-5 years, while only 19 percent
of these firms mentioned that such maturities are between 6-10 years. (6)
(b) The maximum maturity of the DIB's loans to SSMFs is 5 years with the
possibility of extending this maturity for one or two more years. (7)
(c) Commercial banks are expected to be restrictive in setting loan maturities, as
only one respondent mentioned that MTLT loans from commercial banks have
maturities between 6-10 years. (8)
(d) Both the DIB and commercial banks require collateral for MTLT loans, as all
the respondents mentioned that these loans are secured. (9)
The second category represents non-institutional types of MTLT finance which
incorporate retained profits (54.4 percent of the responses), loans from family
members and friends (5.5 percent of the responses), profit-sharing finance from
individuals (2.2 percent of the responses), (10) trade credit (1.1 percent of the
responses) and loans from the partners (6.7 percent of the responses). Hence, all
(5) Crosstabulation of questions 10 and 17.
(6) Analysis of question number 18.
(7) An interview with the vice-general manager for small-scale industry credit, Cairo: DIB,
February. 1988.
(8) Crosstabulation of questions 17 and 18.
(9) Analysis of question number 19.
(10) Crosstabulation of questions 10 and 17.
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non-institutional types of MTLT finance account for 69.9 percent of the responses.
The most significant source of MTLT finance in general, and non-institutional
MTLT finance in particular, is retained profits which accounts for more than half
the responses; moreover, retained profits are mentioned by 51.9 percent of SSMFs
as the only source of MTLT finance. (ii) Also, if retained profits are compared
with all non-institutional sources of MTLT finance, they will account for 77.8 per-
cent of these sources. (12) The other interesting point is the employment of trade
credit for the financing of MTLT requirements, but it should be noticed that it
is not a common practice as it is mentioned by only one respondent who stated
that it was for the purchase of machinery from domestic market. On the whole,
non-instituional sources are much more significant than institutional sources oi
MTLT finance, and the main implications are:
(a) As mentioned in the last chapter, the owners/managers of SSMFs regard re-
tained profits as a cost-free source of finance because they are unaware of the
opportunity cost associated with such profits.
(b) The owners/managers of SSMFs are encouraged to employ loans from family
members and friends as those loans are often cost-free because of the reluctance
of some relatives and friends to charge the borrower any interest, provided that
they have confidence in him and his project's potential.
(c) The owners/managers who employ profit-sharing finance from individuals are
not necessarily those pious people who do not employ interest-bearing types of
finance. The reason is that the majority of them obtain such finance from rel-
atives and friends with whom they feel more comfortable than would otherwise
be the case. However, this type of finance is no longer available to SSMFs, as
it became confined to publicly quoted companies which are established for the
purpose of receiving money from the public for investment. (13)
(11) Different analysis of question number 17.
(12) Calculated to the author from the responses to question number 17.
(13) Article one of Law no. 146 of 1988.
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(d) Loans from partners appeal to many owner-managers because: first, it is an
easy-to-approach source of finance compared with loans from banks, especially if
those partners, or some of them, are wealthy; second, because those owners share
the management of the firm, they have more confidence in each other; and third,
in many cases these loans are interest-free.
Given that institutional MTLT finance is confined to the firms which depend
on bank credit, is non-institutional MTLT finance confined to those firms which
do not depend on bank credit? The answer can be derived from the following
table:
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Table 10.8 shows that the firms which have dealings with banks employ
both institutional and non-institutional MTLT finance, albeit institutional MTLT
finance is employed by the majority of these firms. The' institutional types are
loans from the DIB, loans from commercial banks and profit-sharing finance from
Islamic banks, which account together for 74.9 percent of the responses. In this
regard, the DIB is the most significant source of MTLT finance for these firms,
as it accounts for 38.9 percent of the responses compared with 25.0 percent for
commercial banks. On the other hand, the firms which depend on bank credit em-
ploy non-institutional MTLT finance, especially retained profits, which account
for 16.7 percent of the responses and come in the third place after the DIB and
commercial banks but before Islamic-bank finance. Also, these firms depend on
loans from family members and friends to the same extent as those firms which do
not depend on bank credit. Trade credit does not represent a significant source of
finance, even though it is employed by the firms which have dealings with banks
rather than those which do not. Concerning the firms which do not depend on
bank credit, their main source of MTLT finance is retained profits, which account
for 79.6 percent of the responses. The importance of retained profits, as a source
of MTLT finance for these firms, can be demonstrated by comparing them with
the second important source (the partners) which accounts for only 11.1 percent
of the responses. These results suggest that:
(a) Taking into consideration the reasons for not depending on bank credit, dis-
cussed in the last chapter, it seems that the dependence on retained profits is a
consequence of not dealing with banks and not vice versa.
(b) Institutional sources of MTLT finance seem to be insufficient, as these sources
are approached, in some cases, in combination with non-institutional sources. (14)
(c) The DII3, which has only three branches, is a more important source of MTLT
finance for SSMFs than commercial banks, which have hundreds of branches; but
(14) Different analysis of question number 17.
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this applies only to the firms which have dealings with banks rather than SSMFs
in general, i.e. the DIB does not represent a significant source of MTLT finance
if all the surveyed firms are considered.
10.4. Foreign-Currency Finance: 
Business concerns in Egypt in general, and SSMFs in particular, need foreign-
currency finance for the importation of raw materials, product components and
equipment for which there are no local substitutes or where the local supply does
not meet the demand. In this regard, the survey shows that 41.4 percent of SSMFs
obtain foreign-currency finance and 58.6 percent do not. (15) Of course this type
of finance is obtained from institutional sources represented by commercial banks,
the DIB and Islamic banks. The forms of foreign-currency finance are shown in
the following table:
Table 10.9. Percentage diaribution of SSMFs, which depend on bank credit,
according to their employment of the different forms of foreign-currency finance
Forms of foreign-currency finance %*
Short-term loans 14.3
Documentary credits 57.1
MTLT loans 28.6
Total 100
* Multiresponse.
Source: Question number 23.
It is noticed that documentary credits represent the most significant form
of foreign-currency finance, as they account for more than half the responses.
The reasons for this may be: (a) documentary credits are the traditional forms
of foreign-currency finance and are well known to all firms; and (b) documen-
tary credits can be provided by almost all types of banks. On the other hand,
(15) Analysis of question number 22.
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short-term loans are the least employed, accounting for only 14.3 percent of the
responses. In fact, it is not a common practice for a small firm, in Egypt, to
obtain a foreign-currecny short-term loan for the importation of raw materials as
it is often easier to import raw materials via documentary credits. MTLT loans
are employed by twice the number of firms which employ short-term loans. This
may be because SSMFs need to import machinery rather than raw materials, as
the shortage in local production of the former is more evident than is the case
with the latter. On the whole, it seems that the DIB is the main supplier of
foreign-currency long-term loans because: (a) its share in providing MTLT loans
to SSMFs is larger than that of commercial banks, as shown in section 10.7 above;
and (b) it is the only financial institution in Egypt to carry out the programmes
of financing small-scale industrial firms in general, and SSMFs in particular, de-
pending on loans from international organizations in foreign currencies.
Given that the supply of foreign currencies in Egypt lags behind the de-
mand for them, SSMFs are expected to face some difficulties in obtaining foreign-
currency finance. According to the survey results, 69.2 percent of the firms,
which depend on bank credit, mentioned that they face problems in obtaining
foreign-currency finance, while 30.8 percent mentioned that they do not face
such problems. (16) The problems that face SSMFs, concerning foreign-currency
finance, are shown in the following table:
(16) Analysis of question number 24.
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Table 10.10. Percentage distribution of SSMFs, which depend on bank credit,
according to the problems which they face in obtaining foreign-currency finance
-
The problems of foreign-currency finance %*
Difficult lending terms 43.7
Insufficient amounts of funds 18.7
Exchange-rate problems 31.3
Unstable rules of foriegn-currency dealings 6.3
Tot al 100
* Multiresponse.
Source: Question number 25.
As shown in table 10.10, the most significant problem is the difficult lending
terms (43.7 percent of the responses). This problem is common among almost
all SSMFs concerning almost all types of institutional finance, as discussed in the
last chapter. As far as foreign-currency finance is concerned, this problem gains
a special importance because of the limited amount of foreign currencies in the
banks. This has two dimensions: (a) for commercial banks, the availability of
foreign currencies depends to a large extent on the transfer of money from abroad
via these banks, foreign-currency deposits and the amount of foreign currencies
they purchase in the local market; and (b) for the DIB, the main determinant of
its foreign-currency resources is the availability of loans from international orga-
nizations such as the World Bank and the European Community. Consequently,
commercial banks and the DIB are expected to set up some criteria to be used
as screening devices in order to select the most eligible customers for foreign-
currency finance. Concerning the problem of insufficient amounts of funds (18.7
percent of the responses), it can be said to be a problem whose symptoms are the
difficult lending terms discussed above. As for the exchange-rate problems (31.3
percent of the responses), they can be regarded as consequences of the problem
of the unstable rules of foreign-currency dealings (6.3 percent of the responses).
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Accordingly, the exchange-rate problem can be said to account for 37.6 of the
responses (31.3 percent plus 6.3 percent). The following regulations, which are
extracted from a certain bank's circular memoranda, are deemed to stress the
above-mentioned problems:
—Before January 5, 1985, the Bank used to treat foreign-currency loans accord-
ing to the exchange rate of $1 = LE 0.84.
— On October 13, 1986, the Higher Committee of Investment and Economic
Affairs (in the Bank) decided that foreign-currency loans advanced to the Bank's
customers on January 5, 1985 onwards would be treated according to the exchange
rate in the "commercial-bank pool", where the exchange rate ranged between
$1 = LE 1.12 and $1 = LE 1.18.
—On November 23, 1986, the Executive Committee (in the Bank) approved the
decision of the Committee of Credit (in the Bank) to add the following clause
to loan contracts: "the loans will be repaid in the same foreign currency and
the Bank may accept the local currency according to the highest exchange rate
declared by the CBE, plus a bonus to be declared on the date of maturity or
repayment whichever is higher; and the borrower will bear the exchange-rate risk
whether he repays in foreign currency or in local currency".
—On March 23, 1987, the Bank's board of directors decided that due to the fluc-
tuations in the exchange rate between the Egyptian Pound and the US Dollar:
(a) the terms of the contracts of foreign-currency loans would be amended, for the
unsigned contracts, to state that foreign-currency loans must be repaid, together
with the interest, in foreign currency; (b) a clause to be added to the contract
stipulating that repayment may be in the local currency, if the concerned author-
ities decide so, according to the highest exchange rate on the day of repayment;
and (c) concerning the contracts which are signed but their credit accounts are
not open yet, the legal department has to prepare a form to that effect to be
signed by the customer.
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— On May 12, 1987, as a result of the implementation of the free-market exchange
rate (declared on May 10, 1987), the Executive Committee (in the Bank) decided
that: (a) all contracts which are signed until May 11, 1987, would be dealt with
according to the old system; and (b) any contracts which will be signed after that
date should stipulate that the customer's obligations are in foreign currency and
the repayment will be according to the highest exchange rate in the free market
if the Government decides so.
It is noticeable that SSMFs face real problems in obtaining foreign-currency
finance; meanwhile, the banks cannot take all the blame for such problems, as the
institutions themselves are victims of the unstable exchange-rate rules in Egypt.
10.6. Lease Finance: 
The main features of lease finance in Egypt are: (a) it does not represent
a significant type of finance for small businesses in general and for SSMFs in
particular; and (b) the main objects of leasing for SSMFs are trucks, either for
the transportation of raw materials or for the transportation of products or even
for both purposes. The survey of SSMFs shows that only 7.4 percent of these
firms employ lease finance while 92.6 percent of them do not. (17) The main
source of lease finance is the private sector which provides 85.7 percent of leases
compared with 14.3 percent for the public sector. (18) SSMFs which employ lease
finance have different reasons for employing this type of finance as shown in the
following table:
(17) Analysis of question number 28.
(18) Analysis of question number 30.
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Table 10.11. Percentage distribution of SSMFs according to
the reasons for employing lease finance
,
Reasons for employing lease finance %*
1. It is cheaper than bank loans 14.3
2. It is easier to deal with than bank loans 28.6
3. It is not an interest-bearing type of finance 28.5
4. It is cheaper than purchase 14.3
5. It does not represent tied-up capital 14.3
Tot al 100
* Multiresponse.
Source; Question number 29.
The reasons shown in table 10.11 are given numbers in order to facilitate their
explanation. Hence, these reasons can be classified into three categories: the first
category incorporates reasons 1 and 2 which account, together, for 42.9 percent
of the responses; these reasons are given by firms with no dealings with banks as
they regard bank loans as expensive and difficult to deal with. (19) The second
category is represented in reason 3 (28.5 percent of the responses) which seems to
be given either by firms that deal with Islamic banks or by firms that do not have
dealings with banks at all; in either case, this reason demonstrates the adherence
of such firms to the prohibition of interest in Islam. Finally, the third category of
reasons incorporates reasons 4 and 5 which account, together, for 28.6 percent of
the responses; these reasons are expected to be given by those owners/managers
who are aware of cost effectiveness and opportunity cost in finance. This latter
point shows that some owners/managers have the financial awarenenss which
favours leasing compared with purchasing, given that: (a) lease payments are less
than loan payments, should the owner/manager buy the asset and finance the
purchase with a loan; and/or (b) the use of the leased asset is sporadic or for a
(19) Crosstabulation of questions 8 and 29.
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fairly short period of time.
The above-mentioned results suggest that the employment of lease finance
,
among the surveyed firms cannot be attributed to any one category of reasons,
as each of the categories accounts for less than 50 percent of the responses. In
this regard, it could be argued that the first category of reasons (reasons 1 and 2)
has the highest percentage of responses (42.9 percent of the responses), and these
reasons are given by firms that do not have dealings with banks, consequently lease
finance is employed as a substitute for bank credit. Such an inference cannot be
held true as the survey results show that although 83.3 percent of the firms which
depend on bank credit do not employ lease finance, 61.3 percent of the firms which
do not depend on bank credit do not employ lease finance at the same time. (20)
Given that 92.6 percent of SSMFs do not employ lease finance, this phe-
nomenon is more important, and is worth investigating, lhan Ihe phenomenon th
employing lease finance. The reasons for not employing lease finance, as given by
SSMFs, are shown in the following table:
Table 10.12. Percentage distribution of SSMFs according to
the reasons for not employing lease finance
Reasons for not employing lease finance %
1. It is not available 25.0
2. We have enough equipment 58.4
3. We prefer purchase 5.0
4. It is not familiar to us 3.3
5. Raw materials can be processed in another factory 3.3
6. It is difficult to move the equipment from one factory to another 5.0
Total 100
Source: Question number 31.
(20) Crosstabulation of questions 8 and 28.
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It is noticed, in table 10.12, that the most significant reason for not employing
lease finance is that the respondents have enough equipment (58.4 percent of the
firms). This result justifies the insignificant relationship between employing, or
not employing, lease finance and not depending, or depending, on bank credit;
moreover, question number 31 included the alternative answer "because it is more
expensive than bank loans", and no respondent chose it. The second major reason
is that lease finance is not available which is mentioned by 25.0 percent of the
firms, and this implies that these firms could have employed lease finance were it
available to them. For those firms, which do not employ lease finance because it
is not available, a further investigation shows that 60 percent of them depend on
bank credit, (21) which implies that they may be using bank credit as a substitute
for lease finance. The rest of the reasons can be classified into two categories: the
first category incorporates reasons 3 and 4 (mentioned, together, by 8.3 percent of
the firms); these reasons reflect the cultural background of those owners/managers
who prefer to have their own assets rather than using "other people's assets".
The second category incorporates reasons 5 and 6 (mentioned, together, by 8.3
percent of the firms); these reasons reflect the impracticality of leasing because:
(a) the sporadic nature of some products and the small size of production do not
even justify leasing the equipment (reason number 5); and (b) the complexity of
equipment deters the leasing of such equipment as firms, if applicable, lease each
other's equipment because of the unavailability of specialized leasing companies
in Egypt.
10.6. Financing Firms' Expansion: 
Expanding a firm's activity means increasing its production capacity, which
requires additions to its fixed assets, mainly machinery, its current assets and its
workforce. Consequently, the type of finance required for the expansion is mainly
(21) Crosstabulation of questions 8 and 31.
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MTLT finance; this means that the surveyed SSMFs are expected to depend, in
the first place, on MTLT finance at such a stage. According to the survey results,
53.7 percent of SSMFs expanded their activities while 46.3 percent did not expand
at all. (22) For those firms which expanded their activities, the main implication
is that they are successful and have the ability to penetrate the market for their
products. As for those which did not expand, this has one or more of the following
implications:
(a) They are not successful enough to expand.
(b) The market for their activities is not large enough to absorb more output.
(c) They have the opportunities to expand but they lack the necessary finance to
carry out the expansion.
(d) they are relatively new.
The first implication cannot be assessed in this context because it is irrelevant
to this study, and there is no information about SSMFs to help in assessing
their performance. Concerning the second implication, it is too early to claim
that there is demand saturation in the Egyptian market, as supply lags behind
demand for the majority of products. Yet, the last two implications raise some
questions related to the relationship between expansion and some attributes and
characteristics of the surveyed firms, namely the dependence on bank credit and
the age of the firm.
10.6.1. The Relationship Between Expansion and Other Attributes
of the Firm: 
10.6.1.1. Dependence on Bank Credit: 
As discussed in chapter four, the employment of bank credit makes available
additional funds at a relatively low cost which enhances the firm's profitability;
(22) Analysi . of question number 32.
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high profitability enables the firm to retain more profits which, in turn, sustain its
ability to expand. The relationship between expansion and dependence on bank
credit is shown in the following table:
Table 10.13. Percentage distribution of the expanded and non-expanded
SSMFs according to their dependence, or non-dependence,
on bank credit
Has the firm expanded Does the firm depend on bank credit? Total
its activity? Yes % No % %
Yes 55.8 44.2 100
No 16.2 83.8 100
Source: Questions 8 and 32.
As this table shows, more than half of the firms which expanded their activities
depend on bank credit while the rest do not. On the other hand, only 16.2 percent
of the firms which did not expand their activities depend on bank credit while
83.8 percent do not. These figures may suggest that there is a correlation between
expansion, or non-expansion, and depending, or not depending, on bank credit.
Such an inference needs confirmation by testing the relationship the other way
round, i.e. by testing the relationship between depending, or not depending, on
bank credit and expanding, or not expanding, the firm's activity as shown in the
following table:
Table 10.14. Percentage distribution of the surveyed SSMFs according to
their dependence, or non-dependence, on bank credit as based on
the expansion, or non-expansion, of their activities
Does the firm depend Has the firm expanded its activity? Total
on bank credit? Yes % No % %
Yes 80.0 20.0 100
No 38.0 62.0 100
Source: Questions 8 and 32.
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Table 10.14 shows that 80 percent of the firms which depend on bank credit
have expanded their activities while only 20 percent of them have not. On the
other hand, only 38 percent of the firms which do not depend on bank credit have
expanded their activities while 62 percent have not. These figures support the
inference, drawn from table 10.13, that there is a correlation between depending,
or not depending, on bank credit and expanding, or not expanding, the firm's
activity. Hence, it can be claimed that banks can play an important role, not
only as sources of finance for business enterprises, but also as means to enhance
the growth of these businesses due to: (a) the relatively low cost of bank credit as
compared with the cost of equity financing; and (b) the readiness of bank credit as
compared with equity financing should the owner/manager look for new partner(s)
or await the retainment of enough profits. However, the hazards of employing
bank credit, as discussed in chapter four, should be taken into consideration as
such a source of finance might turn out to be a fatal one.
10.6.1.2. Firm Age: 
It can be presumed that the older the firm the more viable it is to expand;
hence, a consecutive relationship is expected to exist between firm age and ex-
pansion. The distribution of the expanded SSMFs, according to age, is shown in
the following table:
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Table 10.15. Percentage distribution of the expanded and non-expanded
SSMFs as based on their age
Date of starting
the firm's activity
Has the firm expanded its activity? .	 Total
Yes % No % %
— 1959 33.3 66.7 100
1960 — 1969 100 0.0 100
1970 — 1974 50.0 50.0 100
1975 onwards 46.7 53.3 100
,
Source: Questions 2 and 32.
Apart from the first age group (i.e. the firms that started their activities before
1960), the percentages of the expanded firms seem to be consistent with the dates
of starting their activities. For the first age group, only one third of the firms have
expanded their activities while two thirds have not, which seems to be eccentric
among the rest of the groups. A further investigation shows that none of those
firms, which were established before 1960, have dealings with banks; (23) and this
supports the inferences, drawn from tables 10.13 and 10.14, that employing bank
credit enhances the firm's growth. Given that the firm is successful and market
conditions are favourable, these results suggest that:
(a) Expanding the firm's activity depends not only on its age but also on the
availability of external finance, mainly bank credit.
(b) Even if a firm can expand its activity while depending only on internal sources
of finance, such expansion is expected to be limited.
(c) Non-institutional types of finance can have a significant effect on the firm's
growth only if they are available in fairly large amounts and on better terms than
those offered with bank credit.
(23) Crosstabulation of questions 2 and 8.
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10.6.2. Sources for Financing Firms' Expansion: 
As mentioned earlier, the main financing requirement for expansion is MTLT
finance; consequently, MTLT sources of finance are expected to dominate the
financing of the surveyed firms' expansion. The sources of financing the expansion,
employed by these firms, are shown in the following table:
Table 10.16. Percentage distribution of SSMFs according to the employment
of different sources for financing their expansion
Sources for financing firms' expansion %*
Retained profits 	 - 34.9	 -
Increasing the firm's equity capital 25.3
Loans from family members and friends 10.9
Loans from the DIB 10.9
Loans from commercial banks 9.6
Profit-sharing finance 6.0
Trade credit 2.4
Total 100
* Multiresponse.
Source: Question number 33.
It can be noticed in table 10.16 that equity finance is the most common source
for financing the expansion among the surveyed firms, as both retained profits and
equity capital account, together, for 60.2 percent of the responses. Moreover, 11.6
percent of these firms financed their expansion with retained profits only and 9.3
percent of them financed their expansion depending only on increasing their eq-
uity capital. (24) Although loans from family members and friends and loans from
the DIB have the same relative importance (10.9 percent each), 4.7 percent of the
firms financed their expansion with loans from the DIB only, but none of them
mentioned loans from family members or friends as the only source for financing
(24) Different analysis of question number 33.
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the expansion. (25) Also, loans from commercial banks account for 9.6 percent
of the responses vis-à-vis 6.0 percent for profit-sharing finance; but only one firm
mentioned that it financed the expansion by depending only on profit-sharing
finance, while none of the firms mentioned commercial banks as the only source
of financing the expansion. (26) Trade credit is the least employed source for
financing the expansion (2.4 percent of the responses)— this is expected to rep-
resent the purchase of equipment on credit. These results suggest that:
(a) Institutional finance does not have a significant role in the financing the ex-
pansion of SSMFs, as both loans from the DIB and loans from commercial banks
account, together, for 20.5 percent of the responses.
(b) Even if profit-sharing finance is assumed to have come from Islamic banks,
the relative importance of institutional sources will become 26.5 percent compared
with 73.5 percent for non-institutional sources.
(c) The DIB has a more significant role than commercial banks in financing the
expansion of the surveyed firms.
(d) Apart from equity finance, other non-insitutional sources of finance can be
employed only as supplementary to each other or to institutional sources.
However, if banks, as sources for financing the expansion, are confined to the
firms which employ bank credit, does this mean that non-institutional sources
are confined to those firms which do not employ bank credit? The answer can be
derived from the following table:
(25) Ibid.
(26) Ibid.
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Table 10.17. Percentage distribution of SSMFs according to their employment
of different sources for financing the expansion as based on
their dependence, or non-dependence, on bank credit
Sources for financing
the expansion
Does the firm depend
on bank credit? Total
%Yes % No %
Retained profits 51.7 48.3 100
Increasing the firm's equity capital 47.6 52.4 100
Loans from family members and friends 44.4 55.6 100
Loans from the DIB 100 0.0 100
Loans from commercial banks 100 0.0 100
Profit-sharing finance 80.0 20.0 100
Trade credit 50.0 50.0 100
Source: Questions 8 and 33.
Table 10.17 shows that non-institutional sources are employed by all firms,
both the firms that depend on bank credit and those which do not, to finance
their expansion. It is noticed that 51.7 percent of the firms which employed re-
tained profits to finance their expansion depend on bank credit, which means
that retained profits are employed to supplement bank credit rather than a sub-
stitute for it. On the other hand, more than half of the firms which employed
both equity capital and loans from family members and friends are those firms
that do not have dealings with banks; this means that these sources tend to be
substitutes for bank credit rather than supplementary to it. In this regard, it
should be noticed that loans from family members and friends are employed in
combination with either retained profits or equity capital, (27)
 which means that
these loans cannot, alone, replace bank credit. With profit-sharing finance, 80
percent of it came from Islamic banks and 20 percent came from individuals, and
(27) Ibid.
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these types are substitutes for each other and for bank credit, as they are usually
available in sufficient amounts. As for trade credit, it can be employed either as
a substitute for or to supplement bank credit, though for the most part it tends
to be supplementary to bank credit. On the whole, these results seem to support
the inferences drawn from table 10.16 above.
Finally, it can be noticed that throughout this chapter, and chapter nine, no
respondent mentioned investment-and-business banks as sources of finance. This
may be due to one or more of the following reasons:
(a) These banks are fairly unknown among many businssmen, as they were intro-
duced to Egypt after 1974.
(b) These banks are reluctant to finance SSMFs, which they may regard as more
risky and less profitable than other businesses.
(c) The owners/managers of SSMFs are hesitant to approach these banks, as the
majority of them are branches of foreign banks. (28)
Also, it is noticed, in this chapter and chapter nine, that insurance companies
have no role in financing SSMFs. (29) As discussed in chapter six, insurance
companies have reasonable amounts of funds which can satisfy the financing needs
of several businesses, especially for long-term finance, but these companies choose
a safe approach by depositing these funds with banks.
(28) See figure 6.1 in chapter six.
(29) No respondent answered question number 34 concerning obtaining finance from insurance
companies and. consequently. questions 35 through 37.
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Chapter Eleven
Case Studies
11.1. Five Case Studies of SSMFs
11.2. Two Case Studies of Handicraft Establishments
11.3. Two Case Studies From Banks
This chapter undertakes three types of case studies:
(a) five case studies of SSMFs, in order to assess their current status and their
potential;	 '
(b) two case studies of handicraft establishments in order to predict the possibility
of their expansion; and
(c) two case studies of SSMFs from the banks' viewpoint, i.e. how banks assess
the creditworthiness of these firms.
It is worth mentioning that the information included in these case studies was
given by the owners/managers in interviews with the author either in the firm
itself or outside the firm after office hours. During the interviews which took place
in the firms, the author was given the chance to observe the different aspects of
the firm's activity and operations. Concerning the interviews which took place
outside the firms, the only source of information was the owner/manager. In
Egypt, however, it is very difficult for any researcher to collect detailed informa-
tion about any business unless he or she is a friend of the owner/manager or is
introduced to him by one of his or her friends or relatives. Hence, the case studies
of firms represent the firms to which the author could have access via his friends;
even though, some of the owners/managers did not give the detailed information
required, especially that involving figures such as turnover, profits, debts, asset
value ...etc., which they considered as confidential. As regards collecting infor-
mation from banks, the situation is even worse, partly because they do not like
to reveal their lending practices and partly because they do not like to reveal any
information about their clients. Accordingly, the information contained in this
chapter represents the maximum amount of material which could be obtained
within the limits of time and restrictions.
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11.1. Five Case Studies of SSMFs: 
Case One:	 A Tobacco Factory	 ,
— This factory was established in 1957 with start-up capital of LE 100 which
amounted to LE 100,000 at the beginning of 1988.
—Activity: tobacco products.
—Location: Cairo.
—Owned and managed by Mr. Sobhi Zaghloul.
—The factory started with 4 workers, who increased to 52 in 1978. The type of
labour employed in the factory is mainly skilled labour whose wages are deter-
mined according to the items produced by each worker.
— The equipment employed is manually operated, and there is only one semi-
automatic machine which was imported before a similar one was produced
locally.
— The factory uses five kinds of raw materials; two of them are imported and
three produced locally. All raw materials are bought at the local market either
from the producers or from dealers in imported merchandise; the suppliers of the
raw materials can be either private-sector or public-sector companies.
—With respect to marketing, no sales take place in Cairo because of the strong
competition from three large public-sector companies and about sixty private-
sector companies. Hence, the marketing of the factory's product takes place in
two governorates, one of them 120 kilometers south of Cairo and the other 90
kilometers south west of Cairo, where the factory sells to wholesalers from two
storage places in these two governorates. The factory does not export its product
because it has no market abroad, and the owner has little overseas knowledge.
—The production cycle is one week and the annual turnover is LE 450,000.
— The factory owes no debt because: (a) it does not obtain trade credit, as
payments for raw materials are made in advance or on delivery; and (b) it does
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not depend on bank credit, as the owner-manager regards dealings with banks as
"disastrous". Hence, the main sources of finance are equity capital and retained
profits; the annual net profits range between LE 12,000 and LE 25,000.
— This factory faces the following problems:
(a) The demand for its product is decreasing.
(b) The prices of the imported raw materials are increasing because of the depre-
ciation of the exchange rate for the Egyptian Pound, as well as the inflation in
the exporting countries.
(c) Both the weight and the price of the tobacco pack are determined by the
Government; and this results in a low profit margin which may be, according to
one of the owner-manager's sons, as low as 5 percent.
(d) The owner/manager is getting old and is unable to carry out the management
duties as he should; he also has no assistant because his sons are engaged in their
own businesses which are more profitable than the factory itself. At the same
time the owner-manager is unwilling to hire a professional manager because he
does not trust anybody to take command of the business.
— As a result of the forementioned problems, the factory's activity is shrinking;
one evidence for this shrinkage is that the number of workers decreased to 12 at
the beginning of 1988, a mere fraction of its past work force of 52 in 1980. The
owner-manager does not intend to replace the workers who left the factory be-
cause they retired or resigned to work elsewhere; even those who were fired were
not replaced.
Assessment: 
This is an example of a fading business which faces crucial problems caused,
mainly, by the owner-manager who made some serious mistakes as follows:
(a) The most serious mistake made by the owner-manager is the wrong choice
of plant location. As mentioned above, the factory is located in Cairo and mar-
kets its product in two governorates, one of them 120 kilometers south of Cairo
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and the other 90 kilometers south west of Cairo. The rational choice of plant
location suggests that the factory should have been established in either one of
the two governorates simply because they are only 42 kilometers apart and have
almost the same market size. The time and cost which could have been saved
can easily be envisaged by comparing the transportation of the production under
each alternative. Under the current situation the simplest way of transporting the
production is to carry it for 90 kilometers south west of Cairo and then continue
with the other governorate's quota for 42 kilometers which gives a sum of 132
kilometers; if each govemorate's quota is to be transported individually, the situ-
ation will be even worse (the total distance will be 210 kilometers). If the factory
had been established in either one of the two governorates, only one governorate's
quota would have been transported for 42 kilometers. In this latter case, the
time and cost which could have been saved are obvious. However, it seems that
the owner-manager had chosen the factory's location mainly because he lives in
Cairo, i.e. his business had followed him, not vice versa.
(b) The second mistake is that the owner-manager did not prepare a second-
generation manager, who could be one of his three sons or one of his relatives, or
even a hired assistant manager. Another alternative could 1;e taking one partner,
or more, who could share the management of the business at the same time.
(c) Also, the business does not depend on bank credit because the owner-manager
regards dealings with banks as "disastrous". This attitude may be because the es-
tablishment of the factory coincided with the Egyptianization of foreign companies
in 1957 and the wave of nationalizations which started in 1960. The significance
of such coincidence is that the banking sector, during the 1960s, enjoyed a monop-
olistic status which resulted in a falling standard of customer service; that is why
some businessmen used to consider banks as bureaucratic government agencies.
As far as this factory is concerned, it seems that the owner-manager did not try
to obtain credit from banks, and he established his judgement of dealing with
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banks on the experience of other businessmen who do not, necessarily, represent
the banks' customers.
..
On the whole, this business is unlikely to survive because:
(a) Its product is a special type of tobacco consumed by some people of the work-
ing class and some people in the countryside. Because the consumption of this
kind of tobacco requires special preparations (narghile, or hookah, and coal), many
young people are unwilling to consume it and some older people turn to other
kinds or even give up smoking completely. Moreover, this factory has neither the
flexibility nor the financial capability to move to the production of another kind
of tobacco.
(b) The strong competition from other companies, especially public-sector com-
panies, whose products are marketed all over the country and are well known to
the customers; meanwhile, the product of this factory is not known enough even
in the two governorates which represent its market.
(c) The Government intervention in determining the price and weight of the pack
limits the profit margin; from the above-mentioned figures, the average profitabil-
ity of sales is 4.1 percent (a minimum of 2.7 percent and a maximum of 5.5
percent).
(d) Given this limited profit margin and given the rising inflation in Egypt, this
business seems to be vulnerable should there be a significant increase in the cost
of production or transportation.
(e) The total dependence on equity finance makes the cost of capital to this
business relatively high; from the above-mentioned figures, the average return on
equity capital is 18.5 percent (a minimum of 12 percent and a maximum of 25
percent). Whether it is equal to the opportunity cost or not, this percentage
is higher than the maximum interest rate, on loans to the industrial sector, of
15 percent (as established by the CBE). Moreover, as discussed in chapter four,
the real cost of borrowing is less than 15 percent if the tax saving from interest
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payment is taken into account.
(f) Finally, the significant decrease in the work force, which will not be replaced,
is evidence of deterioration. 	 ..
Case two:	 A Cotton-Textile Factory
—This factory was established in 1948 by five owner-managers.
—Location: Cairo.
— According to one of the owner-managers, the factory produces a distinct type
of textiles.
—Although three of the owner-managers died, the number of partners is 32 be-
cause: (a) the sons and daughters of the dead partners inherited their shares in the
factory; (b) some of the sons and daughters of the existing partners are partners as
well; and (c) some of the grandsons and granddaughters, of the founder-partners,
are partners in the factory.
— The management of the factory is carried out by some of the male partners
because: (a) some of the male owners have their own jobs and businesses, and oth-
ers are not experienced enough to take part in the management of the business;
(b) some of the female owners are not interested in such business and others do
not work at all; and (c) the number of partners is too much to share the manage-
ment of the factory.
— The factory does not depend on bank credit because, according to one of
the owner-managers, banks impose difficult lending terms including high interest
rates.
— The sources for financing the factory's activity are equity capital, retained prof-
its, and trade credit.
— During the period 1963-1974, the factory used to market its products via
public-sector companies; during the period 1975-1987, the marketing was made
via wholesale stores owned by some of the partners' sons.
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—The factory faces the problem of the rising prices of raw materials that must
be bought from public-sector companies which monopolise the supply of these
materials and impose their terms on the buyers.
—The machinery is too old and must be replaced, but the main problem which
faces the partners is finance because: (a) the prices of machinery have increased
o
.1dramatically in recent years because of the world inflation and the depreciatm of
Is
the exchange rate for the Egyptian Pound; (b) the owner-managers are reluctant
to borrow from banks as they regard the interest rates as too high to be paid
from the earnings; and (c) retained profits are insufficient to finance the purchase
of new machinery.
—The factory is at a standstill because of the problem of finance, and the partners
could not reach an agreement to solve this problem.
Assessment: 
The case of this factory stresses the seriousness of the problem of finance, so
much so that the factory came to a standstill because of the lack of finance. The
question which arises, in this case, is who caused the problem? In other words,
is this problem a consequence of some difficulties encountered in obtaining bank
credit? Or is it a consequence of a mismanagement of the business? The answer
is that the problem tends to be attributed to the mismanagement, rather than
outside factors, because:
(a) The founder owner-managers represent the traditional managers who believe
that the best sources of finance are equity capital and retained profits; their reason
is that bank credit is always risky and time consuming.
(b) The younger generation of owner-managers seem to have inherited this belief
from their fathers and did not even try to borrow from banks.
(c) The owner-managers, like many others, believe that retained profits represent
a cost-free source of finance; and this makes them regard bank credit as expensive
no matter how low the interest rate is.
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(d) It seems that almost all the partners share the decision making, as regards
certain aspects of the business, which makes it very difficult to reach a final
decision; this issue indicates the lack of authority delegation which should be
given to the managers.
(e) Even if it is assumed that non-dependence on bank credit is a sound financial
policy, there was no concrete plan for the replacement of machinery, e.g. replacing
it one item at a time over a certain period.
On the other hand, the complaint concerning the difficulties associated with
obtaining raw materials seemed to be plausible because:
(a) The rising cost of raw materials is a common complaint among SSMFs in
general and textile factories in particular. In the meantime, these factories have
limited ability to raise the prices of their products because of the strong compe-
tition from large companies, especially public-sector companies.
(b) Public-sector companies, as the major source of raw materials for the textile
factories, could force their clients to buy both bad-quality materials and good-
quality materials.
Case three.	A Silk-Textile Factory
— Established in 1940.
—Location: Cairo.
—It is owned by two brothers and managed by a professional manager who has a
long experience and is well regarded among the neighbouring factory managers.
—The machinery installed in the factory was manufactured in 1935 and must be
replaced. According to the author's observation, all the machinery on the upper
floor ceased to operate and became a pile of scrap iron; also, more than half the
machinery on the ground floor ceased to operate and the rest cannot operate
efficiently.
—The replacement of machinery costs LE 1 million, but the owners and the
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manager are reluctant to finance the replacement with bank credit because they
do not expect the earnings to cover the repayment of the credit. The manager
gave an example of the expense of bank credit, mentioning that he applied for a
documentary credit of LE 250,000 and the bank retained, in advance, both the
compensating balance and the interest for the first year, which resulted in the real
amount of the credit being only LE 150,000. He also mentioned that the bank
always requires collateral for any type of credit.
—Concerning short-term finance, the manager stated that there is a steady rise
in the prices of raw materials; an example is that the price of synthetic silk
was LE 7,000 per ton in 1987 and became LE 9,000 in January 1988. He also
mentioned that these prices are imposed by public-sector companies, which have
the monopoly on such raw materials, require cash payment and refuse to give the
buyer a grace period and force the business to buy bad-quality materials.
—The manager complained of the haphazard estimation of the business's profits
by the tax assessors who always overestimate these profits. He stated, also, that
the Tax Agency (TA) has the right to sequestrate the business's balances with
banks for the settlement of overdue taxes.
—The number of workers in the factory is now 6 workers, but the number used
to be 70 during the peak of the factory's activity.
—The owners intend to shut down the factory, but they are waiting for the
remaining workers to retire or resign; then the factory will be converted into a
storage place for a glass factory, which is being established by the same owners.
Assessment: 
This case is almost a repetition of the last case with one major difference. In
the last case the owners did not reach a decision as regards the destiny of the
factory, but in this case the owners decided to shut down the factory and start
a different business. The closure of this factory seems to be due to some reasons
that are more influential than the lack of finance; one evidence of this inference
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is that the owners have access to financial resources which are sufficient enough
to start a new business. Consequently, the collapse of this business is expected
'to be due to the following reasons:
(a) The rising cost of raw materials and the inability of the business to raise the
price of its product, in order to maintain a certain profit margin, because of the
strong competition, especially from public-sector companies. Even if some busi-
nesses can raise the prices of their products, this rise usually lags behind the rise
in raw-material prices which has an adverse effect on the performance of these
businesses.
(b) The deterioration in the quality of the product due to the use of bad-quality
materials imposed on the Imshless by -publxt-sectoi totaiRdles.
(c) The deterioration in production operations and product quality due to the
obsolescence of the machinery whose replacement is well overdue.
(d) The rising cost of production caused by the continuous maintenance of the
machinery, which requires more expenses and interrupts the production process.
(e) There was no long-term plan for the replacement of machinery as mentioned
in the last case.
(f) It seems that the experience of the manager applies to the technical rather
than the financial aspects of the business.
(g) It seems also that the manager is not the only decision maker in the business
but, rather, the owners share the decision-making process or, even, they are the
ultimate decision makers.
(h) The overestimation of taxes due on the business, by the tax assessors, rep-
resents a common complaint among almost all the surveyed firms as indicated
by the comments on question 40 of the questionnaire. In this regard, it is worth
mentioning that some of these complaints are true and others are not; the main
reason is the lack of confidence between businessmen and the tax officers.
To the author's knowledge, a large number of textile factories have collapsed
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during the last few years because of many problems, not least of which is the
problem of finance. The manager of the above-mentioned factory claims that
private-sector textile factories are decreasing in number, as there used to be 1,000
of these factories in 1986, but this was reduced to only 200 in 1988; the problem,
he added, is mainly a problem of finance.
Case four:	 An Engineering-Product Factory
—Established in 1958.
—Location: Cairo.
—Activity: manufacturing different tools made of brass and aluminium.
—The factory used to be owned and managed by two brothers, but one of them
left in 1978 and went into real-estate businesses.
—After 1978, the factory has become a limited partnership between the owner-
manager and his sons.
— Before 1978 the factory used to employ 60 workers, but numbers have been
decreasing steadily, and there were only 10 workers at the beginning of 1988.
— According to one of the owner-manager's sons, the factory's activity has been
shrinking because:
(a) The owner-manager who left was interested in real-estate businesses to such
an extent that he used to withdraw money from the factory to finance his real-
estate projects; also, the owner-manager who left established some of his projects
on parts of the factory's space.
(b) After the separation of his partner, in 1978, the other owner-manager was ill
and could not look after the factory for some time.
(c) Some of the workers resigned and joined public-sector companies which they
regarded as more secure; at the same time, the owner-manager faced serious
difficulties in replacing the skilled labour who resigned.
— At present, the factory's activity is confined to aluminium products whose
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quality, according to the owner-manager's son, compares favourably with those
produced by larger companies.
—The major problem which faces the owner-manager is the rising prices of raw
materials which threaten the continuation of production.
—The factory does not depend on bank credit, and the main sources of finance
are equity capital, retained profits and trade credit.
Assessment: 
According to the forementioned information, it can be claimed that the turn-
ing point in this factory's life was the year 1978, during which: (a) one of the two
owner-managers was separated; (b) the number of workers started to decrease;
and (c) the factory's activity started shrinking. However, the key factor was
the separation of the two owner-managers. The other factors can be regarded
as the consequences of this separation. Yet, there is another important factor
represented in the reason for this separation, which is one partner's interest in
real-estate businesses. In fact, both the real-estate sector and the trade sector
have become the most lucrative activities in Egypt during the first decade of the
Open-Door Economic Policy (ODEP), adopted in 1974, because:
(a) the influx of both native and foreign businesses created a substantial demand
for office space and residential flats, especially in Cairo, which the existing supply
could not satisfy; and
(b) the trade sector enjoyed a high turnover and a high profit margin as compared
with other types of businesses, especially with the increasing purchasing power
resulting from invisible earnings such as remittances.
Concerning the rising prices of raw materials, they seem not to be confined to
the textile industry; and they represent one result of the inflationary pressures in
the Egyptian economy. On the whole, it can be deduced that: (a) in contrast with
his brother, the owner-manager who left was a profit-seeking investor rather than
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a dedicated businessman; and (b) the shrinking of this factory's activity is one of
the passive consequences of the ODEP which introduced unfair competition, in
terms of profitability, among different types of businesses.
Case five:	 A Sock Factory
—This factory was established in 1957.
—Activity: manufacturing different types of socks.
—Owned and managed by two sisters.
—The owner-managers started their business depending only on equity capital
which was sufficient to buy the necessary machinery and the raw materials re-
quired for two production cycles.
—The building is leased since the establishment of the factory.
—The machinery is as old as the factory itself.
—The factory employs 10 workers who are paid according to the items produced.
—The work force is not permanent as workers leave the factory whenever they
find better opportunities.
— The factory does not depend on bank credit.
—The factory's activity is shrinking because:
(a) Some of the machinery ceased to operate because of the lack of maintenance
which is, in turn, due to the unavailability of specialists to maintain such types
of machinery.
(b) The remaining machinery is too old to operate effectively.
(c) The profits achieved represent the only soure of finance for the factory as well
as the only source of income for the owner-managers.
(d) The owner-managers are getting old and they have no spouses or relatives to
help them in managing the factory.
(e) It is difficult for the factory to face competition from modern factories.
(f) The cost of production is rising steadily because of the rising prices of raw
250
materials and the rising wages of workers.
Assessment: 
„
Taking into consideration the above-mentioned reasons for the shrinkage in
the factory's activity, it can be inferred that this business is unlikely to survive
because:
(a) Modern factories can provide better-quality goods at reasonable prices because
they employ modem production technologies.
(b) The fierce competition from modern factories makes it difficult for the owner-
managers to raise the prices of their products in line with the rising production
costs.
(c) The aging machinery is unlikely to be replaced, as this depends only on the
business's meagre financing resources, represented in retained profits, which seem
to be hardly enough to meet short-term requirements.
(d) The absence of managerial assistance either from relatives or hired executives.
(e) More important is the fact that the interviewed owner-manageress mentioned
that she and her sister have no ambitions in life except earning enough money to
survive; this spirit of despair may be because the owner-managers have neither
offspring nor relatives to inherit the business after their death.
11.2. Two Case Studies of Handicraft Establishments:
These handicraft case studies are included in this chapter for three purposes:
(a) to predict the likelihood of their future growth; (b) to assess the problems
that inhibit such growth; and (c) to test the validity of the number of workers as
a determinant criterion in defining SSMFs.
Case six:	 A Rug Factory
—Established in 1971.
—Location: Cairo.
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— Activity: darning and manufacturing rugs.
—Owned and managed by Mr. Abo Talib.
—This factory started as a one-man business where the Owner was working on
his own, and he started hiring workers afterwards.
—By the beginning of 1988, the factory employed 8 workers as well as the owner-
manager who works himself.
—The factory depends completely on manual tools and looms.
— This business does not depend on bank credit because: (a) the owner-manager
can use the down payments, from some customers, to pay for the raw materi-
als, and other requirements can be financed by retained profits; (b) the owner-
manager does not expect his earnings to meet interest payments; and (c) the
owner-manager wants to avoid prosecution, and other legal complications, should
the business fail.
—According to the owner-manager, the business faces the following problems:
(a) Taxes: tax assessors do not pay any visits to new businesses but, rather, they
wait for a long period of time which might be extended to seven years. When
they visit the business they estimate its profits according to the current earnings
without taking into consideration the low income during the early years of the
business's activity. Consequently, the tax assessors overestimate the business's
profits and, accordingly, the taxes due on it.
(b) Social insurance: the business faces real difficulties in firing any workers, after
being registered with the Social Insurance Agency (SIA), because of the compli-
cated and lengthy procedures involved.
(c) Workforce: it is difficult to train young boys who drop their school studies
because the SIA officers visit factories and require the registration of these boys as
workers; this means that the owner-manager must pay their insurance subscrip-
tion which increases their wages. This difficulty, according to the owner-manager,
prevents the training of skilled labour, and this results in a scarcity of such labour
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and a dramatic increase in their wages.
Assessment: 
It is worth mentioning that the main activity of this factory is rug darning
and the subordinate activity is rug manufacturing. For the main activity there is
almost no financing problem as the required inputs cost little, and the main factor
is the skilled labour whose wages usually lag behind the customers' payments. As
for the subordinate activity, i.e. the rug manufacturing, it is practiced on a very
narrow scale which makes short-term finance fairly limited especially with the
down payments made by the customers. The issue of finance emerges only in
terms of dealing with the expansion potential where finance plays a major role.
In this regard it can be argued that if this factory is to expand, it must seek
external finance because:
(a) The factory's expansion requires larger premises, as the existing premises
cannot house more equipment and the owner-manager could be obliged to buy
such premises if leasing is not available. Also, the expansion requires the purchase
of more looms, as the leasing of such equipment is almost non-existent in Egypt.
(b) The profit achieved seems to be insufficient to finance any significant expansion
especially when it represents the only source of income for the owner-manager.
(c) Even if it is presumed that the business can survive and expand depending
only on retained profits, it will take a fairly long time to achieve any significant
expansion.
It is clear that the problems with taxes and social insurance stem from the
lack of confidence between the tax officers and the SIA officers, on the one hand,
and businessmen on the other. This lack of confidence is due to the following
factors:
(a) Some businessmen do not take the initiative in reporting their income to the
tax authorities in the due time.
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(b) Almost all handicraftsmen and the majority of small businesses do not prepare
audited financial statements or keep formal accounting books.
(c) Some businessmen try to dodge the tax officers and the SIA officers.
(d) Some tax assessors overestimate the profits of their clients.
(e) Some tax officers and some SIA officers presume that businessmen do not
report their true income or their true workforce.
Case seven:	 A Silver-Craft Factory
—Established in 1965.
—Location: Cairo.
—Activity: manufacturing silver crafts such as souvenirs and picture frames, as
well as processing other factories' products.
—Owned and managed by the founder who depends on his four sons as assistants.
—The factory employs 15 workers including the owner-manager's sons.
— This factory depends completely on simple tools, as the main production factor
is the human skill.
—The factory has been expanding since its establishment, as it started with only
4 workers including the founder himself.
—Sources of finance: equity capital, retained profits and trade credit; but since
1978 trade credit ceased to exist, as raw-material suppliers require cash payments.
—The factory markets its products via retailers, but it may occasionally sell
directly to consumers.
—According to the owner-manager, the main problems which face the factory
are:
(a) The Government restricts the importation and exportation of silver, and this
obliges him to buy second-hand silver products, such as silver ornaments, and use
them as raw materials for the factory's products.
(b) The supply of raw materials is unstable which makes it difficult to predict the
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prices of raw materials.
(c) During bad seasons the retailers buy the factory's products on credit and do
not pay until they can sell the whole stock to their customers.
Assessment: 
This factory has some qualifications for success as follows:
(a) It is located in the heart of its marketing area, in a market for souvenirs which
is well known to tourists.
(b) The factory faces no problem concerning the availability of skilled labour,
which is the main production factor.
(c) The simplicity of its production operations helps reduce the production costs
and makes the production cycle fairly short.
(d) The owner-manager needs no significant capital requirements should he require
more tools for expansion.
On the other hand, there are some factors that have an adverse effect on the
factory's expansion potential as follows:
(a) The factory occupies one floor in an old building which cannot be extended
any more; thus, a significant expansion requires the movement of the factory to
larger premises that might be far from the market.
(b) The unavailability of external finance, mainly bank credit, restricts the fac-
tory's viability to undertake a major expansion.
(c) The unavailability of trade credit results in an inefficient use of retained profits
as a source for financing short-term requirements.
(d) The Government's restriction on the importation of silver and the unstabffity
of raw-material supplies do not encourage expansion.
(e) The existence of bad seasons necessitates a careful feasibility study for any
planned expansion.
Finally, it is noticed that this factory qualifies as a SSMF according to the
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definition adopted in Egypt (as it employs more than 10 workers), but it is consid-
ered as a handicraft establishment according to the author's argument in chapter
seven (as it depends on simple tools and human skills). On the other hand, the
silk-textile factory, discussed in case three, is considered as a SSMF although it
employs only 6 workers (as it does not qualify as a handicraft establishment).
These two cases show the invalidity of the number of workers as a determinant
criterion in defining SSMFs, as discussed in chapter seven.
11.3. Two Case Studies from Banks: 
These case studies represent two loan applications submitted by two SSMFs to
certain banks in Egypt; one of these applications was approved and the other was
rejected. The purposes of presenting these case studies are: (a) to demonstrate
the rationale according to which a loan application is approved or rejected; and
(b) to assess the bank's decision in each case. However, according to the banks'
request, the names of the banks, as well as the names of the clients will not be
revealed as the information was given to the author in confidence.
Case eight:	 An Approved Loan Application
—In February 1987, a firm applied for a documentary credit in foreign currency
to finance the importation of new machinery for the firm's expansion.
—The credit amount was LE 260 thousand, with a five-year maturity.
—The firm's situation with the bank and other banks during that time was as
follows:
(a) A foreign-currency loan from the same bank of LE 543 thousand secured by
tangible and intangible assets, which amount to LE 372 thousand, as well as a
compensating balance of 10 percent of the loan amount.
(b) A loan from another bank of LE 500 thousand secured by raw materials.
—The firm owes the bank no arrears.
—The main findings of the ratio analysis of the firm's financial statements were
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as follows:
current ratio = 1.5
,
gearing ratio (total debts/net worth) = 0.9
return on sales = 21 percent
return on equity = 25.5 percent
break-even point = 23 percent of the production capacity of the firm
—Other indicators for the expansion project:
net present value = LE 58 thousand (positive)
pay-back period = 6 years
—The bank's decision: the loan was approved with the following terms:
(a) The firm was to deposit, with the bank, 25 percent of the loan amount, and
this sum of money will be deducted from the last instalment which is due at the
end of the five years (the loan maturity).
(b) The firm was to deposit, with the bank, for six months (renewable) an amount
of money equivalent to the customs duty on the machinery to be imported; as an
alternative, the firm can submit a letter of guarantee from another bank with the
same value.
(c) The bank was to possess the documents of the machinery to be imported until
it is installed in the factory when it will be pledged as collateral for the loan.
(d) The firm was to pledge the existing machinery as collateral for the loan.
(e) The interest rate on the loan was 15 percent.
Assessment 
As far as the bank is concerned, it can be noticed that:
(a) The bank withholds a compensating balance of 25 percent of the loan amount
which they call a "cash guarantee". As discussed in chapter two, this compensat-
ing balance raises the cost of borrowing; using one of the formulae suggested in
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the nominal interest rate
chapter two, the real cost of this loan can be calculated as follows:
the real interest rate — 1 — the percentage of the compensating balance
0.15
—•= 0.20 or 20 percent1 — 0.25
(b) According to the bank's lending rules, the compensating balance is 10 percent
of the loan amount; and this balance will be entitled to interest, according to
the interest-rate structure declared by the CBE, and any amount in excess of 10
percent will not be entitled to interest, as it will be kept temporarily. However,
the bank mentioned that the whole balance (25 percent) will be withheld until
the last year of the loan's maturity.
(c) Also according to the bank's lending rules, the loan which will be advanced
against new machinery, as collateral, represents 80 percent of the value of this
machinery if the loan maturity does not exceed five years. In this case, however,
the bank lent to to the firm against 60 percent of the value of the new machinery,
although this latter percent applies only to old machinery, according to the bank's
rules.
(d) In this case, the loan amount is deemed to be equal to the compensating
balance plus 60 percent of the collateral. When these values were calculated,
they amounted to LE 399 thousand while the loan amount was only LE 260
thousand, which means that the collateral was exaggerated.
(e) The figures used in calculating the pay-back period and the net present value
for the new project are inconsistent, i.e. when the bank calculated the pay-back
period it considered the total cost of the project as LE 904 thousand, but when it
calculated the net present value the bank considered the total cost of the project
as LE 373 thousand for unknown reasons.
(f) Apart from the inaccuracy of the figures, the discount rate used to calculate
the net present value was 13 percent, without explaining the rationale for choosing
this discount rate. If it is assumed that this rate is accurate, this means that the
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new project is unprofitable because the highest interest rate on deposits in Egypt
(a risk-free rate) was 13.25 percent which is, in addition, tax free. In fact the
employed discount rate is inaccurate because it does not represent the marginal
cost of capital for the new project (which should be a weighted average cost) that
can be calculated as follows:
—The capital structure for the new project is 30.2 percent equity financing and
69.8 percent loan financing.
—According to the available data, the cost of equity financing is represented in
the return on equity at the end of the year prior to the implementation of the
project, and this return was 25.5 percent.
—As discussed in chapter four, the cost of borrowing represents the real interest
on the borrowed funds which is calculated as follows:
the real cost of borrowing = the nominal interest rate x (1 — the tax rate).
As the tax rate for this firm is 32 percent, then:
the real cost of borrowing = 0.15 x (1 — 0.32) = 0.102 or 10.2 percent.
—The weighted average cost of capital for the new project is:
= (0.255 x 0.302) -I- (0.102 x 0.698)
= 0.077 + 0.0712 = 0.1482 or 14.82 percent.
Hence, the minimum discount rate, which should be used to calculate the
present value of the cash inflows generated by the new project, should be 14.82
percent (excluding a risk premium for the new project).
The most significant point in this assessment seems to be the relatively high
cost of borrowing in real terms (20 percent), which is due to the requirement
of a compensating balance of 25 percent of the loan amount. If the bank has
required only 10 percent as a compensating balance, the real cost of the loan to
the firm would have been only 16.7 percent. Consequently, if the bank requires
a compensating balance of 25 percent from all its clients, those clients will have
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good reason to complain of the high cost of borrowing which might exceed the
cost of equity capital to some firms.
,
Case nine.	A Rejected Loan Application
—Before applying for a loan from the bank, the firm's obligations towards this
bank were as follows:
Credit facilities from the bank
Amount of
credit
LE 000
The firm's
obligations
LE 000
Arrears
from 1986
LE 000
The equiValent of a foreign-currency loan 416.342 625.104 11.167
Local-currency loan 240.0 248.690 8.690
Trade credit 31.452 31.499 0.050
Letter of guarantee 113.960 113.960 22.792*
Tot al 801.754 1,019.253 42.699
* represents the cash coverage of the letter.
—In March 1987, the firm applied for the postponement of its arrears related to
both the foreign-currency loan and the local-currency loan.
— In June 1987, the firm applied for a short-term loan (one year) of LE 100
thousand.
—The bank decided the following:
(a) Postponing the firm's arrears until the end of December, 1987.
(b) Rescheduling both the local-currency loan and the foreign-currency loan in
such a way as to make the first repayment due at the end of December 1989; at
the same time the maturity of the foreign-currency loan will be extended to nine
years instead of five years.
(c) Rejecting the firm's application for a short-term loan of LE 100 thousand.
The bank's decision to reject the firm's application for a short-term loan was
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based on the following:
(a) The firm offered buildings valued at LE 46 thousand as collateral for a loan
of LE 100 thousand; in this case the collateral covers only 46 percent of the loan
while it should cover 166.7 percent of the loan (i.e. the loan should not exceed 60
percent of the value of the collateral) according to the bank's lending policy.
(b) If the bank approves the loan, this means that the total short-term finance,
provided by the bank to the firm, will amount to LE 165 thousand, while the
total value of its working capital is LE 200 thousand. In this regard, the bank
mentioned that the sound lending practices suggest that the firm should finance
at least two thirds of the working capital from its own resources.
(c) The firm's total assets amount to LE 1,352.7 thousand and the finance pro-
vided by the bank amounts to LE 1,019.253 thousand; and this means that the
bank finances 75.3 percent of the firm's assets, i.e. the bank's share in financing
these assets is triple the firm's share.
Assessment: 
In addition to the above-mentioned reasons for rejecting the firm's applica-
tion, there is another reason which can be inferred; that is the bank regards the
firm's reputation as not good because it is in arrears as regards all its obligations
towards the bank. Concerning the bank's reasons for rejecting the loan applica-
tion, it can be noticed that:
(a) Having rejected the collateral, the bank was not expected to provide an un-
secured loan to the firm while it is in arrears.
(b) The bank should have mentioned that the firm offered buildings (fixed assets)
as collateral for a short-term loan for the financing of current assets.
(c) When the bank calculated its share in financing the firm's assets it considered
a letter of guarantee as a source of finance; but it can be argued that a letter
of guarantee does not represent a source of finance as it does not result in funds
being advanced to the client. Consequently, if the value of the letter of guarantee
261
is excluded from the firm's obligations, these obligations will become LE 905.3
thousand and the bank's share in financing the firm's assets will become 67 per-
cent. In this case, the bank's share in financing the firm's assets is twice, rather
than triple, the firm's share; and if the bank is the only creditor to the firm, the
firm's financial gearing will be 67 percent, rather than 75.3 percent, which may
be considered as acceptable.
(d) Finally, the bank was responsive and helpful in postponing the firm's arrears
and rescheduling its loans.
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Chapter Twelve
Conclusion
12.1. Summary of the Results
12.2. Research Findings
12.2.1. General Findings
12.2.2. Finance-Related Findings
12.2.3. Relevance of the Findings
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12.3.1. General Recommendations
12.3.2. Finance-Related Recommendations
12.4. Suggestions for Further Research
12.1. Summary of the Results: 
The starting point in this section is the status quo of the Egyptian economy,
,
which represents the environment in which SSMFs exist and by which they are
affected either directly or indirectly. In this regard, chapter five showed that the
Egyptian economy tends to be commodity-oriented, as the percentage of GDP
accounted for by commodity sectors is 50.6 percent for the fiscal year 1986/87
vis-a-vis 49.4 percent for service sectors. However, by the fiscal year 1991/92
the share of commodity sectors in GDP is expected to become only 48.5 percent
vis-a-vis 51.5 percent for service sectors. This relatively low share of commodity
sectors in GDP will be due to the fall of the petroleum sector's share in GDP
from 13.8 percent in 1986/87 to only 3.5 percent in 1991/92. For the rest of
commodity sectors, their share in GDP is expected to rise significantly during the
period up to the fiscal year 1991/92, especially industry and agriculture. As the
Egyptian economy is open to foreign as well as indigenous investors, the private
sector is gaining a considerable momentum in different aspects of the economy.
For instance, the private sector is expected to undertake more than 50 percent of
the planned investment for agriculture, industry and tourism by the fiscal year
1991/92.
On the other hand, Egypt encounters the following economic problems:
(a) Servicing the external debt which amounted to $34.4 billion in 1987.
(b) A chronic deficit in the balance of trade.
(c) A chronic deficit in the State budget, which is caused mainly by subsidies to
foodstuffs of about LE 2 billion a year.
(d) An inflation rate of 16-18 percent during the period 1981-1987, and some
observers estimated the inflation rate for 1988 to be 35 per cent.
(e) A slow down in the growth of industrial production, as the growth rate of
industrial production slowed down from 10 percent during the 1970s and the
early 1980s to 7 percent in 1985/86 and 1986/87.
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Concerning the finance resources, chapter six showed that there are 99 banks
in Egypt, of which only one bank is not registered with the CBE, and these banks
have 1,063 branches all over the country. If the 153 branches of specialized banks
are excluded, the result will be 910 bank branches, of both commercial banks
and 113 banks, to serve all business enterprises in the country. All industrial
enterprises in Egypt, both private-sector and public-sector, amount to 10,423 en-
terprises which means that there are 11.5 industrial enterprises corresponding to
each bank branch. If the DIB is taken into account, the industrial enterprises will
be in a better situation in terms of the banking service available to them. Also
apart from specialized banks, the consolidated balance sheet of commercial banks
ammounted to LE 45.9 billion on the 30th of June, 1987 and the consolidated
balance sheet of IB banks amounted to LE 11.13 billion on the same date; this
is compared with the State-budget total of LE 23.06 billion for the fiscal year
1987/88. Consequently, the problem is not the insufficiency of the banking ser-
vice but, rather, it is a problem of lending preferences as envisaged by the banks.
In other words, chapter six showed the following:
(a) Only 34.8 percent of commercial-bank loans was advanced to the industrial
sector, compared with 37.3 percent for trade.
(b) Only 13.7 percent of the loans advanced by IB banks was directed to the
industrial sector, compared with 29.0 percent for trade and 24.4 percent for ser-
vices.
(c) 76.7 percent of the loans advanced by both commercial banks and IB banks
were short-term, compared with 17.2 percent for MTLT loans.
(d) 31.2 percent of short-term loans, advanced by both commercial banks and IB
Wanks, were secured and 90.2 percent of MTLT loans were secured.
As far as insurance companies are concerned, they have almost no role in
the financing of business enterprises in Egypt but, rather, they prefer secure
investments with a relatively low return, i.e. they are risk-averse. In this respect,
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it was shown that almost half the funds of public-sector insurance companies
is invested in deposits with banks, compared with 16.2 percent for shares and
bonds, 7.8 percent for real-estate investment and 4.8 percent for loans. Also,
50.2 percent of the funds of private-sector insurance companies is invested in
deposits with banks, compared with 3.0 percent for shares and bonds, 6.6 percent
for real-estate investment and 0.3 percent for loans. This attitude of insurance
companies embodies what may be called as a scaled-down finance. That is to say
that although insurance companies have reasonable amounts of funds which can
be invested on a long-term basis, instead they deposit these funds with banks
and those banks, in turn, use these deposits in lending on a short-term basis.
Such a scaled-down finance deprives business enterprises of a reasonable source
of finance, thus contributing to the creation of a finance gap.
The investigation of the regional distribution of SSIFs, in chapter eight,
showed that these firms tend to be concentrated in the greater Cairo area, es-
pecially Cairo city. In this regard, greater Cairo accounts for 61.8 percent of all
SSIFs in Egypt with Cairo city alone accounting for 42.3 percent of all SSIFs in
Egypt; the same applies to SSMFs, as these two areas account for 62.0 percent and
42.5 percent of SSMFs in Egypt respectively. As the greater Cairo area proved to
have the least banking service compared with the rest of the regions, in terms of
the number of SSIFs corresponding to each bank branch, the banking service was
excluded as the reason for the concentration of SSIFs in this area. Accordingly,
SSIFs are said to be attracted to the greater Cairo area by the externalities that
can be achieved in this area. Such externalities may result from: (a) easy access
to airports, seaports and Government agencies; (b) the availability of modern
communication means and infrastructure; and (c) other externalities resulting
from the establishment of other businesses. The maldistribution of SSIFs among
different regions is expected to be aggravated by the establishment of the new
industrial estate in the 10th of Ramadan city, which is only 35 miles (56 kilo-
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meters) north of Cairo. This industrial estate will, mainly, benefit businessmen
from Cairo and some neighbouring cities. Those businessmen are not expected
to move from their cities, especially Cairo, to live in this . "new" area because:
(a) this area will be less attractive to them in terms of living facilities; and
(b) it is not far from their areas of residence. On the whole, the concentration
of SSIFs in greater Cairo, and the inevitable congestion resulting from it, is ex-
pected to be a consequence of a lopsided development which gives more attention
to certain areas in the country.
Chapter eight also showed that private-sector industrial firms are more ef-
ficient than their public-sector counterparts, as the average annual production
per worker is LE 61 thousand for the former compared LE 17 thousand for the
latter. This relative efficiency of private-sector industrial firms was attikuted to
the overmanning of public-sector companies, which inhibits efficiency. Concerning
SSIFs, they were found to be less efficient than LSIFs, where the average annual
production per worker is LE 33 thousand for the former compared with LE 74
thousand for the latter. The relative inefficiency of SSIFs was attributed to either
one or more of the following factors:
(a) A less-advanced technology employed by SSIFs, compared with that employed
by LSIFs.
(b) A deteriorating condition of the machinary employed by SSIFs, which results
in a low level of output.
(c) A lack of finance which results in discontinuity of raw-material supply and
bottlenecks in production lines.
(d) A lack of finance which results in a delay in equipment maintenance and re-
placement.
(e) An existence of redundant workers who cannot be fired either for legal reasons
or for sentimental reasons.
Concerning the firms' dependence on bank credit, it was shown in chapter
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nine that only 37.0 percent of the surveyed SSMFs depend on bank credit while
63.0 percent do not. Also, it was shown that the firm's legal form has more effect
on its dependence, or non-dependence, on bank credit than its size. That is to
say that although the surveyed firms tend to be concentrated in the smaller-small
section (10 —24 workers) where dependence on bank credit is less obvious, limited
partnerships are more dependent on bank credit than both sole proprietorships
and ordinary partnerships.
For SSMFs which depend on bank credit, the survey showed the following:
(1) Only 23.1 percent of these firms approach more than one bank before applying
for a loan, while 76.9 percent go directly to a specific bank. This implied that
either these firms were satisfied with their lenders or they had no choice but to
deal with a particular bank, i.e. it is the only bank which has a branch in their
area.
(ii) 65.4 percent of the owners/managers of these firms did not know whether the
interest rates charged on their loans were the same as, or different from, those
charged on loans to public-sector companies. Moreover, 23.1 percent of the own-
ers/managers of these firms believe that the banks charge them interest rates that
are higher than those charged to public-sector companies. In other words, those
owners/managers believe that they are discriminated against, in terms of the cost
of borrowing, as compared with public-sector companies. The first group seems to
be unaware of the further details of bank lending and/or they are not interested
in being acquainted with such details. The second group seems to believe that the
DIB and public-sector commercial banks are biased towards public-sector com-
panies, and such a belief might include the CBE itself as a Government agency.
The remaining minority of the owners/managers (11.5 per cent) realize that such
a discrimination does not exist, i.e. they know that they are charged the same
interest as public-sector companies. In fact the CBE establishes the interest-rate
structure as regards different economic activities (industry, agriculture, trade and
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services) rather than on a public-sector/private-sector basis.
(iii) Although these firms depend on bank credit, not a small proportion of them
prefer non-institutional sources of finance. In this regard, SSMFs which depend
on bank credit represented 37.7 percent of the firms which prefer retained profits
as a source of finance, 37.5 percent of those which prefer loans from family mem-
bers and friends and 28.6 of the firms which prefer equity capital. The striking
point is that 52.4 percent of the SSMFs which prefer trade credit are those which
have dealings with banks. The most important implications of these figures were:
(a) the owners/managers of these firms are not fully satisfied with their banks, and
they perhaps wish if they could satisfy their financing needs from non-institutional
sources; and
(b) some of the owners/managers who go directly to a specific bank, especially a
specific commercial bank, do so because it is the only available bank rather than
because they are satisfied with it.
As regards SSMFs which do not depend on bank credit, chapter nine also
showed the following:
(i) The reasons for the inaccessibility of these firms to bank credit, which can be
attributed to their owners/managers, accounted for 52.1 percent of the responses
to question number 26. These reasons had the following implications:
(a) Some owners/managers are unaquainted with the differential costs of financing
sources, as they regard both retained profits and trade credit as cost-free types of
finance compared with bank credit. This was also shown in case study one where
the owner-manager depends completely on retained profits whose cost averaged
18.5 percent; at the same time the interest rate on loans to industrial firms was
11 percent for short-term loans and 12 — 15 percent for MTLT loans.
(b) The piety of some owners/managers who adhere to the prohibition of interest
in Islam.
(c) An existing hostility between some owners/managers and banks, as they gave
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the reason "we do not like to deal with banks". Also, the owner-manager of the
factory demonstrated in case study one mentioned that dealing with banks is
"disastrous", and one of the owner-managers of the factorrdemonstrated in case
study two mentioned that dealing with banks is "risky".
(ii) The reasons for the inaccessibility of these firms to bank credit, which can
be attributed to banks, accounted for 47.9 percent of the responses to question
number 26. These reasons were:
(a) Difficult lending terms, which was the most significant among all reasons, as
the main source of complaint was the requirement of collateral for bank loans.
This was also demonstrated in case studies three and eight; moreover, in case
study eight the bank lent to the firm against 60 percent of the value of the ma-
chinery, although its lending policy stipulates that this percentage is 80 percent.
(b) Lengthy lending procedures, where the main sources of complaint were the
time which elapses in assessing the firm's creditworthiness and the lengthy proce-
dures of pledging the firm's assets. This was referred to in case study two, where
the owner-manager mentioned that dealing with banks is "time consuming".
On the whole, the owners/managers who mentioned these reasons seem to
have tried to obtain bank credit but were unsuccessful, or used to deal with banks
but gave up because of the above-mentioned reasons. In addition, there was the
requirement of a compensating balance which resulted in a noticeable increase in
the cost of borrowing. In case study three the manager mentioned that he applied
for a documentary credit of LE 250 thousand and the bank retained, in advance,
both the compensating balance and the interest for the first year, which resulted
in the real amount of the credit being only LE 150 thousand. Also, in case study
eight the bank retained a compensating balance of 25 percent of the loan amount,
which resulted in the real interest rate being 20 percent instead of 15 percent.
(iii) The most significant substitutes for bank credit were retained profits and
trade credit, as they accounted for 46.1 percent and 36.8 percent of the responses
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to question number 27 respectively. Moreover, 28.8 percent of these firms men-
tioned that they depend only on retained profits as a substitute for bank credit,
13.5 percent depend only on trade credit and 32.7 percent depend only on retained
profits and trade credit. Given these results and given that a significant propor-
tion of SSMFs which depend on bank credit prefer non-institutional sources of
finance, the popularity of these sources among SSMFs is quite obvious. Equally
important are the reasons for preffering non-institutional sources of finance, shown
in table 9.10(b), which have the following implications:
(a) Some owners/managers are concerned about the out-of-pocket cost rather than
the opportunity cost, e.g. they regard retained profits as a cost-free type of
finance.
(b) Approaching banks for credit involves some difficulties which the owners/
managers want to avoid.
(c) Some owners/managers adhere to the prohibition of interest in Islam.
(d) Some owners/managers prefer to be "self-sufficient".
(e) Loan repayment is a source of worry for some owners/managers.
(f) The existence of a psychological barrier between some owners/managers, on
the one hand, and banks on the other.
(g) The desire of some owner-managers to be independent, in the sense that they
prefer not to get involved in borrowing or even in having partners.
(h) Non-institutional sources of finance are less expensive and easier to approach
than institutional sources.
Hence, it can be claimed that there are invisible barriers between SSMFs and
banks, and this raises the question of who erected these barriers? The answer is
that these barriers represent a consequuuence of the following factors:
(a) The two extreme experiences which the Egyptian economy had before 1960
and during the period 1960-1973. Before 1960, as discussed in chapter five,
the Egyptian banking system was dominated by foreign banks; these banks, pre-
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sumably, considered profitability and safety in their operations rather than the
interests of their customers. Consequently, small businesses were not expected
to qualify as borrowers from these banks unless they provided satisfactory guar-
antees, as envisaged by these banks, not least of which was collateral. Between
1960 and 1973 the Egyptian banking system consisted of only public-sector banks
within the context of a planned economy dominated by public-sector companies
in the majority of economic activities. This situation had the following outcomes:
— Public-sector banks were managed in almost a bureaucratic style which resulted
in lengthy lending procedures.
—These banks enjoyed a monopolistic status, as they had no private-sector com-
petitors.
—Being state-owned, these banks were regarded by many businessmen as "pow-
erful" institutions that can force the borrowing business into liquidation should
it be in arrears.
(b) The unavailability of information to small-business owners/managers as re-
gards the credit facilities that banks can provide, the terms of lending and the
main characteristics of different credit facilities. Moreover, neither banks nor the
concerned Government agencies took the initiative to contact businessmen and
inform them of the best ways of financing their businesses.
(c) In recent years some banks in Egypt encountered serious problems with some
customers who could not repay their loans, and these cases were referred to court
amid allegations that some bank officers lent to some customers on unsound lend-
ing bases. These cases had the outcome of many bank managers being hesitant
in taking lending decisions, which became a source of complaint among many
applicants, especially private-sector firms.
The investigation of the different types and sources of finance employed by
SSMFs, in chapter ten, showed the following:
(i) Non-institutional finance had a dominant role in these firms' start-ups, corn-
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pared with institutional finance, as indicated by the following results:
(a) 43.2 percent of the surveyed firms financed their start-ups depending only on
equity capital.
(b) Trade credit was employed by 37.1 percent of these firms, to finance their
start-ups, vis-a-vis 28.4 percent for loans.
(c) 48.4 percent of start-up loans came from family members and friends.
When the owners/managers, who did not employ bank loans for start-up fi-
nancing, were asked why this was the case they mentioned the same reasons for
not depending on bank credit as mentioned above. For those who employed bank
loans for start-up financing, the DIE represented the major source of institutional
loans accounting for 35.5 percent of start-up loans vis-à-vis 16.1 for commercial
banks. However, it seems that there are no Government start-up schemes, as
start-up loans advanced by the DIB and some commercial banks represent part
of short-term and/or MTLT loans rather than pre-planned schemes.
(ii) Short-term finance was mainly obtained from non-institutional sources,
namely raw-material suppliers; this was proven as follows:
(a) For all the surveyed firms raw-material suppliers represented the dominant
source of short-term finance, as they accounted for 75.3 percent of the responses
to question number 14 compared with 19.8 percent for commercial banks and 4.9
percent for the DIB.
(b) 71.8 percent of all the surveyed firms depend only on raw-material suppliers
for short-term finance.
(c) Even for SSMFs which depend on bank credit, trade credit accounted for 43.5
percent of all forms of short-term finance.
(iii) Non-institutional sources are approached by the majority of SSMFs in Egypt
for MTLT finance; this was proven as follows:
(a) For all the surveyed SSMFs, non-institutional types of finance accounted for
69.9 percent of the responses to question number 17, compared with only 30.1
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percent for institutional types of finance.
(b) Retained profits represented the most significant source of MTLT finance, as
it accounted for 54.4 percent of the responses to question' number 17, and was
mentioned by 51.9 percent of the surveyed firms as the only source of MTLT
finance.
(c) For SSMFs which do not depend on bank credit, retained profits represented
the dominant source of MTLT finance, accounting for 79.6 percent of the re-
sponses of these firms to question number 17.
(d) Even SSMFs which depend on bank credit employed non-institional types of
MTLT finance, which accountered for 25.1 percent of their responses to question
number 17, with retained profits in the third place after loans from the DIB and
loans from commercial banks.
(e) The popularity of non-instutional sources of MTLT finance, mainly retained
profits, was also demonstrated in case studies one through seven; moreover, re-
tained profits were employed to finance short-term requirements in case studies
one, three, five, six and seven.
For SSMFs which depend on bank credit, the DIB was the most significant
source of MTLT finance and commercial banks came in the second place. In this
respect, it should be noticed that:
(a) The DIB has only three branches, concentrated in northern Egypt, while com-
mercial banks have 824 branches spread all over the country.
(b) The maturities of MTLT loans from the DIB and from commercial banks are
relatively short, i.e. they are mainly for 2-5 years.
(c) All MTLT loans from the DIB and from commercial banks are secured.
(iv) SSMFs which depend on bank credit face some problems in obtaining foreign-
currency finance; the most serious of these problems was that of the exchange rate.
Before May, 1987, the main problem of foreign-currency finance was the unstable
exchange rate between the Egyptian pound and foreign currencies, which created
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uncertainty as regards the real amount of repayment should the borrower repay
in local currency. In May, 1987 the exchange rate for the Egyptian pound was
depreciated and it was decided that the exchange rate should depend on the daily
free rates, mainly in the London market. Consequently, foreign-currency borrow-
ers, who were supposed to repay their loans in local currency, faced the problem
of swollen repayments as their indebtedness to banks was almost trebled. This
problem has not yet been solved, and it is still a subject of debate among debtors,
banks and the CBE.
(v) Lease finance does not represent a significant type of MTLT finance for SSMFs
in Egypt, as only 7.4 percent of the surveyed firms employed lease finance while
92.6 percent did not. For SSMFs which employed lease finance, it could not be
assured that lease finance is employed as a substitute for bank credit. In this
regard, the survey results showed that although 83.3 percent of SSMFs which
depend on bank credit did not employ lease finance, 61.3 percent of SSMFs which
do not depend on bank credit did not employ lease finance either. As regards
SSMFs which do not employ lease finance, the survey results showed that:
(a) The most significant reason for not employing lease finance is that they have
enough equipment, which justifies the assumption that lease finance is not em-
ployed as a substitute for bank credit.
(b) The second significant reason is that lease finance is not available, which im-
plies that these firms could have employed lease finance were it available.
(c) Also, for SSMFs which did not employ lease finance because it is not available,
the survey results showed that 60 percent of these firms depend on bank credit;
this implies that bank credit was employed as a substitute for lease finance, but
not vice versa.
(d) The rest of the reasons for not employing lease finance, reflected two aspects:
— the cultural background of some owners/managers who prefer to have their
own assests rather than employing "other people's assets"; and
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— the impracticality of leasing in some cases such as the sporadic nature of the
product, the small size of production and the complexity of equipment.
(vi) As far as expansion was concerned, 53.7 percent of the surveyed SSMFs
expanded their activities while 46.3 percent did not. For the firms which ex-
panded their activities, the main implication was that they are successful and
have the ability to penetrate the market for their products. As for those which
did not expand, the most relevant implications were: (a) they had the opportunity
to expand but they lack the necessary finance to carry out the expansion; and
(b) they were relatively new.
Concerning the relationship between expansion and other characteristics and
attributes of the surveyed firms, it was found out that the employment of bank
credit has more effect on the firm's growth than its age. The main implications
of these results were:
(a) Expanding the firm's activity depends not only on its age, but also on the
availability of external finance, mainly bank credit.
(b) Even if a firm can expand while depending only on internal sources of finance,
such expansion is expected to be limited.
(c) Non-institional types of finance can have a significant effect on the firm's
growth, only if they are available in fairly large amounts and on better terms
than those offered with bank credit.
As regards the financing of firms' expansion, the survey results showed that
the expanded firms financed their expansion depending mainly on non-
institutional sources of finance, especially retained profits and increasing their
equity capital. Moeover, non-institutional finance was employed by SSMFs which
depend on bank credit as well as those which do not. Also, these results showed
that:
(a) Institutional finance did not represent a significant source of financing the ex-
pansion of the surveyed firms, as loans from the DIB and from commercial banks
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accounted, together, for 20.5 percent of the responses to question number 33.
(b) When profit-sharing finance was assumed to have come from Islamic banks,
the relative importance of institutional sources became 26.5 percent vis-à-vis 73.5
percent for non-institutional sources.
(c) The DIB had a more significant role in financing the expansion of SSMFs than
commercial banks, as 4.7 percent of the expanded firms financed their expansion
depending only on loans from the DIB, while none of them mentioned commercial
banks as the only source of financing their expansion.
(d) Apart from equity finance, other non-institional sources of finance tend to be
supplementary to each other or to institutional sources.
(vii) IB banks have no role in the financing of SSMFs, as no respondent mentioned
them as sources of finance.
Also, related to the survey results are the comments of the owners/managers
on question number 40; these comments indicated the following problems:
(i) They complained of the overestimation of the firm's profits by the tax asses-
sors, which results in overestimated corporate-tax payments; this complaint was
also demonstrated in case studies three and six. The main reason for this com-
plaint is that the majority of small businesses in Egypt do not produce audited
financial accounts or keep formal accounting books. Therefore, tax assessors visit
these businesses unexpectedly in order to watch the flow of production and/or
sales and estimate the annual income accordingly.
(ii) They also complained of the social insurance officers who are alleged to regis-
ter any one in the factory as a worker even if he/she is a trainee or a relative who
volunteers to help the owner-manager. The main reason for this complaint is that
the Social Insurance Agency (SIA) wants to make sure that every employee in
the country is insured, in order to guarantee a reasonable income should he/she
retire or have an accident. This complaint and the former one can be regarded as
symptoms of a problem represented in a lack of liaison between tax assessors and
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SIA officers, on the one hand, and businessmen on the other. The main causes of
this problem are:
(a) Some tax assessors might estimate the business's sales on a "theoretical" basis
without taking into consideration sales fluctuations throughout the year, and the
situation worsens if the tax assessor visits the business on a peak day.
(b) Some owners/managers might not distinguish between "tax avoidance" and
"tax evasion". Tax avoidance means reducing tax payments by legal means, i.e.
by making use of tax saving resulting from deducting some expenses such as
interest and depreciation. On the other hand, tax evasion means reducing tax
payments by illegal means such as omitting some receipts and/or exaggerating
the expenses.
(c) Some social insurance officers might presume that the owner/manager is un-
willing to register his workers with the SIA; accordingly, they register any one in
the working site as a worker unless the owner/manager proves that he/she is not.
(d) Some owners/managers might not register their workers with the SIA in order
to avoid the increment in the worker's wage by the subscription amount, and to
make it easy for themselves to fire the unwanted workers.
(iii) Many owners/managers face problems with their workforce; these problems
are: (a) a scarcity in skilled labour, which results in a dramatic increase in their
wages; and (b) the adverse effects of absenteism and high turnover of workers.
(iv) When the owners/managers borrow from individuals and those individuals
charge them interest, the Tax Agency (TA) does not recognize such interest pay-
ments as tax-deductible expenses. In this case non-institutional loans might be
more expensive than institutional loans, as the borrowers will not enjoy the tax
saving from interest payments which results in the real interest rate being equal
to the nominal interest rate.
(v) The most common complaint among almost all the respondents was the
rising prices of raw materials, which was also refered to in case studies one through
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five. The main cause of this problem seems to be the inflationary pressures in
the Egyptian economy, which affect all economic activities in the country. At the
same time, some SSMFs find it difficult to raise the prices of their products in
line with inflation because of the competition from larger companies, especially
public-sector companies.
(vi) Almost all the owners/managers of the textile factories mentioned that
public-sector companies monopolize the supply of raw materials and levy high
prices for them. They also mentioned that these companies allocate an insuf-
ficient quota for each customer, and force their customers to buy bad-quality
materials as well as good-quality materials; these complaints were also mentioned
in case studies two and three. The reasons for these problems seem to be: (a.) the
inflationary pressures which affect the economy as a whole; and (b) the orientation
of some public-sector companies towards exporting. They, of course, export the
good-quality materials and may supply an inferior quality to the home market.
Also, many owners/managers of the surveyed firms mentioned that public-sector
companies usually require prompt payment for raw-material supplies. Hence, it
seems that when the owners/managers mentioned that they prefer trade credit as
a source of finance, they meant trade credit obtained from private-sector suppliers
rather than their public-sector counterparts.
12.2. Research Findings:
The problem under investigation was diagnosed as a finance gap represented in
limited access to institutional finance in general, and MTLT finance in particular.
Consequently, this study was based on the following hypotheses:
(i) The banking service in Egypt is inadequate.
(ii) The owners/managers of small firms are reluctant to employ institutional
finance.
(iii) Institutional finance is more difficult to obtain than non-institutional finance.
(iv) The owners/managers of small firms are unaware of the relative advantages
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of institutional finance as compared with some forms of non-institutional finance
(mainly equity capital and retained profits).
This study had two objectives:	
,
(0 Testing the validity of these hypotheses.
(ii) Suggesting some practical solutions to the problems that small firms encounter
in obtaining the necessary finance, especially institutional finance.
The findings of this study are divided into two main parts: general find-
ings, i.e. findings related to areas other than finance, and finance-related findings.
However, finance-related findings are the main concern of this section as they rep-
resent the underlying proof of the validity, or invalidity, of the above-mentioned
hypotheses.
12.2.1. General Findings:
1. SSIFs in general and SSMFs in particular are concentrated in the greater Cairo
area, especially Cairo city.
2. The new industrial estate in the 10th of Ramadan city will aggravate this
concentration, as it is located only 35 miles (56 kilometers) north of Cairo.
3. Although private-sector industrial firms, in general, are more efficient than
their public-sector counterparts, SSIFs are less efficient than other private-sector
industrial firms, mainly LSIFs.
4. The owners/managers of SSMFs encounter some difficulties in dealing with
Government agencies, especially the TA and the SIA.
5. There is the problem of the scarcity of skilled labour, which results in a
dramatic increase in their wages as well as a high turnover of the workforce.
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12.2.2. Finance-Related Findings: 
1. Egypt enjoys a reasonable banking service, both in terms of the spread of bank
branches and the amounts of funds available to these banks.
2. The DIB, which is the only bank to be specialised in financing the industrial
sector, is concentrating its branches in greater Cairo and northern Egypt.
3. The real problem of the banking service in Egypt is the lending practices of
the banks in terms of:
(a) directing more lending to the trade sector;
(b) concentrating on short-term, rather than long-term, lending; and
(c) attaching much importance to collateral, especially with MTLT loans.
4. Insurance companies have no role in financing business enterprises in general
and SSMFs in particular.
5. Only 37 percent of the surveyed firms depend on bank credit, while 63 percent
do not.
6. The firm's legal form has more effect on its dependence, or non-dependence,
on bank credit than its relative size.
7. The majority of the owners/managers of SSMFs which depend on bank credit
(63.4 percent) are unaware of the interest-rate structure prevailing in Egypt.
8. Some owners/managers of SSMFs, which depend on bank credit, go directly
to a specific bank because it is the only available bank rather than because they
are satisfied with it.
9. The reasons for not employing bank credit, which can be attributed to the
surveyed SSMFs, are:
(a) The owners/managers of these firms do not employ bank credit either because
of their piety or because of their negative attitudes towards banks.
(b) The owners/managers of these firms are unaware of the comparative costs of
institutional and non-institutional finance.
10. The reasons for not employing bank credit, which can be attributed to banks,
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are:
(a) The difficult lending terms established by the banks, mainly the requirement
of collaterals for their loans.
(b) Lengthy lending procedures.
11. Both short-term finance and MTLT finance, as well as start-up finance, were
obtained mainly from non-institutional sources.
5
12. Loans to SSMFs tend to be secured, as 90 percent of short-term loans are
secured and all MTLT loans are secured.
13. Lease finance does not represent a significant type of finance for SSMFs in
Egypt.
14. Bank credit tends to be employed by some SSMFs as a substitute for lease
finance, but not vice versa.
15. The employment of bank credit has more effect on the firm's growth than its
age.
16. Non-institutional finance was employed by the majority of the surveyed
SSMFs, both those which depend on bank credit and those which do not, to fi-
nance their expansion.
17. IB banks have no role in the financing of SSMFs in Egypt.
18. According to Law no. 146 of 1988, profit-sharing finance from individuals is
no longer available for all business enterprises in Egypt.
19. There seems to be an information gap encountered by SSMFs, in the sense
that many owners/managers of these firms have no knowledge about the financing
facilities, which banks can advance, as well as the lending terms of these banks.
20. Small businesses in Egypt in general, and SSMFs in particular, tend to be
managed by their owners, thus eliminating agency costs associated with outside
equity. Moreover, the owner-manager is expected to restrict his personal expen-
diture in order to sustain the equity base of his business.
21. Excessive, or full, dependence on equity financing by some SSMFs is expected
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to raise the cost of capital to these firms.
22. None of the surveyed firms is publicly quoted, which avoids the problems
associated with raising equity capital via share issues.
23. SSMFs face the problem of the rising prices of raw materials.
24. Textile factories face the problem of the monopoly of public-sector companies
on raw materials.
The first finding rejects the first hypothesis; findings 9(a), 11, 14 and 16 prove
the second hypothesis, findings 2, 3, 4, 10(a), 10(b) and 17 prove the third hy-
pothesis and findings 7, 9(b) and 15 prove the fourth hypothesis. Having been
proved, these hypotheses represent the reasons for the limited access to institu-
tional finance as experienced by SSMFs. Apart from findings 23 and 24, the rest
of the findings are either supportive or explanatory to the main findings. Finding
23 represents a general problem encountered by all business enterprises in Egypt.
Finding 24 represents a problem which is peculiar to textile factories in their
dealings with public-sector companies.
12.2.3. Relevance of the Findings:
This section investigates the relevance of the finance-related findings to the
financial literature, as well as the results of other studies. In this regard, it can
be noticed that:
(i) In chapter one, it was shown that the Macmillan Gap was expressed in terms
of the difficulties associated with raising long-term finance in amounts that were
not large enough for a public issue. On the other hand, the Bolton Committee
reported that there was no gap corresponding to the Macmillan Gap, but pointed
out that not every small business was able to find finance of the type it needs
at the price it can afford to pay. As far as Egypt is concerned, the finance gap
experienced by SSMFs is represented in limited access to institutional finance.
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This is expressed in finding 5 where 63 percent of the surveyed firms do not
depend on bank credit; the reasons for this limited access are shown in findings
9 and 10. Concerning the difficulties associated with long-term finance, finding
3 shows that banks concentrate on short-term, rather than long-term, lending;
also, finding 17 shows that IB banks have no role in financing SSMFs in Egypt.
Raising long-term finance via bond issues is not known among small businesses in
Egypt because: (a) none of these businesses is publicly quoted; (b) they are very
small compared with many small businesses in the U.K.; and (c) the floatation
cost is prohibitive.
Also in chapter one, Ray and Hutchinson argued that a finance gap exists
when the cost of money to small businesses exceeds the cost of money to large
businesses. If the cost of money is deemed to represent the declared interest rate
on loans, this issue will be irrelevant to SSMFs in Egypt. In other words, the
interest rates on loans to the industrial sector are established by the CBE on
a concessional basis in order to encourage industrial firms, large and small, to
employ bank credit. Hence, if banks want to charge SSMFs higher interest rates,
the only way to do so is to stick to the upper limit of the interest-rate structure.
In this case, the cost of loans to industrial firms will be notaceably less than the
cost of loans to trade firms, as the maximum interest rate on the former is one
percentage point less than the minimum interest rate on the latter (as discussed
in chapters six and nine). Nevertheless, the requirement of a compensating bal-
ance may raise the cost of borrowing noticeably; this was shown in case study
eight where the bank retained a compensating balance of 25 percent of the loan
amount, which resulted in the real interest rate being 20 percent instead of 15
percent.
(ii) The review of the financial literature in chapter two revealed some features
of small business finance, the most important of which are:
(a) There is a more important role of trade credit in the financing of small busi-
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nesses. This is shown in finding 11 where short-term finance is obtained mainly
from non-institutional sources, i.e. from trade-credit suppliers. Also, finding 16
shows that non-institutional finance is employed by both SSMFs which depend
on bank credit and those which do not.
(b) Small business loans tend to be secured. This also represents a feature of
small business loans in Egypt, as finding 12 shows that 90 percent of short-term
loans, to SSMFs, are secured and all MTLT loans are secured.
(c) The small businessman may not know how or where to obtain finance. This is
shown in finding 9, which summarises the reasons for not employing bank credit
that can be attributed to the owners/managers of the surveyed firms. More-
over, finding 7 shows that the majority of the owners/managers of SSMFs, which
depend on bank credit, are unaware of the interest-rate structure prevailing in
Egypt. Also, finding 19 shows that many owners/managers of SSMFs have no
knowledge about the financing facilities, which banks can advance, as well as the
lending terms of these banks.
(d) The trade-credit position of small firms worsens as large firms demand prompt
payment for supplies while delaying their own payments of bills. This is shown
in finding 24, where textile factories face the problem of the monopoly of public-
sector companies on raw materials, and these companies require prompt payment
for raw-material supplies. Also, this issue was referred to in chapter nine where
snme owners/managers of the surveyed firms complained that public-sector com-
panies seldom give them a grace period for raw-material payments.
(e) Some small firms depend more heavily on banks for external finance than do
most large firms. This issue is irrelevant to small business finance in Egypt, as
finding 5 shows that 63 percent of the surveyed firms do not depend on bank
credit.
(f) Loans from directors are common in small firms. These loans correspond to
loans from the partners in the surveyed firms, as those partners often share the
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management of the firm at the same time. However, loans from the partners
do not seem to be popular amongst SSMFs in Egypt. In other words, although
findings 11 and 16 show the popularity of non-institutional finance, it was shown
in table 9.9 (in chapter nine) that loans from the partners, as a substitute for
bank credit, accounted for only 5.3 percent of the responses to question number
27. Moreover, loans from the partners were not mentioned in table 9.10(a) as one
of the best sources of finance from the viewpoint of the owners/managers of the
surveyed firms.
(iii) The results of some surveys, discussed in chapter three, raised various issues
concerning MTLT finance for small businesses as follows:
(a) A research report by the Bolton Committee revealed that the cost of raising
equity capital via share issues is higher, as a percentage, for a small issue than
for a large issue mainly because of fixed costs which do not vary proportionately
with the issue size. Finding 22 shows that none of the surveyed firms is publicly
quoted, and this makes the problems of raising equity capital via share issues
irrelevant to this study. In fact none of the small businesses, in all activities,
in Egypt is publicly quoted as they fall in three categories: sole proprietorships,
ordinary partnerships and limited partnerships.
(b) The Bolton Committee, also, pointed out two main difficulties encountered
by U.K. small businesses in obtaining MTLT finance; these are:
—The proportion of funds of some insurance companies going to small firms var-
ied from nil to under one percent. This is shown in finding 4, where insurance
companies in Egypt have no role in financing business enterprises in general and
SSMFs in particular.
—Only a minority of pension funds engage in financing small firms. In this regard,
it was mentioned in chapter seven that the author could not have access to any
information related to the sources and uses of pension funds in Egypt. However,
pension funds in Egypt are not expected to engage in financing the private sector
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in general and small businesses in particular, as these funds are administered by
the Government in the context of its budget and plans.
(c) The Wilson Committee showed that loans from directors represent 51.5 per-
cent of long-term loans to small businesses in the U.K. As mentioned above, these
loans correspond to loans from the partners in SSMFs in Egypt. In this regard,
table 10.7 (in chapter ten) showed that loans from the partners accounted for
only 6.7 percent of the responses to question number 17 concerning the different
types of MTLT finance. Also, table 10.8 showed that these loans were employed
by SSMFs which do not depend on bank credit, and they accounted for only 12.1
percent of the responses of these firms to question number 17.
(d) The study of 860 small businesses in West Scotland revealed that growth
inhibition due to the availability of finance was reported by 31.0 percent of man-
ufacturing firms, 26.5 percent of retailing firms and 22.0 percent of services firms.
As far as SSMFs in Egypt are concerned, finding 15 shows that the employment
of bank credit has more effect on the firm's growth than its age. In other words,
it was shown in chapter 10 (table 10.15) that two thirds of of the oldest group of
the surveyed firms did not expand, and none of the firms in this group depend on
bank credit.
(iv) The 12-country study, discussed in chapter four, had the following results:
(a) In developing countries 43 percent of the firms with 5-20 employees depend
on bank credit, and this percentage is 70 percent for developed countries. For
developing countries, the percentage of small firms which depend on bank credit
is 32 percent in Kenya, 33 percent in Indonesia, 35 percent in Brazil, 54 percent
in Cameron and 55 percent in Colombia. As far as Egypt is concerned, finding
5 shows that 37 percent of the surveyed firms depend on bank credit. This per-
centage lies within the range of the forementioned developing countries, albeit
the definition of SSMFs in Egypt is different from that adopted in the 12-country
study.
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(b) In the early stages of growth, the firms are less dependent on bank borrowing
and more dependent on relatives/friends and personal equity capital; and this
phenomenon is more noticeable in developing countries. This is shown in finding
16, where non-institutional finance was employed by the majority of the surveyed
firms, both those which depend on bank credit and those which do not, to finance
their expansion. In this regaed, table 10.16 (in chapter ten) showed that retained
profits accounted for 34.9 percent of the surveyed firms' responses to question
number 33 as a source of financing their expansion, equity capital 25.3 percent
and family members and friends 10.9 percent.
(c) As the small firm grows in size or age, more financing options become available
to it. For SSMFs in Egypt, the availability of more financing options is deemed to
mean the availability of bank credit to these firms. In this respect, finding 6 shows
that the firm's legal form has more effect on its dependence, or non-dependence,
on bank credit than its relative size. This was shown in tables 9.6, 9.7 and 9.8 (in
chapter nine), where limited partnerships were more dependent on bank credit
than both sole proprietorships and ordinary partnerships, although all of them
tend to be more concentrated in the smaller-small section (10-24 workers) where
dependence on bank credit is less evident.
(v) Also in chapter four, the review of the literature showed that the cost of
equity financing is the highest among all other types of finance. Hence, more
dependence on equity financing means higher cost of capital to the firm and vice
versa. Finding 21 shows that excessive, or full, dependence on equity financing by
some SSMFs is expected to raise the cost of capital to these firms. In this regard,
it was shown in table 10.7 (in chapter ten) that retained profits accounted for 54.4
percent of the responses of SSMFs to question number 17 concerning the types of
MTLT finance. Also, table 9.10(a) (in chapter nine) showed that retained profits
and equity capital accounted for 58.3 percent and 5.3 percent, respectively, of the
responses of SSMFs to question number 38 concerning the best sources of finance.
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12.3. Recommendations:
Although the main concern of this section is finance-related recommenda-
tions, some general recommendations will be suggested for solving the problems
represented by the general findings.
12.3.1. General Recommendations;
1. As the Government has the intention and the resources to establish new
industrial estates for SSMFs, these industrial estates must be established far from
the congested metropolitan area. This can have two advantages: (a) curbing
labour-force immigration from rural areas to urban areas, especially greater Cairo,
as these industrial estates will provide new jobs for the growing population; and
(b) achieving balanced development among different regions.
On the other hand, the implementation of this recommendation requires the
following:
(a) Improving the infrastructure in rural areas in order to match those in urban
areas.
(b) Providing some means of attraction to these areas such as tax relief.
(c) The location of these industrial estates should take into consideration the
availability of raw materials and markets for the products.
As these requirements involve capital expenditure, the Government should
start with the most needed industries in the most needy regions according to a
certain plan. Also, those costs will be recovered from the direct and indirect ben-
efits from the new industrial estates, such as job creation, regional development,
import substitution and export promotion.
2. Apart from finance, there should be genuine programmes to improve the
efficiency of SSMFs. This can be achieved as follows:
(a) Training programmes for the owners/managers of SSMFs, especially in the
areas of production management, accounting and marketing.
289
(b) Technical training for the existing workforce, as well as the unemployed, in
order to bridge the gap in skilled labour.
,
Implementing this recommendation requires the following:
(a) The existence of training centres or other Government agencies that can carry
out these programmes. In this regard the EIDDC is a useful resource, but it
needs the collaboration of the universities and research centres in order to apply
the academic research to the real world. As subsidiaries of the Ministry of Indus-
try, both the EIDDC and the PAI can cooperate in setting more comprehensive
training programmes for the owners/managers of SSMFs.
(b) More important is the need for those owners/managers to be convinced of the
value of approaching these agencies for help or training. In other words, busi-
nessmen in Egypt usually refrain from approaching Government agencies which
represent, to them, bureaucracy and lengthy procedures. Accordingly, both the
EIDDC and the PAI should take the initiative to approach their would-be clients.
This can be done by issuing leaflets about their activities and sending them to
the owners/managers of SSMFs; also, these agencies' staff may visit those own-
ers/managers in order to explain the services they render and encourage them to
benefit from these facilities.
(c) Concerning the financing of the training programmes, the budgets of both the
EIDDC and the PAI can meet part of the expenses. Also, the trainees may be
charged a certain fee, which should be less than the cost of the programmes in
order to encourage attendance and, at the same time, avoid the abuse of these
programmes should they be free of charge.
3. As regards the difficulties which SSMFs encounter in dealing with Government
agencies, especially the TA and the SIA, these difficulties cannot be eliminated by
decisions from the concerned authorities or by new legislation. As these difficulties
are due to a lack of liaison between those agencies and businessmen, the solution
is to create an atmosphere of liaison and confidence between the two parties. This
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can be achieved via the following:
(a) Training programmes for the tax assessors and the SIA officers on how to deal
with businessmen and gain their confidence.
(b) Simplifying the procedures of dealing with these agencies, namely the required
documents and approvals.
(c) For the businesses which do not keep formal acounting books, tax estimation
should be on an average basis rather than on a one-day sales basis.
(d) Issuing and distributing leaflets which explain the duties and rights of each
party towards the other and the penalties for violating the rules.
(e) Businessmen themselves should be convinced that Government officers are
there to perform certain duties rather than to penalize their clients.
4. Finally, the following suggestions may be useful in encouraging and assisting
SSMFs, as well as benefiting the economy as a whole:
(a) Promoting agro-industries in rural areas depending on the availability of dif-
ferent raw materials in different regions.
(b) Promoting feeder industries which can provide various components to the
producers of durable goods such as cars and household appliances.
(c) Publishing regular statistics about small businesses in the country, especially
in the area of business failure and the reasons for this failure.
(d) The PAI and/or the PAIFZ may collect information about the market (supply,
demand, consumer preference and consumer spending) and make this information
available to the potential investors via information bureaux in different areas.
(e) Setting variable corporate tax rates by establishing different thresholds, cor-
responding to different tax brackets, instead of a uniform tax rate for all business
enterprises large and small.
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12.3.2. Finance-Related Recommendations: 
It has often been recommended that the Government should establish new
financial institutions to specialise in the financing of SSIFs. Such a recommenda-
tion seems to be impractical because: (a) there is the DIB whose main purpose
is to finance SSIFs; (b) the existing banking service in Egypt is not insufficient;
(c) the benefits from establishing new financial institutions are not expected to
justify the costs of their establishment; and (d) establishing new institutions will
place a further burden on the Government's resources which are already stretched
to the limit, or even more than the limit. Hence, the following recommendations
are suggested within the context of the existing banking system, in order for these
recommendations to be more practical.
1. Widening the role of the DIB and strengthening its position via the following
means:
(a) New branches should be established outside the regions where the existing
branches are concentrated, preferably where new industrial estates will be estab-
lished.
(b) As deposits represent a tiny fraction of the DIB's resources, the CBE can help
it in attracting time deposits in order to sustain its loanable funds.
(c) Restricting the finance advanced to LSIFs by the DIB in order to give more
room for the financing of SSIFs, e.g. by confining the financing of LSIFs to local-
currency loans.
(d) The DIB's role in the financing of SSIFs may be confined to MTLT loans and
start-up loans.
(e) The DIB may relax the requirements of collaterals and compensating balances
from SSIFs.
2. It might be suggested that a minimum proportion of bank loans should be
allocated for small business lending, in order to secure enough finance for small
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businesses. Such a suggestion may result in either unused funds, should there be
fewer applicants, or a misuse of funds on the part of banks in order to satisfy
the limit. However, the Government can encourage the banks to lend to SSIFs
by adopting a guarantee scheme similar to the Small Business Loan Guarantee
Scheme in the U.K. In this regard, the Egyptian Government, represented by
the Ministry of Industry, may guarantee the repayment of 50 percent of loans
to SSIFs. Apart from the simplicity of calculation, the rationale for suggesting
a 50 percent guarantee is that less than 50 percent may be less attractive for
both the borrowers and the lenders. On the other hand, more than 50 percent
might lead to abusing the scheme by both the borrowers and the lenders. In other
words, some businesses might borrow excessively depending on the Government's
guarantee and some banks might not take the necessary care in assessing loan
applications depending, also, on the Government's guarantee of these loans.
The implementation of the suggested scheme requires the following:
(a) The lending procedures should be simplified in order to reduce the time which
elapses in assessing the loan application and reaching a decision.
(b) Easing the requirments of collaterals and compensating balances.
(c) Apart from collaterals and compensating balances, the banks should assess
the borrower's creditworthiness as though the scheme were non-existent.
(d) The borrower should sign a declaration that, for the duration of the loan,
he/she will not pledge assets equivalent to those to be pledged should the loan be
secured.
(e) The borrower should have a current account with the same bank.
(f) In case of default, the bank should use all possible means with the borrower,
such as rescheduling the loan, before claiming repayment from the Government.
3. Insurance companies can have a significant role in the financing of industrial
enterprises in general and SSMFs in particular. In this respect, insurance com-
panies may provide lease finance or hire-purchase, as those types of finance are
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insignificant in Egypt; they may also provide loans for the financing of buildings.
Providing finance to SSMFs can achieve dual benefit for insurance companies be-
cause: (a) they achieve profits from the provision of finance to these firms; and (b)
the owners/managers of SSMFs may insure their factories with these companies,
as almost all the surveyed firms have no insurance dealings.
4. As profit-sharing finance from individuals is no longer available for SSMFs, as
well as for all other business enterprises in Egypt, they have to approach Islamic
banks which can represent a significant source of finance for these firms, especially
MTLT finance. However, it might be argued that providing profit-sharing finance
for small businesses is risky for Islamic banks and more expensive for these firms;
such an argument is refutable because:
(a) Unlike commercial banks, Islamic banks are assumed to be risk takers.
(b) If providing profit-sharing finance is riskier than providing interest-bearing
loans, Islamic banks may be compensated by the relatively high return on their
funds.
(c) If obtaining profit-sharing finance is more expensive for SSMFs than obtaining
interest-bearing loans, this relatively high cost may be justified by the safety of
such finance should the business fail or incur loss.
5. The problem of the rising prices of raw materials is a national problem caused
by the inflationary pressures in the economy as a whole. The solution of this
problem can be achieved through macroeconomic policies that are not the concern
of this study.
6. As regards the public-sector monopoly on raw materials used by textile facto-
ries, there are two probabilities and, accordingly, two solutions:
(a) What seems to be monopoly is a shortage of supply because the producers,
both public-sector and private-sector, prefer to export these materials in order to
secure enough foreign currencies for the financing of their imports. In this case,
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there should be Government intervention in order to divert part of these exports
to the local market, especially public-sector exports. This solution has the advan-
tage of solving the problems of textile-producing firms which, in turn, can export
finished goods rather than raw materials. On the other hand, the Government is
required to secure foreign-currency resources for raw-material producers, as they
may need to import some equipment from abroad.
(b) This monopoly is a consequence of public-sector companies being the only
source of these raw materials. In this case, the solution is creating competition
in the market by encouraging private investors to enter the activity of spinning.
If the processing of raw cotton is confined to public-sector companies, this re-
striction should be eased and many private investors may enter the activity of
spinning stimulated by the shortage of supply. This solution is expected to have
the outcome of forcing public-sector companies to improve their product qual-
ity and their marketing policies, as well as eliminating a source of trouble for
private-sector manufacturing firms.
So far the recommendations have been concerned with the supply side of
finance, in the sense that they have been concerned with securing more finance
for small businesses. Equally important is the demand side, i.e. stimulating small
businesses to employ institutional finance. This can be done through the following
methods:
'T. The above-suggested loan guarantee scheme may work as a stimulus for SSIFs
in general, and SSMFs in particular, to employ bank credit. Nevertheless, such
a scheme might be useless in this regard if it is not accompanied by sufficient
publicity. In other words, in order for this scheme to be successful in attracting
small business to employ bank credit, it is a prerequisite that all businessmen
know about it. This can be done as follows:
(a) Advertising the scheme in both the EIDDC and the PAI as well as all bank
branches in the country.
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(b) Using the media to announce the existence of the scheme with details of how
to benefit from it.
(c) The scheme can also be advertised in Government agencies, with which small
businesses often deal, such as the TA.
(d) A leaflet about the scheme can also be enclosed with official correspondence
with small businesses, e.g. letters from the EIDDC, the PAI or the TA.
8. For SSMFs which do not depend on bank credit, the training programmes
suggested earlier may include financial education programmes for the owners/
managers of SSMFs. This can be done as follows:
(a) Explaining the different aspects of both institutional and non-institutional
finance, such as the cost of each type and the different situations in which one or
the other is preferable.
(b) Inviting bank managers to explain the nature of their activities to the trainees.
(c) Bank managers may invite the trainees to visit them in their banks as a pre-
liminary step towards encouraging those businessmen to deal with banks.
(d) All this must be done in an informal atmosphere in order to encourage dis-
cussions and inquiries.
(e) Also, the issue of publicity for these programmes should be stressed.
These programmes, as well as the loan guarantee scheme, can achieve the
following advantages:
(a) Improving the financial knowledge of the owners/managers of SSMFs.
(b) Bridging the information gap experienced by those owners/managers.
(c) Encouraging SSMFs to employ bank credit, i.e. bringing down the invisible
barriers which seperate these firms from banks.
9. For those firms which have at least current accounts with banks, bridging the
information gap can be achieved as follows:
(a) The interest-rate structure must be displayed in every branch of each bank.
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(b) The banks should display leaflets in their branches to advertise the services
which they provide to their customers, especially small businesses.
(c) The banks should advertise in the media more widely the financing services
they render to their customers, especially small businesses.
(d) The banks can also introduce the advisory service to small businesses.
12.4. Suggestions for Further Research: 
As this study was confined to the problems of financing SSMFs in Egypt,
further research can be carried out in the following areas:
(a) The problems of financing small farms.
(b) The effect of agency costs on the financing of small businesses.
(c) Risk/return analysis of profit-sharing finance.
(d) The effect of capital structure on the cost of capital to small businesses.
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Appendices
Appendix One: The Questionnaire
Appendix Two: SSIFs and All Industrial Enterprises in Egypt,
December 1987
Appedix One
The Questionnaire
,
I. General Information:
1. Type of activity.
	
2. Date of starting activity.	
3. Number of workers:
(a) 10 — 24
(b) 25 — 49
4. Legal form:
(a) sole proprietorship
(b) ordinary partnership
(c) limited partnership
II. Financial Information:
5. What is the source(s) of start-up capital?
(a) owner(s)' funds only
(b) owner(s)' funds + loans
(c) owner(s)' funds + trade credit
(d) owner(s)' funds + loans + trade credit
(e) other sources (please specify) 
	
6. If (b) or (d), are those loans from:
(a) family members
(b) friends
(c) the Development Industrial Bank
(d) commercial banks
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(e) other sources (please specify) 	
7. If the business is a partnership, what is the source(s) of the owners' start-up
capital ?
(a) family members
(b) friends
(c) other people
8. Do you depend on bank credit?
(a) yes
(b) no
9. If you depend on bank credit , do you approach more than one bank for a
loan?
(a) yes
(b) no
10. If no, do you go directly to:
(a) the Development Industrial Bank
(b) a specific commercial bank
(c) a specific Islamic bank
(d) another financial institution (please specify) 	
11. Why do you go to this particular institution?
(a) because it is the only available one
(b) because it is the only one you know
(c) because you have had past dealings with it
(d) because it does not deal with interest
(e) other reasons (please specify) 	
12. Do you obtain credit facilities from more than one one bank?
(a) yes
(b) no
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13. If yes, why?
(a) to benefit from the advantages of each bank
(b) because you have changed your lender	 ,
(c) to guarantee the financing of the firm in emergency cases
(d) other reasons (please specify) 	
14. What is the source(s) of short-term finance?
(a) the Development Industrial Bank
(b) commercial banks
(c) raw-material suppliers
(d) other sources (please specify) 	
15. What is the form(s) of short-term finance?
(a) short-term loans
(b) overdrafts
(c) documentary credits
(d) trade credit
16. Does the bank require collateral for short-term loans?
(a) yes
(b) no
17. What is the type(s) of medium-and long-term finance?
(a) retained profits
(b) increasing the firm's equity capital
(c) loans from family members and/or friends
(d) loans from the Development Industrial Bank
(e) loans from commercial banks
(f) profit-sharing finance from individuals and/or Islamic banks
(g) trade credit
(h) loans from the partners
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(i) other sources (please specify)
18. What is the maturity of medium-and long-term loans?
(a) 2 — 5 years
(b) 6 — 10 years
(c) more than 10 years
19. Does the bank require collateral for medium-and long-term loans?
(a) yes
(b) no
20. Does the bank charge you an interest rate which is:
(a) the same as that charged to public-sector companies
(b) higher than that charged to public-sector companies
(c) you don't know
21. Does the bank charge you an interest rate which is:
(a) fixed for the duration of the loan
(b) variable during the duration of the loan
(c) you don't know
22. Do you obtain finance in foreign curruncies?
(a) yes
(b) no
23. If yes, in which form?
(a) short-term loans
(b) overdrafts
(c) documentary credits
(d) medium-and long-term loans
24. Do you face any problems with foreign-currency finance?
(a) yes
(b) no
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25. If yes, what are these problems?
(a) difficult lending terms
(b) insufficient amounts of funds
(c) exchange-rate problems
(d) other problems ( please specify ) 	
26. If you do not depend on bank credit, why not?
(a) because banks refuse to lend to the business
(b) because banks impose difficult terms on the business
(c) because loans are interest-bearing finance
(d) lengthy lending procedures
(e) high interest rates
(f) other reasons (please specify) 	
27. What is the alternative type(s) to bank credit?
(a) retained profits
(b) increasing the firm's equity capital
(c) loans from family members and/or friends
(d) profit-sharing finance from individuals and/or Islamic banks
(e) trade credit
(f) loans from the partners
(g) other sources (please specify) 	
28. Do you depend on lease finance?
(a) yes
(b) no
29. If yes, why?
(a) because it is cheaper than bank loans
(b) because it is more easy to deal with than bank loans
(c) because it is not an interest-bearing type of finance
(d) because it is cheaper than purchase
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(e) other reasons (please specify) 
	
30. What is the source(s) of lease finance?	 ,
(a) public-sector companies
(b) private-sector companies
(c) other sources (please specify) 	
31. If you do not depend on lease finance, why not?
(a) because it is not available
(b) because it is more expensive than bank loans
(c) because you have enough equipment
(d) because you prefer purchase
(e) other reasons (please specify) 	
32. Have you expanded your activity?
(a) yes
(b) no
33. If yes, what is the source(s) for financing this expansion?
(a) retained profits
(b) increasing the firm's equity capital
(c) loans from family members and/or friends
(d) loans from the Development Industrial Bank
(e) loans from commercial banks
(f) profit-sharing finance from individuals and/or Islamic banks
(g) trade credit
(h) loans from the partners
(i) other sources (please specify) 	
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34. Do you obtain finance from insurance companies?
(a) yes
(b) no
35. If yes, in which form?
(a) short-term loans
(b) long-term loans
(c) an equity stake in the firm
36. Do you face any problems in obtaining finance from insurance companies?
_	 (a) yes
(b) no
37. If yes, what are these problems?
(a) difficult lending terms
(b) high interest rates
(c) other problems (please specify) 	
38. What is, in your opinion, the best source(s) of finance?
(a) retained profits
(b) increasing the firm's equity capital
(c) loans from family members and/or friends
(d) loans from the Development Industrial Bank
(e) loans from commercial banks
(f) profit-sharing finance from individuals and/or Islamic banks
(g) trade credit
(h) loans from the partners
(0 other sources (please specify) 
	
39. Why do you prefer this source(s) in particular?
40. If you have any further comments, please add here?
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Appendix Two
SSIFs in Egypt
,
December, 1987.
Governorate Type of
industry
Number of
firms
Number of
workers
Production value
LE million
Alexandria Food 105 2,494 46.37
Textiles 165 3,651 35.55
Chemical 102 2,210 46.86
Engineering 114 2,922 38.82
Construction 29 622 9.67
Mining 2 77 2.55
Petroleum 1 48 2.12
Total 518 12,024 181.94
Beheira Food 20 421 9.94
Textiles 9 186 6.20
Chemical 8 188 7.88
Engineering 17 -	 388 23.76
Construction 24 506 5.05
Mining 1 27 0.04
Total 79 1,716 52.87
Matrouh Food 1 15 0.02
Mining 1 18 0.05
Total 2 33 0.07
Gharbeya Food 33 711 12.98
Textiles 115 2,257 23.63
Chemical 17 350 8.33
Engineering 18 332 3.37
Construction .25 626 7.32
Total 208 4,276 55.63
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Governorate Type of
industry
Number of
firms
Number of
workers
Production value
LE million
Daqahleya Food 21 493	 - 35.24
Textiles 12 258 5.33
Chemical 7 122 2.67
Engineering 33 653 33.19
Construction 23 446 5.85
Tot al 96 1,972 82.28
Kafr El-Sheikh Food
,
8 134 1.05
Textiles 6 84 0.06
Chemical 1 37 1.61
Engineering 1 12 0.05
Construction 11 179 1.48
Mining 1 21 0.03
Total 28 467 4.28
Damietta Food 15 314 5.76
Textiles 5 109 0.67
Chemical 1 13 0.17
Engineering 7 183 2.97
Construction 7 139 7.96
Total 35 758 17.53
Menofeya Food 16 422 5.81
Textiles 2 50 10.09
Chemical 1 35 1.65
Engineering 1 11 0.03
Construction 15 312 3.19
Total 35 830 20.77
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Governorate Type of
industry
Number of
firms
Number of
workers
Production value
LE million
Port Saeid Food 9 220	 - 4.24
Textiles 1 11 0.01
Chemical 1 37 4.97
Engineering 5 151 1.40
Construction 1 29 0.04
Total 17 448 10.66
Suez Food 3 121 2.44
Textiles 2 61 0.51
Chemical 2 36 3.00
Engineering 2 43 0.34
Construction 1 25 0.39
Total 10 286 6.68
Ismaeileya Food 4 77 0.61
Chemical 2 26 0.21
Engineering 3 55 0.15
Construction 4 67 0.59
Total 13 225 1.56
Sharqeya Food 23 582 42.65
Textiles 12 375 21.24
Chemical 19 592 47.62
Engineering 27 778 129.72
Construction 10 462 13.91
Total 91 2,789 255.14
Sinai Textiles 1 18 0.06
Construction 1 18 0.10
Mining 1 35 1.39
Total 3 71 1.55
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Governorate Type of
industry
Number of
firms
Number of
workers
Production value
LE million
Menya Food
Metal
11
1
272	
,
23
11.01
0.22
Total 12 295 11.23
Asiute Food 6 124 2.70
Textiles 2 57 0.18
Chemical 1 14 0.12
Construction 2 48 0.67
Total 11 243 3.67
Sohag Food 7 205 405.79
Textiles 1 18 0.08
Total 8 223 405.87
Qena Food 7 184 11.40
Total 7 184 11.40
Aswan Food 6 186 3.67
Mining 4 71 3.82
Total 10 257 7.49
New Valley Food 1 33 0.07
Total 1 33 0.07
Fayoum Food 1 14 0.01
Textiles 1 12 0.19
Chemical 3 50 2.02
Engineering 3 45 2.05
Construction 2 32 0.15
Mining 1 23 0.16
Total 11 176 4.58
,
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Governorate Type of
industry
Number of
firms
Number of
workers
Production value
LE million
Beni Suef Food 3 54	 " 2.27
Chemical 1 11 0.05
Construction 8 124 2.18
Mining 1 24 0.15
Total 13 213 4.65
Cairo Food 178 4,842 161.00
Textiles 475 9,727 124.05
Chemical 246 4,933 280.65
Engineering 371 7,686 125.93
Construction 66 1,419 23.49
Metal 1 47 1.56
Mining 2 57 0.17
Total 1,339 28,711 716.85
Giza Food 48 1,364 101.01
Textiles 32 653 9.69
Chemical 44 995 109.25
Engineering 55 1,248 42.02
Construction 47 839 20.97
Mining 2 70 0.79
Total 228 5,169 283.73
Qaliubeya Food 27 702 48.07
Textiles 222 4,920 22.93
Chemical 55 1,380 37.37
Engineering 64 1,452 41.30
Construction 19 441 8.45
Total 387 8,895 158.12
Total SSIFs 3,162 70,294 2,298.62
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All Industrial Enterprises in Egypt
Decmber, 1987
Sectors Number of
firms
Number of
workers
Production value
LE million
All private-sector
industrial enterprises 9,551 219,680 13,390.0.
All public-sector
industrial enterprises 872 579,213 9,722.7
source:, Public Authority for Industrialization (PAI), Cairo, January, 1988.
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